LA Rams Film Room: What To Expect From New HC Sean McVay On Offense

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  • #63746
    Avatar photoAgamemnon
    Participant

    http://www.turfshowtimes.com/2017/1/17/14277488/la-rams-film-room-scouting-report-new-head-coach-sean-mcvay-offensive-scheme

    LA Rams Film Room: What To Expect From New HC Sean McVay On Offense

    The Washington Footballers have overachieved on offense over the past few years, considering their quarterback situation. Can new head coach Sean McVay replicate that success with the Rams?
    by QBKlass Jan 17, 2017, 10:30am CST

    Former Washington Footballers Offensive Coordinator Sean McVay is one of the most exciting head coaching hires in recent memory.

    On a macro level, it’s exciting for the league as a whole because McVay is the youngest head coaching hire in league history and will be bringing his youthful pep to Los Angeles, hopefully to help revive the NFL fan base in the city. For the Rams at the micro level, McVay could be the one to make the Rams young, expensive offense look the way it is supposed to.

    Assuming McVay had a strong influence in Washington’s system installation, game planning and play calling last year, the style of offense that he is bringing over is good news for quarterback Jared Goff. Washington’s offense last year was about as close to a true “spread” offense as an NFL can get. Considering Goff played in Cal’s “Bear Raid” system for three years in college, McVay’s spread-out attack should give Goff the conditions he needs to succeed.
    Vertical Game

    McVay likes to stretch the field vertically. If executed well enough, the vertical game will open up room underneath for easier throws in that area, and it will soften up the box for the running back. Defenses are willing to force fifteen-play drives, but they do not want to give up big plays, so forcing a defense to respect the threat of a big play down the field will make the rest of the offense run smoother.

    Three or four verticals is the simplest way to attack down the field. It is a staple of aggressive offenses in all ranks of football, from high school to the NFL. McVay adds two interesting twists to this tried and true concept in this clip, one to the strong side and one to the weak side. Let’s start with the strong side.

    The strong side of the formation (three receiver side) has the less drastic change. Normally on three or four verts, all three receivers on the strong side of the formation will go vertical and the inner two receivers will take slight bends inside at about 16-20 yards deep, while the outside receiver stays outside and strictly vertical so as to force the deep safety to choose between splitting receivers.

    In this instance, the outside receiver takes an inside release to his vertical stem, then breaks off into a ‘dig’ (deep-in) route over the heart of the field. With the deep safety focused on the vertical routes, that ‘dig’ route is a 1-on-1 battle unless one of the underneath defenders drops deep.

    McVay doesn’t allow that to happen. Linebacker Damien Wilson, who showed blitz off the left edge before the snap, trotted back into coverage after the snap. Normally, Wilson would have gained more depth that he did and drifted toward the middle of the field or followed the running back out of the backfield, but the Washington receiver running a shallow crosser distracted Wilson and got him to bite forward. The same goes for Dallas’ strong side safety, who rotated down from a Cover 2 look into a shallow zone. His job is to flow down into the heart of that three receiver set and look for work, but when they all took vertical stems, he saw the crosser and saw where Cousins was looking, he bit on the short route.

    But wait, there’s more! The shallow crossing route is normally a vertical route for verticals concepts. Most of the time, that player is another vertical threat that the safety has to worry about and adds one more option for the quarterback to choose, theoretically giving the quarterback better odds of someone getting open. What the shallow crosser does is make the read unclear for the linebacker, as stated previously. If that receiver were to have gone vertical, the linebacker would have had one clear read: follow the back out of the backfield or drop into an intermediate zone if the back stays in pass protection. The crosser seemingly confused Wilson into thinking there would be a coverage switch with himself and the cornerback, so Wilson followed the crosser, leaving the running back wide open. (Of course, Cousins was oblivious as could be.)

    This play is a bit less fancy, but it does showcase something that Washington’s offense did a lot with McVay at the helm. McVay loved to call vertical combinations with three receivers on the same side of the field—it’s no coincidence that the last play was exactly that. Three vertical stems coming from the same side of the field, especially with as tightly bunched as McVay often had them, can create for some weird combinations and angles that defenses aren’t used to seeing all that often.

