Putin on Syria

Recent Forum Topics Forums The Public House Putin on Syria

Viewing 12 posts - 1 through 12 (of 12 total)
  • Author
    Posts
  • #69648
    wv
    Participant

    #69656
    zn
    Moderator

    Next…Stalin on Estonia.

    Hussein on Kuwait.

    Nixon on Vietnam.

    #69661
    wv
    Participant

    Next…Stalin on Estonia.

    Hussein on Kuwait.

    Nixon on Vietnam.

    ——-
    What die Putin say exactly that was wrong? What did he say that was not factual?

    w
    v

    #69663
    zn
    Moderator

    What die Putin say exactly that was wrong? What did he say that was not factual?

    w
    v

    He didn’t say he was backing an anti-democratic regime in the interests of Russian sphere of influence power and nothing else. He doesn’t want Syria to become Libya. The USA didn’t want South Vietnam to become North Vietnam. No difference.

    All the rest is bs and rhetoric.

    There is no good gain from acting like an ex-KGB autocrat like Putin is actually a thoughtful statesman.

    We’re critical of americans for doing less. Why would we act like Putin of all people is something he’s not.

    Some euro-leftists defend Putin. It made me lose respect for them. It’s like they lost their ability to think and analyze.

    #69693
    wv
    Participant

    What die Putin say exactly that was wrong? What did he say that was not factual?

    w
    v

    He didn’t say he was backing an anti-democratic regime in the interests of Russian sphere of influence power and nothing else. He doesn’t want Syria to become Libya. The USA didn’t want South Vietnam to become North Vietnam. No difference.

    All the rest is bs and rhetoric.

    There is no good gain from acting like an ex-KGB autocrat like Putin is actually a thoughtful statesman.

    We’re critical of americans for doing less. Why would we act like Putin of all people is something he’s not.

    Some euro-leftists defend Putin. It made me lose respect for them. It’s like they lost their ability to think and analyze.

    =================
    Well, i didn’t understand any of that answer, but ok.

    We just see this differently. This is about understanding Syria to me. Understanding Syria. And to understand whats going on in Syria and why its going on, i think its necessary to listen to Putin. To get the Putin point of view. To add it to the mix.
    His autocratic policies in Russia are a separate issue.

    I think its useful to listen to Putin’s critiques of the corporotacracy’s positions on foreign policy, Syria, etc. I might have a different view about listening to Putin defend his autocratic domestic policies. Big difference to me. You just seem to dismiss everything he has to say. I wouldnt listen to Stalin about his domestic policies. But i might listen to his views on what Hitler was up to.

    w
    v

    #69694
    zn
    Moderator

    I think its useful to listen to Putin’s critiques of the corporotacracy’s positions on foreign policy,

    I just see that as part of the Putin PR move where they do this shallow and obvious pandering to the western left. It’s just PR. While I might add violently disallowing similar kinds of dissidence at home.

    I don’t think you understand Syria if you listen to Putin. Try reading some genuinely informed critiques of Putin in Syria, instead of the Putin PR machine.

    Putin is a right-wing autocrat. Those guys don’t suddenly start offering englightment and truth because they entered a foreign civil war.

    Starting with readings from 2015.

    ===

    Why Russia Needs Syria

    Amy Knight

    Why Russia Needs Syria

    Russia’s entry into the Syrian conflict has fundamentally changed the dynamic of the four-and-a-half-year-old war there. With a bombing campaign that now includes launching cruise missiles into Syria from Russian warships in the Caspian Sea, the Kremlin is gambling that it can preserve the weakened Assad regime. The move brings Russia into a costly and intractable civil war, raises the threat of terrorism by Islamist groups in Russia, and puts Russian forces in direct confrontation with the US-led coalition that is arming moderate Syrian rebels and fighting ISIS.

    So the question arises: Why is Russia doing this now? According to a high-level source in the Kremlin, the decision to intervene in Syria was urged on Putin this summer by three senior members of his team: Sergei Ivanov, head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Nikolai Patrushev, former head of the FSB and now the leader of the Russian Security Council. Assad’s regime was increasingly in danger, facing not only ISIS, but al-Nusra, and holding, by some estimates, less than 17 percent of Syria’s territory. Even members of Syria’s Alawite minority, to which the Assad family belongs and which are a crucial base of his support, had begun fleeing the country. With the conflict in Ukraine still unresolved and Putin increasingly isolated by the West, intervention in the Middle East was intended to reassert Russia as a major world power and act as a counterforce to Western support for the Ukrainian government in Ukraine.

    It was no surprise that the principal targets of Russian bombing raids in Syria have not been ISIS, but rather other rebel groups that the US and its Western allies support. (Though Russian cruise missiles have now also been directed as ISIS targets.) Putin, in his appearance at the UN in late September, stated unequivocally that Russia was committed to keeping the Assad regime in power, and from the Kremlin’s point of view, this makes sense. Russia fears the total collapse of the Syrian state, which would end a decades-old alliance and threaten its strategic position in the Middle East. And it views Islamic insurgents as not only a threat to Assad, but also a potential threat at home.

    It is important to note that Russia has a long history with Syria, dating back to the immediate post-World War II period. The Soviet Union signed a secret pact with Syria in 1946, promising political and military support to Syria’s national army, followed four years later by a non-aggression treaty. The 1955 Baghdad Pact, an agreement among Britain, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan to prevent Soviet expansion in the Middle East, led to further rapprochement between Syria and the Soviet Union. The alliance was strengthened during the Suez crisis of 1956, which brought the two countries together in backing Egypt.

    Syria, at this time, had the largest Communist Party in the Arab world and significant oil and gas reserves, which offered the Soviets an opportunity to provide technological support to its energy ventures. The geo-strategic position of Syria became even more important to the Soviets in 1971, when they leased a naval base at Tartus, on Syria’s Mediterranean coast. Tartus hosts the fleet of ten Russian warships and auxiliary vessels in the area. Given that Russia’s Mediterranean fleet is so distant from home, this base is crucial to Russian military interests.

    This is not to mention the income Russia has received from selling arms to Syria. Russia has been Syria’s major arms supplier for decades, accounting now for over three quarters of Syria’s arms purchases, including in August, a package of YAK-130 attack jets and MiG-29 fighters. Since Damascus is now essentially bankrupt, Moscow has had to write off much of the debt from the Soviet era, but that has not stopped the continuation of arms contracts with Russian firms.

