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4th Down: When to Go for It and Why
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/05/upshot/4th-down-when-to-go-for-it-and-why.html?_r=0
This post is meant to be a quick tutorial on fourth-down strategy, neatly summarized in the chart above. (You can also read a post that explains the history of me — the NYT 4th Down Bot.)
First, the No. 1 lesson from my 10 years of data analysis about what to do on fourth down: Teams need to go for it much more often than they do. It does get a little complicated toward the end of games, but coaches should almost always consider going for it.
In a reasonably close game, and any time until the last 10 minutes of the fourth quarter — when time and score become even more important considerations — here are my recommendations.
In General
Coaches traditionally punt or kick on fourth downs, a convention inherited from the days when scores of 7-6 and 10-9 weren’t uncommon and a punt was more likely to pin an opponent on his side of the field. The modern N.F.L. is starkly different. It’s a pass-happy league in which offenses can zip up and down the field, easily gaining back the field position a punt may have purchased.
Touchdowns are obviously worth more than twice the points of a field goal. But a key and often overlooked consideration is that, despite the high accuracy of today’s kickers, field goals are not automatic. Coaches often behave as if they were.
Punts are no longer as valuable as they once were — the more freely offenses can move down the field, the less important field position becomes — and field goals aren’t as valuable as squishy human brains perceive, so that leaves the go-for-it option looking better every day.
More than half of all plays in the N.F.L. gain 4 or more yards, which means the numbers are on the offense’s side and a conversion is more likely than not. That’s why it frequently makes sense to go for it.
Near your own goal line, going for it on fourth-and-1 is better than punting: You’ll probably make the first down; if you don’t, your opponent will have good field position, but a punt would have given your opponent pretty good field position anyway. Near your opponent’s goal line, going for it is better because your opponent is left with poor field position even if you fail — and you’ll often get the ball back near midfield in short order.
As a rule of thumb:
On fourth-and-1, go for it any place on the field where that is possible, starting at your 9-yard line.
On fourth-and-2, go for it everywhere beyond your 28-yard line.
On fourth-and-3, go for it almost everywhere beyond your 40.
As the down-to-go distance increases, your chances of successfully converting a first down become smaller — and the decisions become more nuanced. On fourth-and-medium, punting is a good idea close to your end zone, and kicking a field goal is wise closer to your opponent’s. But around midfield, depending on the distance you have to go, I still recommend that coaches go for it.
Again, those rules of thumb, which vary depending on the specific teams involved:
On fourth-and-4, go for it between your 45 and your opponent’s 29.
On fourth-and-5, go for it between midfield and your opponent’s 33.
On fourth-and-6, go for it between your opponent’s 47 and your opponent’s 35.
As the yards-to-go increases, the low risk of succeeding on fourth down makes punting or kicking a field goal a wiser option for most places on the field, except in that nether region where you’re barely out of field-goal range but too close to punt. There, the risk of missing a field goal is too high, and the field position advantage you gain by punting is not as positive, especially if you punt in the end zone.
On fourth-and-7, go for it between your opponent’s 44 and your opponent’s 36.
On fourth-and-8, go for it between your opponent’s 41 and your opponent’s 37.
On fourth-and-9, the only place I recommend going for it is around your opponent’s 38.
Continue reading the main storyOn fourth-and-10 and worse, I don’t recommend rewarding your offense with another down.
Punting vs. Kicking
In general, if the numbers do not favor going for the first down, I recommend attempting a field goal rather than punting anywhere inside the opponent’s 37-yard line.
In the Final Minutes
My rules of thumb apply only before the time remaining becomes a critical consideration. If a game gets to that point, I use a more advanced method for weighing the options, but my recommendations are still based on the data.