    For one, McVay makes it tougher for the defense to predict who is going where because the receivers’ stems intertwine at the line of scrimmage. Tight end Jordan Reed, wide receiver Jamison Crowder and wide receiver DeSean Jackson are lined up in that order from left-to-right before the snap, but switch into a line up of Jackson, Reed and Crowder from left-to-right by the time the most vertical player is about seven yards down the field. It’s a massive mix up that causes the defense to rethink their assignments.

    The vertical stems force the defense to retreat, and the middle of the field linebacker is locked onto the quarterback’s eyes, so he naturally drifts toward the middle of the field as Cousins’ eyes do. Cousins should have known that the vertical stems, as well as the down and distance (3rd-and-14ish), would force the defense to back off, allowing him to look off the linebacker real quick and hit Reed near the sticks. Of course, 3rd-and-14ish is not going to be converted most of the time, but this play design did give the play a chance, at least as much of a chance as one can hope for on 3rd-and-14ish.
    Bunch Sets

    Washington’s offense featured bunch sets often last year. Whether it was to create unique angles in the vertical game or to spur confusion in the short-to-intermediate area, Washington utilized a lot of tight three receiver sets to catch the defense out of position. In using these bunch sets, McVay often had the receivers intertwine their route stems as soon as the ball was snapped. Upper echelon defenses will not be phased too much by the mix ups, but for most defenses, the slight pause that reevaluating one’s assignment takes is enough for the quarterback to find an open receiver.

    Washington’s offense featured plenty of motion, too, like in the play above. McVay would often motion players in or out of these tight three receiver sets.

    After the running back (Chris Thompson) is motioned into the bunch set, Washington runs a curl/flat combo with Thompson and wide receiver Jamison Crowder. Crowder is running the curl, while Thompson sprints out to the flat. Over the top of Crowder, wide receiver Pierre Garcon is running a ‘dig’ route. This combination was a perfect counter to the Steelers’ blitz, and would have been a nice combination even without the opposing blitz.

    The Steelers are running Cover 3 with a unique four-man rush. Instead of rushing both outside linebackers, the Steelers only rushed their strong side linebacker, stunted the two interior linemen to the weak side and blitzed inside linebacker Lawrence Timmons through the strong side. With the blitz, the coverage is naturally shifted at the snap. Whereas the two middle linebackers would normally man the middle of the field, the blitz forces the two intermediate zone players to start their play from the weak side (weak side inside linebacker and weak side outside linebacker dropping off the line of scrimmage).

    Washington’s route combo nullified the blitz. With the strong side hook/curl area vacated because of the blitz, that weak side inside linebacker has a lot of ground to cover from his pre-snap alignment to where Crowder ends up stopping for his curl route. The linebacker’s real bind, though, is the ‘dig’ route. He sees the vertical stem and knows that he can’t let anyone beat him over the top, so he hesitates before attacking Crowder on the curl route. The moment of hesitation was all that Cousins needed to find Crowder in time.

    Now, let’s get hypothetical real quick. Had the linebacker gunned straight for Crowder, he would have been able to either stop the play there or break up the pass. That being said, he would have left the strong side cornerback out to dry. ‘Dig’ routes are tough to cover to begin with because the cornerback can’t use the sideline to his advantage- it’s a route over the heart of the field. On this play, the cornerback would have been especially screwed because the receiver’s tight alignment to the formation created a natural cushion between the receiver and the Steelers’ deep third zone. The linebacker did the right thing by preventing the bigger play, but this concept had great potential for the offense.
    Adjusting to Opponent

    The mark of a good coordinator is not just the base scheme or flow of play calling, but how both of those things are altered for different opponents. Some defenses are going to blitz more, some defenses are going to play more man-to-man, some defenses will play different amounts of different zone coverages, and so on and so forth. No two defenses can be attacked exactly the same way.

    The Vikings like to run Cover 2 and 2-Man coverage a fair amount. The shallow coverages coupled with Minnesota’s impressive pass rush often forces quarterbacks to panic, and that’s exactly what Mike Zimmer (or any coach) wants. This play from Washington is a nasty counter for those coverages, though.

    On this play, it looks like the Vikins are running a hybrid coverage. To the strong side (left), the Vikings appear to be playing man coverage with the two cornerbacks to that side with a safety playing a deep half over the top of them. To the weak side (right), the Vikings appear to be running true Cover 2 coverage, where the cornerback is playing the vertical stem until the break and then playing the flat, the linebackers play middle of the field zones and a safety plays a deep half over the top.

