3 million killed in Korea

Link: http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/

How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear
In 1950, Harry Truman had to decide whether to use B-29s to drop atomic bombs.

On the final night of World War II, hundreds of U.S. Army Air Forces B-29s swarmed over Japan, severing the frayed threads of Japanese resistance. Coming at the end of a long war, those mid-August 1945 missions should have been a curtain call for the world’s preeminent heavy bomber.

The following year, most of the thousands of Boeing Superfortresses that had served in the Pacific were stored at the vast Davis-Monthan airfield near Tucson, Arizona, to be mothballed or scrapped. The airplane that had demonstrated that one bomber could destroy a city with one bomb would, it was assumed, hand the baton to a rising generation of bombers powered by jet engines. As it turned out, the B-29’s retirement didn’t last. Although underpowered and inclined to engine fires, the Superfortress remained America’s indispensable airplane—the only one in the world configured to deliver the enormous plutonium bombs of the day.

In January 1950, U.S. intelligence analysts predicted trouble in Korea. Like Germany, the country had emerged from World War II divided. The Soviet Union occupied Korean territory north of the 38th parallel; the United States occupied the south. The north inherited much of the infrastructure—bridges, railroads, hydroelectric complexes, and heavy industry—remaining from more than 30 years of Japanese occupation, less what the Soviets had taken home at the end of the war. The south was the peninsula’s rice bowl.

The intelligence community, noting Soviet-equipped North Korean troops massed north of the 38th parallel, predicted an attack in June. Few took the prediction seriously, but on Sunday, June 25, North Korean ground and air forces poured into South Korea, beginning what might be called the First Korean War.

There was a second Korean war, one that has been studied and discussed even less than the first, which some have called “the forgotten war.” The second one was nuclear. It consisted of a series of threats, feints, and practice runs, and it very nearly made it to the Korean battlefield.

the u.s. far east air force (FEAF) quickly mobilized its modest post-World War II resources. Three days after the invasion, four B-29s from the 19th Bombardment Group struck what military targets they could find in the narrow band between Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and the 38th parallel, just to the north of the city.

The bombers had been stationed at Andersen Air Force Base, on Guam, then moved to Kadena Air Base, on Okinawa, which put them within 800 miles of the battle zone. Two days later, 15 Superforts attacked North Korean forces massing along the north bank of the Han River in preparation for moving on Seoul.

The 98th Bombardment Group deployed its B-29s to Yokota Air Base, some 20 miles west of downtown Tokyo, and about 720 miles from the fight. Under the aegis of FEAF Bomber Command, the Superforts began chipping away at the advancing North Koreans. Back in the United States, mothballed B-29s were refurbished and aircrews recalled.

Initially at least, there was not much to fear from flak or from North Korea’s prop-driven Yaks and Sturmoviks, which were easy targets for the North American P-51s and Lockheed P-80 jet fighters that escorted the bombers. Over Japan in World War II, B-29s had encountered so little opposition that all but their tail guns had been removed, saving weight for bombs and fuel. For Korea, the guns were restored.

Dean Allan was a left gunner who signed up for a four-year tour in January 1951, seven months after the war had started. He remembers the routine followed by the B-29 crews who flew night missions from Yokota. Most mission days had a briefing at six in the evening outlining the target, weather, and, as Allan says, “what to expect. We’d load the aircraft about 1900.” After the preflight checks, he says, the “chaplain came out and wished us luck. We’d usually take off about dusk, fly south to the ocean, cross Japan. We’d test-fire the guns about halfway between Japan and Korea. By the time we crossed into North Korea, we were up to 29 or 30,000 feet.”

What forced the B-29s into exclusive night missions was the arrival of Soviet-built MiG-15s, but in the early days of the air war, the greatest enemy was less the North Koreans than strategic dithering by competing staffs. Analysts, generals, and politicians in Washington and Tokyo, determined to keep the war little, nervously pondered what might provoke Soviet or Chinese intervention.