    All of which has provided a strong incentive for Russia to prevent the collapse of the Assad regime. Kremlin decision-making is always an enigma, but the comments of Dmitry Rogozin, deputy Russian prime minister in charge of the defense industry and one of the architects of the Crimean invasion, who is on the EU sanctions list, suggest that Putin’s close advisors are in unison on Syria. Rogozin directs an economic cooperation committee between Russia and Syria established this year by Putin. After Russia began bombing in Syria last week, he posted this on Facebook: “Our guys in Syria are suppressing a war against Russia on distant plains. Anyone who does not understand is a fool or an enemy.” This is as clear a statement yet of Russian motivations, however irrational and short-sighted they may seem to the West.

    A more important question is how Russia’s new military involvement in Syria will play out with the Russian population. The chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee for International Affairs, Alexei Pushkov, has said that Russia’s air campaign in Syria would continue for two to three months, but he could not exclude the possibility that it would last longer. Meanwhile, Russia has said it plans to send ground troops, claiming of course that they are “volunteers,” as it has done with Ukraine. As yet, there is no confirmation of any major deployment in Syria. But if the Kremlin does carry out such a plan, what happens when body bags start to arrive home? 75 percent of over 50,000 responders to a recent poll by the independent radio station Ekho Moskvy were against Russia deploying ground forces in Syria. This audience represents a select group that reaches beyond state-controlled television for its news, but a poll by the authoritative Levada Center in Moscow showed that 69 percent of respondents opposed Russia introducing troops to support Assad. Russian journalist Gamid Gamidov, predicting that Russia will be mired in the Syrian conflict for a long time, observed that “a war on foreign territory, at a time of deepening financial crisis, means increasing the likelihood of more dissatisfaction…on the side of [Russia’s] population. The idea that ‘we have nothing to eat here and they are throwing all the money on a war in Syria’ will gain momentum and discontent with the [Kremlin] regime could bring it to an end.”

    Putin has justified the Russian incursion in Syria as a fight against global terrorism, warning that Russian militants fighting against Assad could come back home and carry out terrorist attacks. But it seems far more likely that Russia’s own involvement in Syria will encourage, rather than contain, such threats. Russia has a population of over 15 million Muslims, most of them Sunnis. And there are millions more in the neighboring republics of the former Soviet Union. While Russia has a history of militant and terrorist attacks, until now, there have not been incidents tied to ISIS or the war in Syria. However, the Kremlin’s attacks on Sunni strongholds in Syria could well produce a backlash and radicalize these Muslim populations, particularly in the North Caucasus.

    Putin may hope that Russians will come to view the Kremlin’s Syrian venture as they have its involvement in Ukraine. In contrast to Syria, the Ukraine intervention continues to have broad public support. A Levada poll in June revealed that a majority of Russians backed the annexation of Crimea and saw the war in Ukraine as a result of the US and its allies’ efforts to undermine Russia. According to Russian sociologist Denis Volkov, “Russian television’s portrayal of Ukraine as a failed and disintegrating state overrun by nationalist forces has mostly had the desired effect.”

    While the Western press has been preoccupied with Syria, Russia has continued its activities in Ukraine. In early October, Putin had talks with the leaders of Ukraine, France, and Germany in Paris, the first meeting since a peace deal was signed in Minsk in February. Russia agreed to persuade Ukrainian separatists in Eastern Ukraine to postpone their plans to hold their own elections this month, which Kiev and its Western allies have opposed. But a disturbing report by the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) last week about a new and highly destructive Russian weapons system—the so-called Buratino multiple rocket launcher—appearing in Eastern Ukraine raises doubt about Russian intentions.

    A larger question, however, is whether the serious decline in the Russian economy could erode support for these military ventures. The plunge in oil prices, together with Western economic sanctions, have caused real incomes in Russia to fall significantly, with inflation reaching more than 15 percent. According to the independent Russian newspaper Novaya gazeta, Russian expenditures on the Syrian military effort are so far within the bounds of the country’s budget, and much less than the estimated $9.9 million a day that the US and its allies are spending there in bombing attacks. The Russians are using airplanes and ammunition that have long been paid for. But the price will rise significantly if Russia introduces ground troops into Syria or its bases are attacked by militants. According to Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer, “Serious spending will begin when losses have to be replenished—damaged ammunition, motor vehicles and maybe aircraft.” All this will add to Russia’s budget deficit, which is projected to be 3 percent this year and next. It may be only a matter of time until Russians begin questioning Russia’s involvement in Ukraine along with Syria.

    The Kremlin’s involvement in Ukraine and Syria seems to be motivated partly by its aversion to democratic regimes, in particular the so-called color revolutions that have sprung up in the Middle East and in Georgia and Ukraine. The Arab Spring came only half-heartedly to Syria, with the democratic uprising soon overtaken by armed conflict. But this does not rule out, from the Kremlin’s point of view, the possibility of insurgent groups unfriendly to Russia eventually taking over the country. The breakup of Syria, or the replacement of the Assad regime by a government more aligned with the Sunni Arab world, would leave Russia without a client state in the Middle East.

    As for Ukraine, it is dangerously close both to Russia and to countries belonging to the European Union and NATO. At the UN in late September, Putin mentioned how difficult it has been for Russia, after the fall of the Soviet Union, to contend with the expansion of NATO to countries along its border. This may explain why Russia has been increasingly aggressive in violating NATO airspace in the Baltics, just as it has recently violated the airspace of Turkey, a NATO member.

    In both the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, the Kremlin is trying to provide a counterweight to NATO. Yet while Russia has managed thus far to hold its own in Ukraine, the Syrian gambit is far riskier. In the words of the prominent Russian journalist Yulia Latynina: “The Islamists, including ISIL, are operating in this war with much longer experience and more successfully than the Kremlin…The scandals over Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib will seem like kindergarten in comparison to what in a month the western media will be saying about Russian involvement in Syria.”

    #69697
    zn
    Moderator

    EXPOSING THE APOLOGETICS FOR ASSAD AND PUTIN

    Ahnaf Kalam

    https://areomagazine.com/2016/12/16/exposing-the-apologetics-for-assad-and-putin/

    Eva Bartlett, an ‘independent’ Canadian journalist, stole the hearts of the anti-war Left in her account of what was really happening in Syria in a now-viral video clip from a UN press conference. Maintaining, among other things, that Syrian civilians overwhelmingly support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and that the mainstream media’s account of the Syrian Civil War is simply pro-regime change propaganda, her position — and her condescending attitude — reflect the moral failings of the prevalent libertarian and anti-war Left movements when faced with humanitarian disasters.