    Washington’s route combination to the strong side of the field creates a clear 1-on-1 for Cousins, both due to alignment and due to displacement of defenders by other routes.

    In essence, the same route combo is being ran on both sides: one receiver gets deep then breaks left, while another receiver runs underneath them in the opposite direction. On the field side (left side and man side), the ‘out’ route takes the deep safety out of the equation before the route is even ran. Considering how much the receiver (Crowder) pressed to the sideline, the safety on that side of the field would have been gambling by sprinting to the boundary to make a play on the ball, not to mention there is a lot of ground to cover there anyway.

    With the safety taken out of the equation by alignment, the other obstacle is the other cornerback, but since he is in man coverage and trails the underneath receiver over the middle of the field, he is no longer an obstacle, either. At that point, it’s up to Crowder to beat his man and Cousins to drill the throw. Both Washington players did their jobs and executed a beautiful play.
    Marrying Shotgun Running with Todd Gurley’s Play Style

    One of the biggest questions heading into the head coaching search was whether or not the Rams would get someone who could maximize their star offensive player, running back Todd Gurley. After a stunning start to his rookie season, Gurley has taken a tumble, largely due to poor offensive line play and bland offensive structure.

    Gurley is a downhill runner. He’s best when he can get moving downhill without thinking or dancing too much. At the University of Georgia and in his first two seasons with the Rams, Gurley became accustomed to running behind a fullback or a pulling guard. Normally these sorts of running plays happen out of 21 or 22 personnel and start under center. The problem is that quarterback Jared Goff plays a completely opposite brand of football.

    Coming out of Cal’s “Bear Raid”, Goff is used to playing almost exclusively from the shotgun and executing spread route combinations. There is nothing wrong with that in and of itself, but when juxtaposed with Gurley’s old school, power football style of play, it becomes a problem. Luckily, McVay can marry the two young players’ styles about as well as possible.

    As has been highlighted in the many plays above, McVay’s passing offense looks like a collegiate offense. There are a lot of four or five receiver sets out of the shotgun and repeated vertical attacks, coupled with easy and effective short throws. That being said, McVay calls for the quarterback to work plenty under center, too. McVay weaves zone running with his bootleg game, as well as man blocking run concepts and more downhill running concepts, even out of the shotgun. McVay’s rushing offense was not more multiple than, say, Anthony Lynn’s in Buffalo last season, but it is more intriguing than what the Rams ran last season.

    Gurley will have to be more decisive than Rob Kelley was on this play, but this is a concept that has Gurley written all over it. If the Rams want to sustain some unpredictability, they’re going to need to find ways to run the ball out of the shotgun. This is how to do it.

    McVay did not call this play too often because Kelley was generally good at executing zone schemes, so Washington leaned that way with him. This concept is a necessity for Gurley and Goff, though: it can keep Goff in the shotgun and not tip run play with Goff under center, while still giving Gurley the downhill power concepts that he likes.

    Washington pulled the left guard and had tight end Jordan Reed flow to the heart of the formation to be a lead blocker. Kelley was given a lead guard and a pseudo fullback in Reed. Even if running out of the shotgun is not Gurley’s fantasy, this is the best way to make him feel comfortable there.
    Red Zone Woes

    Washington had one of the most efficient offenses in football. All throughout the year, they were able to march down the field at will, even with Captain CheckDown playing quarterback. Per DVOA, Washington’s offense was 5th in the league in passing and 4th on the ground, good for an overall 5th place offense. There is no denying that Washington had an effective offense.

    There is also no denying that Washington struggled severely in the red zone. Only the Texans and the Jets had worse touchdown percentages in the red zone than Washington did. Washington converted just 46% of their red zone trips into touchdowns. For reference, the Browns (55%) and the Lions (54%) were the two most average teams for red zone conversions.

    No one man is fully to blame for Washington’s repeated collapses in the red zone, but McVay is not without fault. Washington’s offense struggled to adjust to the red zone because it is a compact area. When playing in the middle of the field, there is a lot more room that the defense has to account for. In the red zone, the back of the end zone is the defense’s friend; it allows the safeties to play more aggressively downhill and not be forced to cover as much ground in the back end. Naturally, that creates tighter windows for the quarterback.