The result was a crippling web of constraints on the people fighting the air war. Targets north of the 38th parallel were off limits, so strategic bombing could not do what it did best: Strike far beyond the battle line to cut the enemy’s paths of reinforcement and supply. Lingering memories of the fire-bombing of Japan took incendiaries off the table, along with the area bombing of cities. Only sites of military import would be hit. And God help anyone who strayed across the Yalu River, which separated North Korea and Manchuria.

Target selection was done in Tokyo, where General Douglas MacArthur had set up headquarters to rule the United Nations campaign. But more often than not, those targets were not where they were thought to be. The maps available at the beginning of the conflict did not describe Korea very well. What looked like a bridge on an old map might be revealed as a shallow ford across a stream.

By the end of the summer of 1950, it seemed possible that the good guys would lose. Republic of Korea and U.N. forces had retreated to a toehold around Pusan, in the extreme southeastern corner of the peninsula. B-29s were sent to relieve some of the pressure on the encircled troops, joining flocks of P-51 Mustangs, Douglas B-26 Invaders, and fighter-bombers (Grumman F9Fs, McDonnell F2Hs, and Douglas A-1s) from offshore carriers to provide ground support—no easy task for the B-29s, which bombed from 10,000 feet. Despite such efforts, the North Korean juggernaut threatened to push the U.N. forces into the sea.

the other korean waR—the nuclear one—had entered the strategic conversation as soon as North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel, and persisted as a kind of play within a play.

By 1949, the Mark 4 plutonium bomb had replaced the demanding Mark 3 (see “How to Deploy a Mark 3” p. 36). About the same size as its predecessor, the new bomb was manufactured, not handmade, and easier to handle. By the time of the North Korean aggression, nearly 300 Mark 4 bombs were in the U.S. stockpile.

And America’s nuclear monopoly was largely intact. The first Soviet bomb test had been conducted in August 1949; the first Soviet air drop would not be made until 1951. China was years away from its first test. Intercontinental ballistic missiles were still a gleam in the military eye. For the moment, the United States remained the only nation capable of delivering an atomic bomb to a distant target.

Given that advantage, and with defeat thick in the air as the difficult summer ended, people wondered why the United States would not take advantage of its nuclear singularity. But others questioned the specialness of the weapons. What was the difference between being blown up by conventional explosives and being vaporized by a radioactive fireball? The Atomic Energy Commission, which developed and built the bombs, certainly believed there was a difference and retained tight custody of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the world war, no atomic bombs had been placed in U.S. military custody, and none had left the United States.

And there was the underlying fear that an atomic bombardment might not produce a decisive victory after all—that the nuclear deterrent would not deter. Because no one had much experience with this new class of weapon or warfare, strategic planning for the war in Korea was more than a heated battleground—it was nuclear kindergarten.

According to Roger Dingman, a history professor emeritus at the University of Southern California, the nuclear Korean war quietly led to a clever bit of statecraft that would, at best, encourage the cessation of conventional hostilities or, at worst, drag the United States and its allies into real nuclear war. The ploy was a modern equivalent of gunboat diplomacy, using B-29s instead of men-of-war.

In July 1950, President Truman ordered Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command, to send B-29s to Great Britain, putting the bombers within easy striking distance of the western Soviet Union. “The order grew out of General [Hoyt] Vandenberg’s desire to do something to counter the impression of ineffectiveness conveyed by the meager results of American bombing in Korea,” writes Dingman in a 1988 issue of International Security. He points out that this was not the first occasion of Superfortress statesmanship. In 1948, after the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, two squadrons of B-29s were deployed to Western Europe. During the Berlin crisis, it was a bluff. The B-29s were not configured to handle nuclear weapons.

In the reprise of the Berlin bluff, the bombers were nuclear-capable, and each carried a fully assembled Mark 4 bomb. The fissile cores, however, remained in the United States.

Three weeks later, again on the president’s orders, the Strategic Air Command sent 10 atomic-capable B-29s, also carrying assembled bombs without their plutonium cores, to Guam. They were soon augmented by 10 more bombers. For the first time since 1945, atomic bombs, complete but for the nuclear cores, were transferred to military custody. All that was needed was someone to light a match.