Things to Remember
Finally, one strategy and one caveat that will help you sound smart or, at the very least, help you avoid embarrassment:
First, considering my aggressive recommendations on fourth-and-short, your third-down strategy should change as well. Given that I recommend going for it on fourth-and-1 in all cases — and that you’ll usually make it — designing a play to gain, say, 5 yards on third-and-6 can make more sense. Richard Thaler, the University of Chicago economist who’s a friend of mine (really), offers this advice to coaches: “When you cross midfield, pretend your punter is hurt. It will improve the calls on both 3rd and 4th downs.”
Second, my model is for an average N.F.L. team: a baseline from which to deviate. Having a league-leading offense, a terrible punter or a Hall of Fame kicker means that a data-literate coach would adjust accordingly. My recommendations are the starting point — not the final word — for decision making.
Here’s an example: In Week 15 of the 2013 season, down by one with 43 seconds remaining in the game, the Baltimore Ravens had a fourth-and-8 on the Lions’ 43. A field goal — 61 yards, very long even in the N.F.L. — would have won the game, but my data told me it was very unlikely to succeed (a 15 percent chance, on average). I recommended going for it. But the Ravens didn’t have an average kicker. They had Justin Tucker, an excellent kicker, who made the field goal and won the game. My report disapproved, in part because it was based on kickers worse than Justin Tucker.
That game was an exception, though. My recommendations will apply to most teams in most circumstances. They’ll help you figure out when your team’s coach — or your most hated team’s coach — is hurting his team.
Get used to it. It will happen a whole lot over the next five months.
Agamemnonhttp://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/11/28/fourth-downs/post.html#how-wp-is-calculated
How Coaches and the NYT 4th Down Bot Compare
By Brian Burke and Kevin QuealyEven the boldest N.F.L. coaches can turn timid on fourth down. When a team fails to pick up enough yards on third down, coaches are faced with a few options. They can decide to kick the ball (by either punting or attempting a field goal) or they can decide to go for it. Going for it is risky – if they fail, they risk ridicule by every TV analyst, armchair quarterback and cabdriver in the country. Kicking is the safe, more conventional choice.
But is it the right one?
That’s where NYT 4th Down Bot comes in. It evaluates whether an N.F.L. team should punt, attempt a field goal or go for it on fourth down, in any situation. To make its decision, NYT 4th Down Bot uses a model developed by Brian Burke, founder of AdvancedNFLStats.com. According to the model (and thus, according to NYT 4th Down Bot), coaches are much more conservative than they should be.
NYT 4th Down Bot works on the premise that for most of the game, a coach should be trying to maximize the point spread between his team and his opponent – that is, scoring as many points as possible while suppressing his opponent’s opportunities for points. Later in the game, other factors come into play (more details on that below), but when the score is reasonably close in the first three quarters and early in the fourth, point maximization is the name of the game.
Here is a comparison of how a coach who truly maximizes points would behave on any fourth down anywhere on the field. On the right, the same chart showing how coaches have actually behaved since 2002.
The bot’s recommendations may seem aggressive, but they are the results of an analysis of N.F.L. games since 2000, including the success rate of fourth-down attempts and the value of having the ball at different places on the field.
The difference is stark: coaches are much more conservative than they should be if they are truly trying to score as many points as possible. Too often, coaches forfeit the ball through a punt, for instance, when they have a solid chance to make a first down. The field position they gain from the punt is often not worth the missed opportunity to keep a drive going.
Perhaps the most common mistake coaches make is punting or kicking a field goal on fourth and only a few yards. Recent football history suggests teams should often go for it on fourth and short even deep inside their own half of the field. By punting, they guarantee the other team will have the ball with good field position. By going for it, they are risking giving their opponents fabulous field position – but with the potential reward of keeping the ball.
Obviously, the best strategy varies, depending on a team’s strengths and weaknesses. But the overall pattern seems clear: coaches are far too conservative.
How does NYT 4th Down Bot decide?