    The UN event where Bartlett made her statements, however, wasn’t a General Assembly meeting or anything remotely as significant, it was a panel hosted by the Hands Off Syria Coalition and the US Peace Council –– two anti-Western nonprofit organizations. Fewer than a dozen people were in attendance.

    Bartlett is also not an “independent” journalist: she is a contributor to RT, the state-sponsored news network of Russia. On her personal blog, she explicitly professes her support for the Assad regime:

    “I SUPPORT SYRIA AGAINST A ‘CIVIL’ WAR THAT IS FUNDED, ARMED AND PLANNED BY THE WESTERN POWERS AND THEIR REGIONAL ALLIES WITH A VIEW TO WIPING OUT ALL RESISTANCE TO IMPERIALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST…”

    Not only does she conveniently brush aside, as though they were fringe details, Russia’s leveling of hospitals in Aleppo, its decimation of UN aid convoys, and Bashar al Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians, she further goes on to claim that there are no international organizations on the ground in Syria, that the civilian victims in Aleppo are “recycled actors,” and that the Al-Quds hospital, which had been bombed in the Spring of 2016, had not actually been bombed, despite the incident having been confirmed in a report by Doctors Without Borders, who have been working closely on the ground in Syria with the Al-Quds Hospital for over four years. Snopes also put out a recent piece, branding Barlett’s claims as “false.”

    It is very telling that Bartlett is not only suspiciously selective in her narrative, but completely denies reality. The amount of mental gymnastics necessary to convince herself that Bashar al Assad and Vladimir Putin are not the bad guys is astonishing. Bartlett has resorted to claiming that the countless civilian children in Aleppo are simply actors, notwithstanding the fact that “Aya” is a very common name in Syria. She has denied well-documented accounts from international organizations (who she maintains are not even there in the first place) as to the unending list of crimes committed by Russia and Syria. She doesn’t even so much as raise an eyebrow at the fact that Mr. Assad won the recent elections in Syria — and only in government-controlled parts of Syria — with almost 90% of the vote, and instead, assumes that to mean that he is a favorable leader. She would likely be shocked to learn what was in store for the people who didn’t vote for Assad.

    Further, Bartlett attempts to preemptively administer culpability to the United States for the chaos in Syria. Not for its inaction or its failure to intervene, which would have been a fair criticism to make, but for actions and mistakes it has yet to even make. To Bartlett and other so-called “anti-imperialist” Assad apologists, massacring hundreds of thousands of civilians, torturing and executing dissidents, and destroying entire cities is preferable to the United States and the West even doing so much as looking in the direction of Syria.

    Though hardly anybody was in attendance at the actual press conference, Bartlett’s sentiments don’t fall on deaf ears. Having gone a step further than simply voting against a hawkish Hillary Clinton, many have internalized Donald Trump’s prospective plans to reconcile our relationship with Russia and have become complacent with the idea of joint cooperation with the Kremlin.

    Over the last several years, Putin has been quietly testing the waters. Having invaded Crimea in 2014, flattened hospitals in Aleppo, and allowed his friend Mr. Assad to murder his own people with chemical weapons, he has taken notice of the fact that Washington has hardly lifted a finger in response, thus enabling him to keep doing what he is doing. For Mr. Putin, the election of Trump could not have come at a better time, as he now effectively has a free pass to call the shots in Syria without reprimand from the US as long as Trump believes that Russia is helping him kill ISIS terrorists. Like Mr. Trump, a striking number of Americans believe that ISIS is the biggest cause for the instability in Syria, and so to them, an alliance with Russia actually sounds like a good thing.

    #69698
    wv
    Participant

    <

    I don’t think you understand Syria if you listen to Putin. Try reading some genuinely informed critiques of Putin in Syria, instead of the Putin PR machine.

    Putin is a right-wing autocrat. Those guys don’t suddenly start offering englightment and truth because they entered a foreign civil war.

    Starting with readings from 2015.

    ——————

    Well thats mildly insulting. You are assuming i haven’t read what YOU call ‘informed critiques’. I have. And i have read the Putin stuff. And i dont think you get a clear picture unless you read ALL of it.

    We just disagree on this. I think the Putin take on Syria is much closer to the truth than the corporotacracy stuff.

    So lets just let each other believe what we will, without the personalizing of it.

    w
    v

    #69711
    zn
    Moderator

    <

    I don’t think you understand Syria if you listen to Putin. Try reading some genuinely informed critiques of Putin in Syria, instead of the Putin PR machine.

    Putin is a right-wing autocrat. Those guys don’t suddenly start offering englightment and truth because they entered a foreign civil war.

    Starting with readings from 2015.

    ——————

    Well thats mildly insulting. You are assuming i haven’t read what YOU call ‘informed critiques’. I have. And i have read the Putin stuff. And i dont think you get a clear picture unless you read ALL of it.

    We just disagree on this. I think the Putin take on Syria is much closer to the truth than the corporotacracy stuff.

    So lets just let each other believe what we will, without the personalizing of it.

    w
    v

    First I don’t mean to be insulting. I wasn’t personalizing though I see why you say that now that it’s pointed out. You though, I think, assumed I (among others) didn’t know what Putin says. But yeah I did know that.

    I will though say what my view is. Putin IS corporotacracy. He’s just the especially brutal face of it. IMO he’s Pinochet, basically. Just an anti-american version thereof.

    At least in the USA things are confused enough, because we are less directly autocratic, that you can get alternative views.

    For the record I personally do not think there is a single grain of truth in the Russian public explanation of Syria. Mostly I marvel and how well they’ve sold it through a sophisticated use of modern social media and internet outlets. Since the world obviously isn’t binary, that doesn’t mean I buy into the opposite lies. It just means not liking lies either way. That’s honestly how I see it.

    It’s a difference of views, not a personal slam. That is, we just approach the entire thing differently. When you post stuff, though, it’s not your fault that Putin pisses me off as much as Trump does. So I lash out. I was never very good with things that piss me off.