Then everything changed.

On September 15, U.N. forces, spearheaded by U.S. Marines, carried out an amphibious landing at Inchon, about 20 miles west of Seoul. MacArthur had long argued for this counter-strike, but the tactic had been vetoed as too risky.

The Inchon landing turned out to be a brilliant flanking attack. U.N. forces quickly retook Seoul and severed the North Koreans’ supply lines. Walton Walker’s Eighth Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter and formed up with other allied units. By early October, American forces had pushed across the 38th parallel and taken the North Korean capital, Pyongyang. Before October was out, U.N. forces had advanced to the Yalu River. The war, most observers believed, would be won by Christmas.

The B-29s from Yokota and Kadena flew in the vanguard of the advance, hitting trains, bridges, ammunition and fuel factories, and depots—anything that fed North Korean forces in the south. As the effort evolved into a full-blown strategic bombing campaign, the North’s heavy industry was added to the target list.

Despite the labyrinthine process of obtaining U.N. approval for every change in targeting, the original constraints on the B-29s began to drop away. At first, the medium bombers were not allowed to hit targets within 50 miles of the Yalu River, and were forbidden to cross the line into Manchuria. The 50-mile limit soon dropped to 20 miles, then several, then “as close to the border as may be necessary.” By the end of October, U.N. forces occupied all of North Korea. Still, Chinese territory stayed off limits.

By then, the bombing campaign had destroyed much of what could be destroyed from the air, and the Superforts seemed to have worked themselves out of a job. MacArthur sent two bomber groups, the 22nd and 92nd, back to the United States.

In late November, communist China began to turn over its cards. It had already covertly sent troops into North Korea. Now, that secret contingent was joined by a fresh infusion from Manchuria, creating a force of some 200,000. As this wave of seasoned soldiers broke across the battle lines, the U.N. and Republic of Korea forces found themselves once more in retreat.

With the Chinese intervention, the United States confronted a hard truth: Threatening a nuclear attack would not be enough to win the war. It was as if the Chinese hadn’t noticed—or, worse, weren’t impressed by—the atomic-capable B-29s waiting at Guam.

President Truman raised the ante. At a November press conference, he told reporters he would take whatever steps were necessary to win in Korea, including the use of nuclear weapons. Those weapons, he added, would be controlled by military commanders in the field.

In April of the next year, Truman put the finishing touches on Korea’s nuclear war. He allowed nine nuclear bombs with fissile cores to be transferred into Air Force custody and transported to Okinawa. Truman also authorized another deployment of atomic-capable B-29s to Okinawa. Strategic Air Command set up a command-and-control team in Tokyo.

This spate of atomic diplomacy coincided with the end of the role played by Douglas MacArthur. After MacArthur had publicly and repeatedly differed with the president over military strategy in Korea, Truman replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway, who was given “qualified authority” to use the bombs if he felt he had to.

In October, there would be an epilogue of sorts to the Korean nuclear war. Operation Hudson Harbor would conduct several mock atomic bombing runs with dummy or conventional bombs across the war zone. Called “terrifying” by some historians, Hudson Harbor merely tested the complex nuclear-strike machinery, as the Strategic Air Command had been doing for years over American cities.

But the nuclear Korean war had already ended. In June 1951, the atomic-capable B-29s flew home, carrying their special weapons with them. They had never entered the battle zone proper, and they had not been part of FEAF Bomber Command’s strategic bombing campaign.

According to cold war historian John Lewis Gaddis, who was interviewed about the Korean War for a 1999 PBS documentary “American Experience: Race for the Superbomb,” the role of the atomic bomb was undefined. “It’s one of the biggest dogs that did not bark in the entire cold war,” says Gaddis. “There was no clear strategy worked out ahead of time for what the role of nuclear weapons in the limited war would be. You’re talking about a war, particularly after the Chinese intervene, with peasants coming down mountain trails carrying everything on their backs. And this was simply not what the atomic bomb had been built for. The only way that you can make the atomic bomb credible is precisely by not using—by keeping it out there as a kind of mysterious, awesome force. That to use it would actually cheapen it somehow.”