NYT 4th Down Bot uses thousands of N.F.L. plays since 2000 to calculate the average number of points each situation is worth, a measure called expected points. (Expected points and its application to fourth downs is not new. It was created in 1971 by former N.F.L. quarterback Virgil Carter and Robert E. Machol and has been improved and refined in various ways since, notably with the book “The Hidden Game of Football” and David H. Romer’s signature 2002 paper. NYT 4th Down Bot’s model is similar to Mr. Romer’s, but has more seasons of data behind it.)
With about 10 minutes left in the fourth quarter, NYT 4th Down Bot switches from maximizing points to maximizing win percentage. Win percentage measures how often teams who punted, attempted a field goal or went for a first down won the game. (This measure is more useful later in the game because it is easier to measure the impact of a single play on a game’s outcome.)
Um, expected points?The measure assigns a single point value to any game situation, based on how likely a team is to score from that field position. Below is a chart of expected points on an average first down, depending on where on the field the first down is.
Goal102030405040302010Goal-1.00+1.0+2.0+3.0+4.0+5.0+6.0Expected points on 1st and 10The chart is straightforward: the closer to the opponent’s end zone, the likelier it is a team will score. Near your own goal line, the expected points dips below zero: from that far back, your opponent is more likely to score next than you are. As you approach your opponent’s end zone, the expected points approach 7, the value of a touchdown and extra point.
How about an example?Consider a hypothetical situation of fourth-and-10 on your opponent’s 38-yard line.
Option 1: Field goal attempt
A field goal is worth 3 points, if it’s successful. But there is a catch: after scoring, you must kick off to your opponent, which, on average, will begin its drive on the 22-yard line. Judging from the chart above, a first-and-10 from your 22 is worth about 0.4 points. To NYT 4th Down Bot, a field goal is worth 3 points minus the cost of kicking off: 3 – 0.4 = 2.6 points. (Similarly, a touchdown and extra point is worth 7 – 0.4 = 6.6 points.)What if the kicker misses? It’s a long field goal, about 55 yards, and the success rate of 55-yard field goals is only about 40 percent.
If the kick is no good, the opponent takes over on its 45-yard line. From our chart above, a first-and-10 from there is worth about 1.8 points. In this case, however, it is a first down for your opponent, so the point value from your perspective is –1.8 points.
NYT 4th Down Bot uses the expected points from success, the expected points from failure and the likelihood of each outcome to compute the net value of a decision.
On average, a 55-yard field goal attempt is worth -0.02 points.
Option 2: Go for it
Say you go for it and get the first down, but just barely — advancing the ball to your opponent’s 28. From our chart above, that is worth about 3.5 points. But if you fail, say, with an incomplete pass, your opponent takes over on its 38. That’s worth about -1.3 points to you.NYT 4th Down Bot’s best estimate of success is about 35 percent, so going for it on fourth-and-10 from your opponent’s 38 is worth 0.36 points.
Option 3: Punt
Finally, you could punt. Even though there are good punts, bad punts and botched punts, punting does not succeed or fail — the ball just moves down the field and the opponent takes over.From the 38, the average net punt is about 24 yards, giving your opponent the ball at its own 14. From our chart above, that is worth +0.04 points for your opponent, or -0.04 points for you.
How do our choices compare?NYT 4th Down Bot looks at all three options and gives its recommendation: Go for it!
Option Expected points
Go for it +0.36 points
Punt –0.04 points
Field goal –0.10 pointsDoes that mean coaches should go for it every time they have a fourth-and-10 on their opponent’s 38? Not necessarily. If there is a strong tailwind, or the coach has a great kicker, he might adjust his estimate for making a field goal. If he has a Pro Bowl punter, the likelihood of pinning the opponent inside the 5-yard line might increase, which would boost the value of punting. But for an average fourth-and-10 from your opponent’s 38, NYT 4th Down Bot will recommend going for it every time.
But what about late in the game?When might a team prefer a strategy other than maximizing points? Certainly, as the end of the game nears, winning becomes more important than getting more points.