    #69723
    wv
    Participant

    #69730
    zn
    Moderator

    Putin is a human rights abusing oligarch. The left must speak out

    Owen Jones

    https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/26/vladimir-putin-russia-oligarch-british-left-speak-out

    For those of us who believe democracy and social justice are universal principles, it’s clear why we should express our solidarity with Russia’s embattled leftists

    A rightwing authoritarian leader who attacks civil liberties, stigmatises lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, indulges in chauvinistic nationalism, is in bed with rapacious oligarchs, and who is admired by the European and American hard right. Leftwing opposition to Vladimir Putin should be, well, kind of an obvious starting point. Now BBC One’s Panorama has broadcast allegations that the Russian leader has secretly amassed a vast fortune. However accurate, there is no question that Putin is close to oligarchs such as Roman Abramovich, who profited as post-Soviet Russia collapsed into economic chaos thanks to western-backed “shock therapy”.

    After Litvinenko, more sanctions against Russia would be pointless – and hypocritical
    Simon Jenkins
    Read more
    Last week, a British public inquiry concluded that ex-Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko was likely to have been murdered at the personal behest of Putin. We don’t know exactly who is behind all the murky killings of journalists in Russia, but we know that some of those critical of the government – like Anna Politkovskaya, who courageously opposed Putin’s war in Chechnya – met violent ends.

    Putin has become something of an icon for a certain type of western rightwinger. Donald Trump is a fan: when Putin called the rightwing demagogue a “very colourful, talented person”, Trump called it a “great honour” and described Russia’s strongman as “a man highly respected within his own country and beyond”. When challenged on the alleged role of Moscow in the murder of journalists, Trump engaged in what is typically known as “whataboutery” (or the “look over there!” approach to debate), responding: “Our country does plenty of killing also.” Last year, a delegation of French rightwing MPs visited Russia to fight “disinformation from western media”, and Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Front which was given a multimillion-euro loan from a Russian bank – is a Putin fan. Our own Nigel Farage assailed opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, suggesting Putin was “on our side” in the war against terrorism, while Ukip MEP Diane James celebrated him as a strong leader and for being “very nationalist”.

    We don’t have to choose between critiquing our own foreign policy and opposing unjust foreign governments
    Sure, the west’s attitude towards Putin is hypocritical. When Putin prosecuted his savage war in Chechnya, there was none of the western outrage later meted out when the Russians annexed the Crimea. Bill Clinton once lavished Putin for having “enormous potential”; Tony Blair, meanwhile, continues to call for the west to work with Putin against Islamic fundamentalism and last year attended a Putin “vanity summit”.

    Sign up for the Guardian Opinion email
    Read more
    But for the left, opposition to Putin should go without saying. Those who claim the left as a whole is soft on Putin are disingenuous at best: as, indeed, this article illustrates. But why are some silent, or even indulgent? Firstly, some profess a fear that – by critiquing those who are already supposedly bete noires of the west – the left will provide cover for western military expansionism. We become cheerleaders for western foreign policy, in other words, feeding the demonisation of foreign foes that is a necessary precondition for conflict. Secondly, it is seen as hypocritical: look at, say, the calamities of Iraq or Libya. Should we not focus on what our governments get up to, rather than what foreigners get up to elsewhere, which is in any case well covered by the mainstream press and political elite?

    Yes, there is something rather absurd about the baiting of the anti-war left for not protesting against, say, Putin or North Korea. The baiters are always free to organise their own demonstration (I would be happy to join), and protest movements can only realistically aspire to put pressure on governments at home, whether it be on domestic policies or alliances with human rights abusers abroad (whether that be, say, the head-chopping Saudi exporters of extremism, or Israel’s occupation of Palestine). In democracies, protests that echo the official line of governments are rare. If the west was actively cheering Putin on and arming him to the teeth, we might expect more vociferous opposition.

    But for universalists – those of us who believe democracy, freedom, human rights and social justice are universal principles that all humans should enjoy, irrespective of who or where they are – that shouldn’t be good enough. We shouldn’t have to wait for a possible western-Russian alliance in, say, Syria to speak out. We should express our solidarity with Russia’s embattled democrats and leftists. We don’t have to choose between critiquing our own foreign policy and opposing unjust foreign governments. In a sense, critics of western foreign policy have more of a responsibility to speak out. While supporters of, for example, the Iraq calamity can be more easily batted away by Putin apologists, nobody can accuse people like me of hypocritically failing to critique western foreign policy. Russia is ruled by a human rights abusing, expansionist, oligarchic regime. The Russian people – and their neighbours – deserve better. And the western left is surely duty-bound to speak out.

    ===

    “We should recognize that there are other imperialisms”: A Marxist dissident explains what the left gets wrong about Russia

    CHARLES DAVIS

    Charles Davis is a writer and producer in Los Angeles whose work has been published by outlets including Al Jazeera

    http://www.salon.com/2015/04/06/we_should_recognize_that_there_are_other_imperialisms_a_marxist_dissident_explains_what_the_left_gets_wrong_about_russia/

    Russia today is not as depicted on Russia Today, the English-language news network established by the Russian government in 2005 that paints a capitalist state led by a right-wing nationalist in pseudo-left colors: the anti-America, almost, where the poor are always fed – not just shot dead by racist police – and foreign policy is motivated not by cynical self-interest, but a dogged, one might even say principled determination to stand athwart U.S. imperialism and yell “stop!” The critiques the network airs of poverty in the United States and Washington’s bloody wars abroad are an amusing, completely fair rejoinder to the State Department’s habit of pointing out the human rights hypocrisy of everyone else, but the implication that things are any better in Moscow is no less amusing to leftists in Russia who are aware an Occupy Red Square, like Occupy Wall Street, would be crushed with all the skull-cracking efficiency a state can muster.

    Russia is also not the Russia we read about in the West’s corporate tabloids, its long-time leader, Vladimir Putin, cast as an irrational psychopath bent on eliminating all who oppose him, at home and in Eastern Europe and maybe even the United States too if he wakes up cranky. The truth, as is so rarely the case, lies somewhere in the middle: The truth is Russia is a nation-state and an imperial power that may not be any better than the United States, but also isn’t really any worse. When it comes to being terrible, the competition is actually pretty close: The only country that sells more arms to repressive regimes than Russia is the United States of America, though the former has actually been stealing some market share by capitalizing on the instability caused by the latter (they also frequently arm the same people). When it comes to imprisoning the highest percentage of its own population, the USA is still number one, but Russia is again number two.