Conventional bombing had, however, taken a toll on North Korea’s civilian population. In The United States Air Force in Korea 1950 –1953 by historian Robert F. Futrell, he includes a description of the town of Huichon written by General William F. Dean, who was held prisoner in North Korea: “The city I’d seen before—two-storied buildings, a prominent main street—wasn’t there anymore. I think no important bridge between Pyongyang and Kanggye had been missed, and most of the towns were just rubble or snowy open spaces where buildings had been. The little towns, once full of people, were unoccupied shells. The villagers lived in entirely new temporary villages, hidden in canyons or in such positions that only a major bombing effort could reach them.”

by the spring of 1952, the ground war in Korea had settled into a variant of trench warfare, with both sides taking and losing small patches of ground. Armistice talks had begun the previous July in the ancient Korean capital of Kaesong, and later moved to the site of Panmunjom. As in the ground war, the talks dragged on without much movement.

In the air, however, there was no stalemate. Conventionally armed B-29s continued to hammer northern targets. Along the Yalu and around heavily defended targets, batteries of radar-guided searchlights illuminated the bombers at night, exposing them to radar-controlled flak batteries and to MiGs circling invisibly overhead.

B-29 gunner Dean Allan remembers one of the strategies for surviving missions at this stage of the war. He says the bombers made their runs at staggered altitudes and three to five minutes apart, which forced the anti-aircraft gunners to keep readjusting their settings. “Usually it was one wing one day, another wing the next, flying every three to five days,” he says. Some of the missions, however, required the participation of all of the Japan-based wings, with up to 80 aircraft on the attack.

Each bomber typically carried 39 500-pound bombs with delayed-action fuses and at least one magnesium flare to illuminate the target area for photography and to light up the target for bombardiers farther back in the stream. After the final bomb run, the bombardier, who had been in control of the aircraft, would hand control back to the pilot.

Robert Sorensen was the copilot on Allan’s B-29, ominously named Trouble Brewer. “The key thing was don’t be illuminated by a searchlight,” says Sorensen. “MiGs were up there, but they had to get you in the light.”

Far below the nocturnal raiders, Douglas B-26 Invaders scoured the countryside for targets of opportunity. “Often we would see line after line of trucks bringing North Korean supplies,” says Allan. “We’d tell [operations] and they’d send B-26s up.”

The relationship with the Invader was symbiotic. B-26s were often tasked with shutting off the searchlights plaguing the Superforts. With an array of forward-firing .50-caliber guns, the B-26s were deadly strafers. But these attacks bathed them in light, and B-26 pilots, according to one of their number, were not keen on searchlight duty.

“By the time we got back to Yokota, it was four or five a.m., often socked in,” says Allan. “More than once we had to go somewhere else.”

On their ninth mission in Trouble Brewer, on June 24, Sorensen recalls: “We couldn’t land at Yokota, so we had to go to the next field. Kadena was too far away. We picked Ashiya air base in Japan, a fighter base with a 5,800-foot runway built for Zeros. We landed well, got on the brakes, but we could see we couldn’t stop. At the end of the runway was an embankment beyond which was a 500-foot drop into the Sea of Japan. We hit the embankment, bounced into it. If we’d bounced higher we would have gone over. The airplane broke in half.”

The only casualty was the bombardier, who broke both ankles. The pilot and flight engineer went on to other things. The rest of the Trouble Brewer crew, with Max Kinnard as the new aircraft commander and a new flight engineer and bombardier, moved on to another B-29, which they named Police Action—“a wonderful airplane that got us home,” says Sorensen. “We finished 27 missions in total with our favorite old bird.”