    When Washington got down to the red zone, they often remained in four receiver sets and tried to spread defenses out. The problem is that spreading the defense our requires the defense to need to cover a lot of space, but with the field condensed, they no longer have to, so many of the advantages of spreading out the defense are nullified. Spreading the defense out can still work in the red zone—because anything can work if executed well—but it should not be the primary attack.

    With as often as Washington tried to spread the defense out in the red zone, defenses continually gave Cousins the easy throws and then swarmed to make the tackle short of the sticks. Had Cousins been more aggressive and capable of fitting tight windows, Washington’s spread approach to the red zone could have been fine, but Cousins is not that type of quarterback and McVay needed to do a better job of understanding who he had at quarterback and adjusting to that.

    To McVay’s credit, Washington’s offense did start to sort out their red zone struggles near the end of the season. McVay began calling for more in-breaking iso routes, as well as doing more to create natural picks and get receivers open without having to actually beat a defender. Still, Washington was only average in the red zone when they were at their best there. Hopefully McVay learns from Washington’s 2016 red zone struggles and rethinks his approach for the Rams.
    Outlook in Los Angeles

    Sean McVay won’t have near the talent that he had at his disposal in Washington. Washington’s receivers were far superior (especially as vertical threats), the offensive line was more reliable and Cousins had years of experience in the offense that Goff won’t have off the bat.

    McVay’s biggest adjustment will be running his offense without DeSean Jackson. Jackson is the league’s deadliest deep threat and opened up so much for Washington’s offense. Defenses have to give him the utmost respect as a vertical threat because one wrong step can result in a touchdown for Jackson. Jackson was the ‘X’ factor for Washington’s offense and McVay won’t have anything like that in Los Angeles.

    In a perfect world, McVay finds a way to turn Tavon Austin into a legitimate deep threat. To this point, Austin has not had the skills to separate from NFL defenders without the help of scheming. With a scheming stud like McVay, Austin is the most likely to become a playmaker in the passing game. But to be fully clear: Tavon Austin is not DeSean Jackson.

    The Rams are still going to be bad on offense in 2017. McVay shouldn’t be penalized for that. Every position on the Rams offense is bottom-five in the league, sans running back. It’s going to take time before this offense can be reloaded again because the trade for Goff drained the Rams of draft capital in the 2016 and 2017 NFL Drafts. Sean McVay deserves a long leash until the Rams have capable offensive talent, then his true test will come.

    For now, McVay needs to simply prove that he is more creative and less lethargic than the past coaching staff.

    There are videos at the site that illustrate the points in the post. You will have to visit the site to see them.

    Agamemnon

    #63758
    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    Washington’s offense last year was about as close to a true “spread” offense as an NFL can get. Considering Goff played in Cal’s “Bear Raid” system for three years in college, McVay’s spread-out attack should give Goff the conditions he needs to succeed.

    McVay likes to stretch the field vertically.

    Interesting. McVay isn’t your typical WCO guy. Typically, the WCO is a horizontal passing game featuring short passes where receivers run outs and crossing patterns and rely on ‘picks’ to get separation.

    McVay doesn’t take that approach. He likes to stretch the field.

    Cool.

    • This reply was modified 7 years, 11 months ago by Avatar photonittany ram.
    #63809
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    McVay likes to stretch the field vertically.

    Okay let me look at that (I am actually typing this before looking).

    Percentage of total attempts thrown 31+ yards: %4.37.

    That’s not a high percentage. It’s not low. It’s just not high.

    Completion percentage on those? (31+ yards). 44%. That’s pretty good.

    How about medium/deep medium? That is passes thrown 11-30 yards.

    Percentage of total attempts thrown 11-30 yards: %25.9%. That’s pretty high. Above the norm by a percent or 2.

    Completion percentage on those? (11-30 yards). 52.7%. That’s also pretty good.

    Now how about throwing short? Percentage of total attempts thrown 10 yards or less: 69.7%. Actually that’s fairly high by a percent or 2.

    So they have a slightly higher than the norm percentage of attempts thrown short, and a not that high percentage of attempts thrown deep (31+ yards).

    Completion percentage thrown short is 75%. Which is pretty good.

    Their YPA was 7.8. 2nd best in the league. But IMO that doesn’t come from throwing deep more. It comes from completing a lot short and then also completing a fair amount medium/deep medium.

    Maybe it was Cousins but the numbers don’t show a deep passing team.