    The United States plays up its devotion to “liberty,” appealing to Russian liberals whose Skype conversations with Western NGOs are recorded by the NSA, while Russia appeals to Western leftists (and Eastern Ukrainians) by capitalizing on nostalgia for the Soviet Union and the idea, more propagandistic than realistic, that state capitalism is markedly superior to the liberal variety. Too often, however, this is what defines the debate: each state’s propaganda machine, with patriots believing their own country’s talking points and dissidents believing the other’s, obscuring what out to be the glaringly obvious fact that neither nation-state is motivated by any principle in domestic or global affairs more honorable than “what’s good for our oligarchs,” who even live in the same parts of Manhattan.

    If there is to be a new Cold War, the left should reject the temptation of reducing evil in the world to the actions of one’s own government and recognize that imperialism, like capitalism, is a global phenomenon for which one can blame more than one villain. Are there differences between the powers? Sure, just as there are differences between Republicans and Democrats – and they are significantly less profound than the partisans of either faction would have us believe, having more to do with who has power than what one does with it. Russia sending billions of dollars worth of weapons to the Assad regime in Syria, for instance, is no less evil, nor fundamentally different, than the United States arming the brutal regimes of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. We on the left can explain why imperialists do what they do and how it’s not irrational but makes total sense according to the logic of capitalist nation-sates, but we shouldn’t confuse an explanation with justification or accept that logic as our own. We should focus on the crimes of the empire we know best, perhaps, but we shouldn’t just dismiss the crimes of others or else we’ll find we lost our moral credibility and swapped mindless patriotism for useful idiocy. The left is at its best when it doesn’t allow skepticism and solidarity to stop at a national border – and just applying a cookie-cutter analysis to events abroad, it actually communicates with its comrades in other countries.

    Ilya Budraitskis is an activist, writer and student at the Russian Academy of Science in Moscow who edits the socialist website, OpenLeft.ru, and serves as a spokesperson for the Russian Socialist Movement, which he described to me as a “Marxist, anti-establishment organization.” Founded in 2011, when Russia saw massive street protests over allegations of vote-rigging by the government – the largest demonstrations since the collapse of the Soviet Union – the group is deeply critical of both Putin and his liberal opposition, demanding the nationalization of major industry and worker control over the workplace while warning that anyone expecting serious change to come from establishment politicians through a corrupt electoral process is going to be sorely disappointed. “Now the streets must become the arena of political struggle,” the group said in a 2011 appeal, arguing that if the left wants to change Russia it must not sit back in the name of unity or pragmatism and cede the political arena to “the rich bastards who have commissioned the hideous farce known as Russian politics!”

    I spoke with Ilya about the opposition to Putin – who’s leading it, as well as who’s going to these demonstrations and why – the effect the conflict in Ukraine has had on Russia’s political culture, who killed Boris Nemstov, and whether Russian imperialism is a necessary evil in a world that could use a check on the ambitions of the American empire.

    Obviously the biggest story in Russia and here in the United State is the recent assassination of Boris Nemstov. Here in the West, Russia right now is portrayed as sort of a police state – people are afraid to express dissent. Is there any truth to that? Can you describe what the climate is like in the wake of this assassination? Is there fear among the opposition or is that overstated in the corporate media?

    I will say that the fear in the opposition came much earlier. It came after we faced repression after the rise of the protest movement in 2011-2012. Maybe you hear about this 6th of May affair – it was a huge police provocation at the anti-Putin demonstration in 2012, just the day before his inauguration as president. So you can say this atmosphere of fear and the atmosphere of repression towards the opposition they were growing during these years. Of course, last year was very difficult and very crucial in this sense because it was the year when the war with Ukraine was started and the confrontation that had existed before in this society became much more harder.

    You can say that from the beginning of last year the main fear in the internal politics for power, for the government, became the shadow of Maidan [Square, the Kiev center where protesters helped topple the Russian-backed Ukrainian government]; that something that happened in Ukraine could also be possible in Russia. So even if there is no real reasons exactly for the moment to have something… in Russia this shadow of Maidan became a paranoid idea for the government and also it became a very good instrument for criminalization of any kind of protest. So even now if you have some local protest or some strike or some kind of action which is not exactly political – it can be immediately identified as a kind of Maidan attempt.

    So there is an atmosphere of paranoia which is very much distributed and of course which is very much in the interest of not only the president, but every local power on any level. So during all this era, from the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, [we have been subjected to] extreme media propaganda. This propaganda was very much focused on the idea of the internal enemy: that we have this “fifth column.” And even the term, fifth column, came from a Vladimir Putin speech a year ago, a very famous speech, when he announced the annexation of Crimea, and he also [claimed] that we have a group of national traitors inside the country and we have a fifth column. So if you look at Boris Nemstov, he was one of the figures who were presented as this fifth column during the last year mostly. So you can see the logic that stands behind this murder.

    I do not totally agree with people who blame Putin for this murder. I’m not sure he has an interest in it. I will say that he probably has no interest in this kind of murder. When it happened it was clear that the media or government, they were very much confused.

    So you don’t think Putin would have ordered this himself because, obviously, this politician wasn’t really a threat to his power. But would you agree with the argument that this atmosphere, this talk of “fifth columns” and “traitors,” contributed to this murder? Or is this too much speculation at this point?

    It was not in the clear interest of Putin because the picture of Russian life and Russian politics that he wants to create and his media wants to create is a picture of national unity and stability. And his fight against a possible Russian Maidan is a fight in the name of stability. When you have this kind of murder very openly, just a few hundred meters from the Kremlin, it totally contradicts the idea of stability. It’s a break with stability. And this break comes not from the opposition, but it seems like from their opposite – from people who call themselves ‘specialists.’ It’s quite clear that those who tried to destabilize the internal situation, they’re not part of the opposition, but they’re like enemies of the opposition. And that completely destroys this propaganda [that it’s the opposition destabilizing the country].

    Second thing, of course it’s an open challenge to the Russian police and security service, because it clearly shows that they don’t control the situation; they even don’t control the most central, important part of the city and they’re also probably not interested in this kind of events for even the bureaucratic reaction [i.e., taking the blame for letting it happen].

    The third thing is that all these . . . these organizers of the anti-Maidan movement [in Russia], all these ‘patriotic groups’ around the government, who are probably feted by the government, they are now very much discredited because what kind of reaction [their rhetoric] now should produce.