Kinnard was one of those generous commanders who share left-seat duties with the copilot. “After a couple of missions, he split left-seat time with me,” says Sorensen. “I logged about 200 hours of first-pilot combat time. Of all the pilots I knew during my five years in the Air Force, Max was the one who most clearly had ‘the Right Stuff.’ ”

For one of the crew’s post-Korea reunions, Sorensen annotated his log of those missions with the detailed narrative that appeared in Futrell’s book. The brief matter-of-fact entry for June 9 describes a 6:45 p.m. takeoff to bomb a railroad bridge. This is how Futrell described the flight: “…Four B-29s of the 19th Bomb Group were dispatched on a bombing mission against a railroad bridge at Kwaksan. Twenty-four searchlights locked on them and kept them completely illuminated. Twelve MiG jet fighters attacked them. One B-29 exploded over the target, a second went down somewhere over North Korea, and a third was badly damaged but managed to make an emergency landing at Kimpo.” After that mission, the B-29s had black gloss lacquer painted on their bellies.

On July 30, Police Action joined 62 other B-29s for an attack on the Oriental Light Metals Company near Sinuiju, only four miles from the Yalu River. According to Futrell, it was the largest strike against a single target of the Korean War. The target was deep in MiG territory, but a thin stratus layer protected the bombers from the searchlights.

Sorensen’s log is a summary of priorities: bridges, railroad marshalling yards, hydroelectric plants, factories, and supply centers. And of course dropping leaflets urging enemy troops to surrender.

Police Action and the other medium bombers were also flying ground support, or “primer,” missions. “They’d give us a ground controller,” says Sorensen. “We put the bombs out in sequence, walked them right up the hillside. People down on the ground [would say] ‘Would you make one more run?’ ”

On October 8 the crew flew Police Action into combat for the last time. It was one of 10 B-29s raiding the Kowan Supply Center in a daylight formation attack. The bombers had Navy F2H Banshee fighters for escorts—a “great way to end a combat tour,” noted Sorensen.

After the Police Action crew returned to the States, Sorensen moved on to the new B-47, whose advent required gunners like Dean Allan to find something else to do (he wound up in supply). Five of the 11 airmen are still alive: Sorensen; Allan; Joe English, the central fire control gunner; Ken Russell, the right gunner; and tail-gunner Jay Lynn.

By the time the armistice was signed, on July 27, 1953, B-29s had more than paid their way. The old bombers had flown 21,000 sorties and dropped 167,000 tons of bombs. Says Allan: “By the time we left, there wasn’t any electricity in North Korea.”

The bombers also paid a price. Thirty-four B-29s were lost in combat, and 14 to accidents or “other causes.” Police Action missed the armistice party. On November 19, 1952, about three weeks after Sorensen and the others headed home, the beloved B-29 was shot down by enemy fighters.

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To me, it was unconscionable that we invaded, or that we backed Rhee in the first place.

Again, I think, in our entire history, there are only two wars we can make a case for: 1812 and WWII. And within those two, we committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, and those should never be swept under the rug of forgotten histories.

Yes, dozens and dozens of empires/nation-states have done the same or worse throughout the ages. But that doesn’t excuse our actions, and we can’t control the actions of those others nations anyway, just our own — in theory, at least. It’s long past time we stop glorifying, romanticizing wars, or their justification. They’re almost all unjustified, and this needs to be taught on our schools.

Innocent people always get killed and injured in war. It’s unavoidable, which makes war something that just should not be an option outside of self defense.

I did not know the history of Syngman Rhee. We have a bad track record of backing ruthless dictators as opposition to Communism.

This spate of atomic diplomacy coincided with the end of the role played by Douglas MacArthur. After MacArthur had publicly and repeatedly differed with the president over military strategy in Korea, Truman replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway, who was given “qualified authority” to use the bombs if he felt he had to.

Still too much missing but better than this:

“…brought the peninsula to the brink of nuclear conflagration, if American generals had their way at the time.”

zn wrote:

I would say the Korean was entirely justifiable and that the South Korean leadership at the time is irrelevant. As events have shown, South Korea was redeemable. North Korea never was and never will be. I have no complaints about bombing North Korea because they started the war—it was a flat out invasion that came just short of succeeding. If Korea because a Stalin proxy that entire region would be far less stable and Japan would have been forced to be an adversarial military state locked in local conflict.