    They do attack the midranges though, in ways the Rams just haven’t the last few years. BUT the Rams threw deep more than Cousins/Washington did.

    #63825
    Avatar photoInvaderRam
    Moderator

    i understood almost none of that. all i care about is that goff understands this offense and is able to execute it.

    They do attack the midranges though, in ways the Rams just haven’t the last few years. BUT the Rams threw deep more than Cousins/Washington did.

    if true, i’ll take that. that’d actually be my preference.

    and hopefully gurley can get back to his 2015 self and mcvay is able to fold that into the offense.

    #63871
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    All 22: Sean McVay’s Offense

    Rams Insider Myles Simmons reviews and breaks down the tape from Sean McVay’s time as offensive coordinator at the Washington Redskins.

    http://www.therams.com/videos/videos/All-22-Sean-McVays-Offense/445f4e2b-81a8-4ee7-b78f-b655c7f9c8f5

    #64045
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    Jared Goff says Rams can run Redskins’ deep passing offense under Sean McVay

    Eric Edholm

    http://sports.yahoo.com/news/jared-goff-says-rams-can-run-redskins-deep-passing-offense-under-sean-mcvay-185504499.html

    Jared Goff has had time to rest up from a trying first season, let his body heal, spend a little time in Mexico with his friends … but now he’s ready to go back to work. He has a new head coach, a new offensive system and new perspective heading into his first full offseason of work in the NFL.

    The Los Angeles Rams quarterback spent much of last season waiting his turn (for much of it as the team’s third quarterback) before starting the final seven games of the season and still seeking his first victory in the league. He’ll be doing it under his third head coach following the firing of Jeff Fisher, and with interim coach John Fassel being replaced by 30-year-old, first-time head coach Sean McVay.

    Goff is now back in Los Angeles (more on that below), and he’s excited to get working with McVay on a new direction offensively.

    “He’s ready, ready to get this thing turned around, as am I,” Goff told Shutdown Corner Friday night. “We’ve talked now a few times since he’s been hired, and it’s a great start.”

    Goff met with McVay before and after the new coach was hired, and he was the only coach Goff met with during the Rams’ interview process — which might say a lot about how impressive McVay with the team’s brass.

    “I thought after that first meeting, if he gets the job I am completely on board,” Goff said. “I was very, very pleased. Now the hard work begins.”

    Goff believes the Rams’ offense can have the same type of feel as the system McVay ran with the Washington Redskins.

    “I think we’re going to do a lot of what they did last year: a lot of downfield passing stuff,” Goff said of the Redskins’ offense, which ranked second in the NFL in yards per pass play and passing yards per game. “I think that’s obviously transferable here.”

    Goff had no idea at the time, but starting early last season he would be watching tape of opposing defenses, and he said it seemed that every other week he was getting a look at what the Redskins and quarterback Kirk Cousins did offensively.

    “I kept saying, either to myself or to the other quarterbacks in the room, ‘Hey, man, I really like this. I like what they do.’ I had no idea [McVay] would be bringing that here at the time,” Goff said. “Great concepts, lots of variety, great execution. It’s all there.

    “Now I get to run that. You could see Kirk making tough throws, but they were scheming stuff up to get guys open. That’s one thing I noticed, a lot of guys running free, which is obviously appealing to me.”

    As far as McVay’s age, Goff says he is not worried at all. The Rams were the youngest team in the NFL last season and likely will be one of the youngest again this season.

    “If there’s a team it’s not going to be a problem with, it’s us,” he said. “But I don’t think it would be a problem regardless, just because of who he is. Who is to say that you can’t be a good head coach at 31? It’s not like the president — you don’t need to be 35. There’s no age requirement. You judge is on their knowledge and their capabilities.

    “I know he is the right guy for this job.”

    Goff might have struggled in his seven starts, completing 54.6 percent of his passes for a mere 5.3 yards per attempt, with only five TDs to seven interceptions. But he feels lucky that he came out of the season healthy and not in need of injury rehab. That will allow him to continue working on his conditioning and also absorb his third offensive system in three years, going back to Cal.

    He also felt that going against so many talented teams and facing some adversity in those seven starts actually will be a benefit building toward his second season.