    All the levels of this official Putin political machine, you have problems with this murder. To say that he wants to frighten opposition, well it’s real effect was the opposite: Because the demonstration which [followed], my impression was that it was one of the most massive demonstrations that you have in the last year and it was clear that this murder touched a lot of people who before were not politically active. You had a lot of very new people at this demonstration.

    What kind of people are showing up to these demonstrations? And how would you describe the opposition in Russia? Is it mostly neoliberals like Nemstov or is it more diverse than that?

    I can’t say that it’s just middle class because you have a lot of middle class who are totally loyal and you have a lot of people who do not belong to belong to the middle class who are on the side of the opposition. But it’s mostly cultural, educational markers – you can say that it’s some people who connect with the Soviet intelligentsia tradition. Maybe some of them are teachers or professors, some of them are small businessmen, but they have the same background, the same more or less level of education, and the same tradition of disagreement. And disagreement, more ethical than political disagreement. So these people, of course they’re very politicized, but at the same time their level of political consciousness is [rather] primitive.

    I mean that, for example, with the poor, they don’t analyze their exact social interest or they don’t connect their social interest with their political expression. So that’s why for them, people like Nemstov, who as you said was openly neoliberal, as are a lot of people in the top of this opposition, who – despite the very just critiques of Vladimir Putin’s politics in Ukraine or lack of freedom of speech – openly say that hospitals should be privatized, that we should be more aggressive in austerity in Russia, and should privatize the state property and things like this. Their position is somehow not so much discussed among their supporters, because for them it’s something secondary, something not in their core of their nature of support, because the most important thing with them is ethical support – they see these people as the good people, the educated people, the people who talk to them using their language, but not people who have some exact social and economic program which confronts their own interest.

    Right, so they’re motivated more by issues like freedom of speech than free markets – that’s the position of the elites, but not what gets these people out to demonstrations.

    Yes, you can say that.

    What do they not like about the Putin government? Is it a sense that there’s a crackdown on civil liberties? The state of the Russian economy, which makes people unhappy with the leader?

    Right now the main issue for people is they feel [there are] so much lies from the government. They are so angry about the propaganda over what has happened in Ukraine. Because what you have now in Russian media, it’s unbelievable. It’s never ever happened, even in Soviet times, I mean this level of aggression and in a very crazy kind of style. If you even look at the Russian TV you understand that the third world war has already started and you are a soldier in this war. And what has happened in Ukraine is already a third world war war against, I don’t know, Barack Obama . . . on one side acting against Russia. And so I think that it’s mostly a reaction to these lies, but not a reaction to some real, economic or social problems that we now face in Russia. But those problems, they are really serious and they touch a much broader part of the population than this strata that are politically active and visit these kind of demonstrations.

    The main question for this opposition is if they are satisfied with this ethical position and in fact isolation from the majority of the population . . . or if they want somehow to break with these constructions, and if they want to break they should also change their social agenda, radically change it, because right now you have an ongoing economic crisis in Russia, you have huge inflation, and you have the very clear answer of the government and this answer is extremely anti-social, it is extremely neoliberal. Putin’s answer is the increase of the pension age, a lack of indexation [increasing pension payments to match price increases] in a situation where inflation is going on – in reality, 15 percent or even more – and you have no opportunities for people who are losing their workplaces

    They’re [the opposition] not able to attract a real big number of people from that part of society which is not already involved in the opposition. So I mean the situation is kind of a dead end. You have 50,000 or even more people in Moscow in commemoration of Boris Nemstov, this is the kind of force that is able to mobilize – this number of people again and again, but there is no chance to build a kind of more broad movement based on the interests of the majority.

    Why do you think given Russia’s history there isn’t more of a class consciousness among the working class in Russia today?

    Now you don’t have the same working class as you did in the Soviet Union because of the total destruction of Soviet industry . . . and Boris Nemstov was a part of that process. And what was the real price of it? It was the lumpenization of a big part of the working class on one side, and on the other side it was the feeling of hopelessness on [the part of] working class people that any kind of collective struggle can work effectively. And you have very, very tiny independent unions in Russia and these independent unions, they became even weaker from the start of the economic crisis. And also, of course . . . their [the working class] main fear is still instability . . . and that’s why they’re still ready to basically support the current government who [they believe can] somehow prevent the situation which happened in the 90s.

    Alexander Dugin has written that the annexation of Crimea marks “Russia’s return to history.” Do you think that “return to history” and this idea of restoring Russia’s greatness on the world scene – that that’s what’s appealing to a lot of Russians? And that this current war climate is basically co-opting people who would otherwise be critics of Putin’s economic policies?

    Yes, of course. These kind of ideas always work, everywhere. If you make a promise to people to bring them back to history, whatever it means, it always works as rhetoric. But I think, for most people, for them it’s unclear what is the real picture of the situation in Ukraine. The majority still believe there is a just struggle between . . . our brothers and a fascist Ukrainian army.

    You say a lot of people buy into the Russian government’s propaganda on Ukraine. Here in the United States some parts of the left seem to have bought into this too. They think Maidan was basically a Nazi coup backed by Europe and the United States and they kind of ridicule the idea that Russia has inflamed the conflict by supporting the separatists in the East. Can you comment on that?

    Of course, both the pictures of what is happening there are very simplified. So firstly, it’s not true that it was a fascist coup in Ukraine because a “coup” is an action of a small, organized, armed group of people. [In Ukraine] the “coup” . . . had the clear support of hundreds of thousands of people. Even if you don’t like it you should recognize that it was a real huge movement with the big support of the population of Ukraine. I have no sympathy with the Ukrainian government that you have now, but for me it’s quite clear it can’t be reduced just to a Western plot. There were some deep social contradictions in Ukrainian society that led to this moment.

    Of course, in any situation like this you have the interests: American interests, European interests, Russian interests, and so on. But these interests can work effectively only if you already have some problems within the country. And that is true also for Crimea and the East of Ukraine; you also can’t say that it’s just the result of Russian military intervention. I knew very well even a few years ago what kind of feelings most people in Crimea had toward Russia. So for me it was clear that a total majority of them want to be part of Russia. It was clear for everyone 10 years ago, even 15 years ago, that you have some serious cultural split in Ukraine between the West and East.