3 million died and that included South Koreans killed by North Korean forces. This is one reason I never buy into the left-wing upside down versions of right-wing propaganda pieces. I prefer the real way of wide-ranging historical sources and real historical analysis, not commie kids camp sloganizing.

Sloganizing is just regressive no matter who does it. I always prefer real analysis. My view on that has always been and always will be this–sloganizing is just the worst of the right turned upside down.

.

Well, I see the sloganizing coming from the “official” line that says it was justified, and I haven’t seen any “real analysis” to support it. I also disagree with your dismissal of alternative takes as coming from “commie kids.” The articles I’ve read on the subject are based primarily on Korea’s own “truth and reconciliation” projects, not from “commie kids.”

Also: It doesn’t prove what you say it proves — that because the NK government is so horrific now, our actions after WWII wouldn’t have mattered. We sided with the South, which instantly and radically improved their chances to survive and eventually — it took thirty more years — become more “democratic.” Logic tells us that if we had chosen the North instead, a similar progression should have occurred, at least. It’s not as if they were different species, North and South. They were all Koreans. All of them. Why would you think that our support of the North wouldn’t have resulted in at least as much progress — which, of course, is in the eye of the beholder — as the South finally achieved?

Same thing goes for the Russian Revolution of 1917. How different would the world be right now if the West, instead of doing everything it could to crush a truly leftist, popular rebellion, had supported it? Is it not highly likely that the West’s endless and violent assault, embargo, fomenting civil wars there, actually made it far, far more likely that a Lenin or a Stalin would arise? Is it not far more likely that the West’s violent opposition to any and all leftist, popular rebellions worldwide actually help those nations become despotic in reaction to this?

If we’re going to play the counterfactual game, let’s do that “real analysis” you’re talking about. Let’s look at all the historical sources, including things like the Koreans’ truth and reconciliation writings, etc.

• This reply was modified 7 years, 1 month ago by Billy_T.

zn wrote:

Well, I see the sloganizing coming from the “official” line that says it was justified

I don’t care about the “official line.” So much so that I could not actually tell you what it is. The idea that it was justifiable is my own determination.

The “sloganizing” comment was aimed at the original article starting this thread. I don’t care, I don’t like that kind of stuff. When the left dumbs down. And I wasn’t debating that, I was declaring a vote. That’s how I vote on that kind of writing. If someone votes different good for them.

That’s fine. I get the vote thing. But would you admit that we’ll never know what would have become of Korea if we had chosen the North instead, or just stayed out completely? Its current regime doesn’t tell us anything regarding that. It doesn’t in any way prove it was beyond redemption, as you suggest, if history had been altered. Radically alter history back then, and logic tells us Korea is on a radically different course now.

Remember, after WWII, Koreans, north and south, wanted unification. They didn’t want partition. The allies forced that to happen, against the will of the Korean people. So we set the table for civil war right off the bat.

Short video by Chomsky on the subject.

zn wrote:

I get the vote thing. But would you admit that we’ll never know what would have become of Korea if we had chosen the North instead,

Well it doesn’t interest me to speculate about that. Though I can’t imagine a world where anything ever associated with totalitarian North Korea is considered worth defending.

I also don’t approach these things as herd board style debates where someone keeps going at it cause they actually think they can win. That requires a level of energy I am just not interested in investing in this topic.

I think the history says it was justifiable. You don’t. So, that’s 2 different votes in the informal poll.

Come on, ZN. No one here is “defending totalitarian North Korea.” Not in any way, shape or form. And it’s a cheap shot for you to throw that out there.

And I’m not trying to keep this going because I “think I can win.” That’s not my thing. You said you prefer strong analysis instead of slogans. I countered by saying that has to include things like Korea’s own truth and reconciliation projects, which simply don’t support US intervention at the time, or before that. They wanted what the allies prevented, in fact: unification. They didn’t want partition. They didn’t want us to support a hard-right dictator in the south who committed prewar and wartime atrocities. They didn’t want a dictator in the north, either, of course.

Vote any way you want. But please stop with the straw men.