    “Just that experience of facing some pretty good teams was huge,” Goff said. “The Seahawks, the Patriots, the Falcons, the Dolphins, even the Cardinals and Saints. The Niners were probably the only team we played that wasn’t of that same caliber. But I think seeing how the game works at the highest level against those good teams, that will pay dividends

    #64048
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    the Redskins’ offense, which ranked second in the NFL in yards per pass play and passing yards per game.

    Well to reiterate.

    Actually with CK, the Rams threw deep (31+ yards) a higher percentage of the time than Washington did. CK also threw deep more than Goff did.

    BUT Washington threw medium and deep medium (11-30 yards) a higher percentage of the time than either CK or Goff did. THAT is a key to Washington’s high YPA.

    Last year, with the Rams, it broke down this way (measuring percentage of total attempts):

    CK:

    10 yards and under: 70.8%
    11-30: 23.6%
    31+: 5.6%

    Goff:

    10 yards and under: 72.4%
    11-30: 24.4%
    31+: 3.2%

    With Washington it broke down this way:

    10 yards and under: 69.7%
    11-30: 25.9%
    31+: 4.37%

    #64054
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    10 yards and under: 72.4%
    11-30: 24.4%
    31+: 3.2%

    Having said that…here’s longball highlights from Goff at Cal:

    #64090
    sanbagger
    Participant

    They do attack the midranges though, in ways the Rams just haven’t the last few years. BUT the Rams threw deep more than Cousins/Washington did

    I actually think that fits Goff better. I like Goff’s medium / deep medium, passes better than I like his bombs. I just think he has a better feel for them and maybe feels a little more comfortable with those tosses…not sure, just a guess on my side.

    #64611
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    Sean McVay likes to attack deep, will seek more balance with Rams

    Alden Gonzalez

    http://www.espn.com/blog/los-angeles-rams/post/_/id/32854/sean-mcvay-likes-to-attack-deep-will-seek-more-balance-with-rams

    LOS ANGELES — The sample size is too small for Sean McVay. He has only been an offensive coordinator for one team; only called plays for two seasons. At 31 — younger than any head coach in the NFL’s modern era — McVay is too early in his career to have solidified his offensive philosophy, which is part of what makes his transition to the Los Angeles Rams so unpredictable and so enthralling.

    With the Washington Redskins, McVay helped Kirk Cousins compile the NFL’s fourth-highest Total QBR from 2015 to ’16 and led an offense that ranked sixth in yards, ninth in points and third in third-down conversions over that two-year stretch. But McVay was handling a more experienced quarterback, a better group up front and a dynamic collection of receivers. With the Rams, he takes over an offense that has amassed the NFL’s fewest yards each of the last two years — with a 22-year-old quarterback, an uninspiring group of pass-catchers and perhaps the game’s worst offensive line.

    How much of McVay’s scheme moves with him from D.C. to L.A. remains wholly uncertain, but that doesn’t mean we can’t learn from the evidence presented to us. Below are three of the main takeaways from McVay’s Redskins offense.

    Stretching the field vertically

    Seven days before McVay was hired as the Rams’ head coach, he sat alone with Jared Goff and went over film for two hours. Goff left that meeting ecstatic about what McVay’s offense could do for his career. He talked about how “everything kind of runs through the quarterback” and said he expects McVay to “bring out the best in me.”

    Goff, the 2016 No. 1 overall pick, was forced to make a lot of adjustments coming out of Cal, which ran an Air Raid offense that spread the field and prompted Goff to take almost every snap from the shotgun. But McVay often resembled a spread offense with the Redskins. He frequently ran formations with DeSean Jackson, Pierre Garcon, Jamison Crowder and Jordan Reed, a tight end, out wide, designing an assortment of deep vertical routes mixed with short, easy targets to take advantage of a soft middle of the field. He loved trips formations, running complex routes off of them that confused defenders. And he did a nice job of using motion before the snap to set up deep strikes down the field.

    The play below illustrates several key aspects of McVay’s offense: (1) motion before the snap, (2) use of play action, (3) unique routes off trips. It came in the season finale against the Giants, in the third quarter of a 19-10 loss. On first-and-10 with less than three minutes left, Cousins sent tight end Vernon Davis in motion to the right side of the screen. At the snap, the two outside receivers ran post routes towards the middle of the field, while Davis ran a deep fade up the right sideline.

    The safety had to pay attention to the deep post and the outside corner had his eyes fixed on the outside receiver. That allowed Davis to beat the slot corner in single coverage and make a 31-yard, heel-tap catch near the 15-yard line. You can see the finish here.