    And of course what happened after Maidan with this language law from the new government, it was a kind of provocation. But at the same time you can’t imagine that this kind of terrible military confrontation that you have in Eastern Ukraine was possible without Russian participation. For those on the American Left who believe that there is some “anti-fascist” partisans operating in the East of Ukraine, I really recommend reading some books about other guerrilla movements, like Che Guevara or whatever they like. It’s the first [anti-fascist] partisan movement in the history, in Eastern Ukraine, which has more arms and more modern arms than the army who they confront.

    Is it a common belief in Russia that these arms are coming from the Russian state?

    There is a lot of evidence . . . . that there are thousands of soldiers or weapons and so on sent to the East Ukraine. I think that the reason why it’s still not recognized officially by the West, it’s not because the West has no evidence, but because the West is trying to find a compromise. If they recognize it, if they say openly that Russia is in fact in a state of war in Ukraine, it means it will be much more difficult to somehow find a diplomatic solution. So I think that’s the only explanation.

    What do you think motivates the separatists in Ukraine? Is it just the language issue and identifying as Russian or is there something else? “Luhansk People’s Republic” – “people’s republic” sounds to my ears as if there’s some socialist motivation. Is economics and socialism at all a part of this or is it all identity?

    These slogans are not just socialist, but mostly Soviet slogans, which refer to a kind of Soviet nostalgia – and they mix openly with Russian chauvinism. A lot of people are fighting not for the Soviet Union, but for Russian empire, and deny even the existence of Ukraine as a nation. And these people are at the top of the movement. They act like the ideologists of this movement, like Igor Strelkov, who was one of the first leaders of this kind of uprising in the East of Ukraine who was a Russian from Moscow who came there with clear identification, historical reference to the White Army during the Civil War, the White Army who fought against he Red Army and who fought against the Ukrainian nationalists for the Great Russia. So I mean if you look at many, many [news] sources of the separatists, you find a lot of Russian chauvinist propaganda, the ideas of Russian empire and so on, which is very much mixed with Stalinism – but Stalinism mostly understood as the idea of the great state, but not as a kind of socialist order of things.

    They’re not motivated necessarily by a workers’ state, but the idea of a strong, powerful state that the rest of the world respects.

    And which can confront the West. And also another very important idea is anti-Semitism. For this movement in the East Ukraine, the idea that Maidan was a Jewish plot and all this kind of thing, they are very distributed. You can find it in thousands of publications. I don’t want to say all people who participate in this movement are a bunch of anti-Semites, fascists and Stalinists, because on the side of Ukraine you also have open Nazis and anti-Semites as well as . . . just normal people who just want to save the independence of the country. And I also can understand their way of thinking, their feelings, and their fears – it’s understandable. In Ukraine, you really have a lot of people for whom the question of the existence of Ukraine is very important. And they really feel that there is a fear for the independence of the country itself; it’s not just the question of East Ukraine, but the right of the state to exist.

    What do you think motivates the Russian government? Is Putin also interested in restoring this Russian empire? Because we also hear that Russia is afraid of NATO expansion and that NATO expansion is what is motivating it to take on a greater role in Ukraine. Is that just an excuse?

    Of course one of the reasons for even the start of this conflict was that Russia was concerned about the expansion of NATO, which happened during the last decade. Also it was the question, you could say, of the “domestic” area of Russian imperialism, which is the post-Soviet space – the idea that the post-Soviet space, maybe including the Baltic states, should be space where nothing can be decided politically without the participation of Russia. So you can’t change the government without agreement from Russian society. That is something that led to the conflict with Georgia in 2008 and that is something that led to the conflict with Ukraine, because it’s just simply a question of the master or owner of this space, who is the main person who should be asked about everything. Of course after what happened in Ukraine, for Putin it was another clear evidence that Russia somehow was out of the decision-making process. And I think there was also a third reason . . . the internal situation. What kind of political example could Maidan give to Russian society?

    As in Putin was fearful of the same thing happening in Russia?

    Yes. What has happened in Ukraine, there was a foreign policy element in it, but it was also a big challenge for the internal policy.

    Russia in its English-language media, such as Russia Today, portrays Russia’s actions as basically just a response to U.S. imperialism, as if Russia itself is not imperialist but rather an anti-imperialist power; supporting the Assad government in Syria, for instance. And that’s portrayed as a check on U.S. hegemony. Do you share that view? Do you think, whatever your view of Putin domestically, that overall Russia does serve as a necessary check on the U.S.’s agenda or does it serve as a negative influence in the world?

    Russian foreign policy is not a policy based on any kind of view of how the world should look. There’s no kind of our own “Pax Americana” or something like this. In this sense, Russia is not the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had a kind of project for the world; a clear alternative to the values and ideas [of the West]. There is nothing like this in Russian foreign policy. Russian foreign policy is a realistic policy. As Obama has pointed out a couple times, there are no ideological problems with Russia. . . . Russia as a realist, cynical world force, wants to discuss its place in the world: the size of their piece of the cake. That’s the explanation you always hear from Putin . . . that everyone has their interests in this world, everyone wants to benefit from everything, so we want to understand the rules of the game.

    I mean, if the left are ready to support this kind of logic, even if this kind of logic in some ways confronts American imperialism, I probably don’t agree with this left in a very fundamental way. I think that one of the main mistakes of a very big part of the left for years was the idea that imperialism can only be American; that if you talk about imperialism, we mean the United States, because there are not any other imperialist powers. But if we look back at the Marxist definition of imperialism we will find that imperialism, it’s always a conflict. It’s a conflict between states, between capitalist interests, and it always leads to a kind of military confrontation with the blocs of interests, like it was in the first world war. . . . So you should simply recognize that yes, even if we have no justification for American imperialism, we should recognize that there are other imperialisms. And you can’t find among these imperialisms something that is more progressive or objectively progressive than the other. That should be a kind of rule, like in the conflicts you have in Ukraine: You have no good side; no progressive side. Of course, you have fascists on both sides. Of course, you have imperialist interests on both sides. And any kind of support of one or another side from the left simply strengthens one of the sides, but weakens the left.

    I read your piece, “Intellectuals and ‘The New Cold War,’” and you talk of the appeal of this kind of black-and-white worldview – of the “imposed choice between two ‘camps,’ the West and Russia” – has to many intellectuals, not just in Russia but here in the United States. What do you think is the problem with that view and also what do you think is so attractive about it?