Here is another example: Say your team is down by 5 points with two minutes remaining. It is fourth-and-8 on the 50. Here is the table of expected points for that situation:
Option Expected points
Punt –0.26 points
Go for it –0.30 points
Field goal –2.49 pointsPunting and going for it are nearly equal options here, and if you only cared about point maximization, you might consider them as roughly equivalent. But in reality, if you do not score again, you lose. You need to go for it. NYT 4th Down Bot thinks so, too.
To calculate which decision gives a team the best shot at winning, it determines how often N.F.L. teams have won in relevant situations from several seasons’ worth of games. Obviously, some situations are rarer than others, so when the sample is too small to make a reasonable calculation, NYT 4th Down Bot broadens its search a little.
But at its core, win percentage is a measure of how often teams in a certain situation can expected to win the game if they punt, attempt a field goal or go for it.
Let’s look at the calculations for win percentage in this situation:
Option Expected points Teams doing this would win…
Go for it –0.30 points 17% of the time
Punt –0.26 points 9% of the time
Field goal –2.49 points 4% of the timeIn general, things are not looking good for your team. You are probably going to lose. But going for it instead of punting nearly doubles the small chance you do have, to 17 percent from 9 percent.
Does NYT 4th Down Bot offer a rigid set of rules for how N.F.L. coaches should behave? No. It is, however, an argument that coaches could benefit from being bolder on fourth down.
When the 4th Down Bot Can Be Wrong
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The 4th Down Bot is, alas, not perfect. There are known situations that can confuse it. For example, the new overtime rules have not been in effect long enough for it to accumulate a large sample of past situations. At the moment, it bases all its recommendations in overtime using traditional sudden death rules.
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NYT 4th Down Bot may also be in error when there is an extreme mismatch in team strength. The estimates used by the underlying model are a baseline for league-average teams.
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Finally, on some occasions near the end of the first half, the value of kicking off is not as high, and the models may therefore undervalue the effect of scoring. Still, NYT 4th Down Bot can be relied on to make the best recommendations for the vast majority of situations.The Math Behind the Robot
NYT Fourth Down Bot is based on a statistical model created from more than 10 years of data from real NFL plays. Read more
Live Updates On Game Day
Second guess your team‘s coach in real time — follow NYT Fourth Down Bot on Twitter. Agamemnonhttps://twitter.com/NYT4thDownBot
It’s 4th-and-8 for the Packers from the Chiefs’ 46. I would go for it.
— NYT 4th Down Bot (@NYT4thDownBot) September 29, 2015
AgamemnonThat is probably the best MATH out there for going for it, kicking a FG, or punting.
Here are a couple things that apply across all games, not just football and that can trump incremental advantages in percentages.
If it is 4th and goal and you haven’t scored yet, kick the FG. You need to get on the scoreboard.
If a play can lose the game and not win it, it is a bad play.
If a play can win the game, it is almost always a good decision to go for it.
You need to be comfortable with your decision. For those times when it is almost too close to call, go with what feels right to you.
It pays to be aggressive. Almost all players could benefit from being more aggressive. If you are not comfortable with this, you may never be able to use it to your advantage.
That is all for now. 😉
AgamemnonIn general, I tend to agree with everything in that first article.
Oftentimes, those “go for it, or dont” decisions
dont really decide the game though. Its usually
the three obvious things:
Execution
Talent
Turnoversw
vw
vMaximizing your decisions is something you can do all the time. It is compliments the other parts of the game. Execution, Talent, TOs, etc.
Maximizing your decisions could well add 3-7 points to your score over what not maximizing could give you.
This is really about what happens after your 3 obvious things have gotten you to a decision point and the game outcome could hang on your decision. imo
AgamemnonROSS TUCKER FOOTBALL PODCAST with Brian Burke
Analytics expert Brian Burke discusses the numbers behind going for it on 4th down and going for two points two more often in the NFL.
“You should go for 2 about half the time.”
The next things for analiytics is roster building(models) and player evaluation(salary cap stuff,?draft), everything that happens on the field. What works against what defense.
Agamemnon
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