    Only one team, the Steelers, attempted more passes of at least 20 yards than the Redskins this past season. The Redskins used three-receiver sets more often than all but four teams, and in the vast majority of those sets, a tight end — either Reed or Davis or both — also acted as a downfield threat. Their vertical passing game opened things up, but it also became a hindrance in the red zone. Only 45.9 percent of the Redskins’ red zone drives resulted in touchdowns, fourth-worst in the NFL, because spreading things out doesn’t work so well with a shrunken field.

    They needed a bigger threat with the run, which brings us to our next point.

    Unbalanced attack

    Chris Cooley, the former Redskins tight end who is now part of the organization’s broadcast team, will tell you McVay “believes in a true run-pass balance system.” He just wasn’t able to implement that with the Redskins. McVay’s offense averaged 23.7 rushing attempts per game, ranked 27th in the NFL even though it didn’t play from behind very often. Cousins, meanwhile, was one of six quarterbacks to attempt more than 600 passes in 2016.

    The Redskins averaged a solid 4.5 rushing yards per carry, but Cooley will tell you that’s “entirely misleading, because there were 10 games this season when we could not run the football at all.”

    As a result, the Redskins threw frequently and unconventionally. They attempted 232 passes on first down and 80 passes in the red zone, both marks within the top 10. One of McVay’s best skills was designing plays that put the Redskins in favorable third-down situations, evidenced by the fact they needed 3 or fewer yards on 32.2 percent of their third-down plays in 2016, fourth-highest in the NFL. But they were rarely able to do it on the ground, and correcting that will be a major focus for McVay with the Rams.

    Todd Gurley, coming off a disastrous sophomore season, is traditionally a downhill runner who prefers to run behind a fullback or a pulling guard. Goff is more comfortable taking snaps from the shotgun and running a spread offense. McVay must strike a favorable balance, which brings us to our last point.

    Ability to adapt

    A turning point for McVay came on Dec. 7, 2015. The Redskins lost to the Cowboys, 19-16, on Monday Night Football and ran the ball on 16 of their 23 first-down plays. Their play-calling was too predictable and too basic. McVay vowed to turn up the aggressiveness. He soon adapted to an offense that was better-suited for throwing the football. He maximized Jackson’s abilities as a deep threat, utilized Reed’s skills on the outside and, according to several of those who watched that offense closely, constantly put his receivers in position to succeed.

    Some say McVay was simply running an offense installed by head coach Jay Gruden. But there were shades of Mike and Kyle Shanahan, particularly the outside stretch zone and the bootlegs. McVay also incorporated the power run concepts of offensive line coach Bill Callahan. And he added his own wrinkles, too.

    Two weeks after that fateful Monday night loss to the Cowboys, Cousins was mic’d up for NFL Films in a game against the Bills. At one point, Cousins walked over to McVay on the sideline and said, “Look at what putting our foot on the gas pedal the whole time has done.” McVay’s response: “That’s what we did last week, too. I’m going to keep doing that. I’m learning, too.”

    The Redskins beat the Cowboys, 34-23, to finish the 2015 season. When the two teams met again in Week 2 of the 2016 season, the Redskins lost, 27-23, but gained 432 yards from scrimmage, even though Cousins missed two open receivers for long touchdowns. There was no way Cousins could miss Josh Doctson in the early stages of the fourth quarter, however. The rookie receiver was too open. It happened, once again, on first down, with motion before the snap and off play-action passing.

    Doctson was motioned to the other side of the field, lining up almost directly behind Jackson. At the snap, Jackson ran a post and took both defenders with him, leaving Doctson wide open on a fly route for a 57-yard gain. The Redskins led by three, were just starting their fourth-quarter drive and had lined up in an offset-I formation. A deep pass down the field was the last thing the Cowboys expected. You can see the play here.

    McVay has a lot to learn as a young, first-year head coach, but he will call plays for the Rams in 2017.

    And he promises to adapt to his personnel.

    “When you talk about forming an offensive identity, it’s about first let’s figure out what our players do best,” McVay said at his introductory press conference. “What does Jared do best? How can we maximize Todd, and Tavon [Austin], and our linemen up front? We’re going to continue to get to know our players, figure out what they do best, and fit our scheme to their skill-sets.”

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