    It’s attractive because it touches some structures of consciousness which were developed during the decades in the time of the Cold War, so it acts like a kind of reflex for many on the left to find some good, “progressive” side. And also of course it represents a lack of general picture of the world from the left. Even a hundred years ago one of the most important and strong points of the left was that they have the explanation of not just some basic laws of capitalism, but also the understanding of what is going on now in the world. They had a kind of complex picture of it. And now the left today they have no picture. They are very fragmented. They are very localized in their own countries, in their own situations. And it’s kind of a paradox because the world became more global and the left became more provincial.

    For the American left, of course for them only American imperialism exists, yes? I can’t understand it. . . . In Russia, there are a lot of leftists who also believe that Russia is the main evil in the world, it’s a reactionary empire, and it should be destroyed. Or, at the same time, you have a lot of leftists who believe somehow Russia is resisting American imperialism [and] who support these “republics” in the East of Ukraine.

    But you have a huge provincialization of the left as a whole because they can’t even understand each other and every leftist community, they believe in their own national reality. And that’s why they can be so easily manipulated. By whom? By Russia Today? I think it’s a very pitiable situation because the Russian propaganda machine, which is not the most clever, not so smart . . . it can so easily manipulate such a big sector of the Western left. It points to the problem of the Western left itself, but not the strength of Russia Today.

    #69731
    zn
    Moderator

    There is a genuine debate here. I take the admonishment to be more constructive about it seriously. Given that here are some ideas I happen to share, from the articles I posted.

    Russia fears the total collapse of the Syrian state, which would end a decades-old alliance and threaten its strategic position in the Middle East. And it views Islamic insurgents as not only a threat to Assad, but also a potential threat at home.

    The Kremlin’s involvement in Ukraine and Syria seems to be motivated partly by its aversion to democratic regimes, in particular the so-called color revolutions that have sprung up in the Middle East and in Georgia and Ukraine. The Arab Spring came only half-heartedly to Syria, with the democratic uprising soon overtaken by armed conflict. But this does not rule out, from the Kremlin’s point of view, the possibility of insurgent groups unfriendly to Russia eventually taking over the country. The breakup of Syria, or the replacement of the Assad regime by a government more aligned with the Sunni Arab world, would leave Russia without a client state in the Middle East.

    We don’t have to choose between critiquing our own foreign policy and opposing unjust foreign governments. Sure, the west’s attitude towards Putin is hypocritical. When Putin prosecuted his savage war in Chechnya, there was none of the western outrage later meted out when the Russians annexed the Crimea. Bill Clinton once lavished Putin for having “enormous potential”; Tony Blair, meanwhile, continues to call for the west to work with Putin against Islamic fundamentalism and last year attended a Putin “vanity summit”.

    But for the left, opposition to Putin should go without saying

    We should express our solidarity with Russia’s embattled democrats and leftists. We don’t have to choose between critiquing our own foreign policy and opposing unjust foreign governments. In a sense, critics of western foreign policy have more of a responsibility to speak out. While supporters of, for example, the Iraq calamity can be more easily batted away by Putin apologists, nobody can accuse people like me of hypocritically failing to critique western foreign policy. Russia is ruled by a human rights abusing, expansionist, oligarchic regime. The Russian people – and their neighbours – deserve better. And the western left is surely duty-bound to speak out.

    each state’s propaganda machine, with patriots believing their own country’s talking points and dissidents believing the other’s, obscuring what out to be the glaringly obvious fact that neither nation-state is motivated by any principle in domestic or global affairs more honorable than “what’s good for our oligarchs,” who even live in the same parts of Manhattan.

    Of course one of the reasons for even the start of this conflict was that Russia was concerned about the expansion of NATO, which happened during the last decade. Also it was the question, you could say, of the “domestic” area of Russian imperialism, which is the post-Soviet space – the idea that the post-Soviet space, maybe including the Baltic states, should be space where nothing can be decided politically without the participation of Russia. So you can’t change the government without agreement from Russian society. That is something that led to the conflict with Georgia in 2008 and that is something that led to the conflict with Ukraine, because it’s just simply a question of the master or owner of this space, who is the main person who should be asked about everything.

    Russia in its English-language media, such as Russia Today, portrays Russia’s actions as basically just a response to U.S. imperialism, as if Russia itself is not imperialist but rather an anti-imperialist power

    Russian foreign policy is not a policy based on any kind of view of how the world should look. There’s no kind of our own “Pax Americana” or something like this. In this sense, Russia is not the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union had a kind of project for the world; a clear alternative to the values and ideas [of the West]. There is nothing like this in Russian foreign policy. … Russia as a realist, cynical world force, wants to discuss its place in the world: the size of their piece of the cake. That’s the explanation you always hear from Putin . . . that everyone has their interests in this world, everyone wants to benefit from everything, so we want to understand the rules of the game.

    I mean, if the left are ready to support this kind of logic, even if this kind of logic in some ways confronts American imperialism, I probably don’t agree with this left in a very fundamental way. I think that one of the main mistakes of a very big part of the left for years was the idea that imperialism can only be American; that if you talk about imperialism, we mean the United States, because there are not any other imperialist powers. But if we look back at the Marxist definition of imperialism we will find that imperialism, it’s always a conflict. It’s a conflict between states, between capitalist interests, and it always leads to a kind of military confrontation with the blocs of interests, like it was in the first world war. . . . So you should simply recognize that yes, even if we have no justification for American imperialism, we should recognize that there are other imperialisms. And you can’t find among these imperialisms something that is more progressive or objectively progressive than the other.

    For the American left, of course for them only American imperialism exists, yes? I can’t understand it. . . . In Russia, there are a lot of leftists who also believe that Russia is the main evil in the world, it’s a reactionary empire, and it should be destroyed. Or, at the same time, you have a lot of leftists who believe somehow Russia is resisting American imperialism [and] who support these “republics” in the East of Ukraine.

    But you have a huge provincialization of the left as a whole because they can’t even understand each other and every leftist community, they believe in their own national reality. And that’s why they can be so easily manipulated. By whom? By Russia Today? I think it’s a very pitiable situation because the Russian propaganda machine, which is not the most clever, not so smart . . . it can so easily manipulate such a big sector of the Western left. It points to the problem of the Western left itself, but not the strength of Russia Today.

Viewing 12 posts - 1 through 12 (of 12 total)
  • You must be logged in to reply to this topic.

Comments are closed.