Another obvious key here: In 1950, America had no way of knowing how Korea would look in 2017. Duh, as the young kids used to say. So it’s absurd to try to read justification into the actions of those in power back then, based on what happened decades later. They couldn’t possibly know. And at the time, the hard-right government in the south was no better than the one in the north. History actually shows us it was worse. At the time. In 1950. It was worse.

So America made its choice, at the time, based upon circumstances that existed at the time, not based on time travel to 2017, and then an assessment based on that. And, again, even if it could perform that particular feat of magic, if it didn’t ALSO know how Korea might have turned out if it had stayed out, or favored the north, then it still wouldn’t have been a proper basis for that decision.

Was it justified based upon how things were in 1950? Um, no. Not at all. Not given the actually existing behavior of the respective governments, north and south at the time, which were both abysmal . . . and certainly not when the Korean people are asked for their “vote” in the context of 1950 or prior to that.

From Wiki:

Soviet occupation and division of Korea (1945–50)
Main articles: Division of Korea and History of North Korea
Suspected communist sympathizers awaiting execution in May 1948 after the Jeju Uprising

At the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was divided into two zones along the 38th parallel, with the northern half of the peninsula occupied by the Soviet Union and the southern half by the United States. Initial hopes for a unified, independent Korea evaporated as the politics of the Cold War resulted in the establishment of two separate states with diametrically opposed political, economic, and social systems.

Soviet general Terentii Shtykov recommended the establishment of the Soviet Civil Authority in October 1945, and supported Kim Il-sung as chairman of the Provisional People’s Committee for North Korea, established in February 1946. During the provisional government, Shtykov’s chief accomplishment was a sweeping land reform program that broke North Korea’s stratified class system. Landlords and Japanese collaborators fled to the South, where there was no land reform and sporadic unrest. Shtykov nationalized key industries and led the Soviet delegation to talks on the future of Korea in Moscow and Seoul.[43][44][45][46][47] In September 1946, South Korean citizens had risen up against the Allied Military Government. In April 1948, an uprising of the Jeju islanders was violently crushed. The South declared its statehood in May 1948 and two months later the ardent anti-communist Syngman Rhee[48] became its ruler. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was established in the North on 9 September 1948. Shtykov served as the first Soviet ambassador, while Kim Il-sung became premier.

Soviet forces withdrew from the North in 1948 and most American forces withdrew from the South in 1949. Ambassador Shtykov suspected Rhee was planning to invade the North, and was sympathetic to Kim’s goal of Korean unification under socialism. The two successfully lobbied Joseph Stalin to support a short blitzkrieg of the South, which culminated in the outbreak of the Korean War.[43][44][45][46]

This is just one quick summary, but I’m just not finding any credible histories that show a “totalitarian North” and the absence of that in the South. I’m seeing histories that describe both halves of the partition as having terrible governments, but with the North being less terrible at the time.

Also seeing that both the South and the North were aggressors at various times. It was never a scenario of white hats against black hats. More black hats against black hats, etc. The North feared the South would invade it. The South feared the North would, etc. etc. But the Korean people wanted unification.

I think the allies could have prevented this from ever becoming a problem in 1945 — and the allies once included the Soviet Union, of course.

ZN,

Again, this isn’t about me persuading you to change your mind. I accept that you won’t. I’m making my own case, regardless, without any expectation of that altering your beliefs. In a sense, it’s an exercise, a way to hone my own arguments. I long ago gave up on the idea that minds are changed in these forums.

So a last word on the subject, and then I’ll bow out. Perhaps WV wants to add more, but I’ve had my say.

You mentioned the “warmongering north” got what it deserved. But, again, the south, at the time, was at least equal in matters of “warmongering.” From my readings, it was worse, in fact. It committed worse atrocities, again, at the time. So, if “warmongering” is the factor/rationale/variable that makes the war justifiable, America should have fought against both governments, north and south — which, of course, is kinda crazy. So that wasn’t a real option. Staying out of the entire thing made far more sense — at the time.

Anyway, that’s it for me. Hope all is well in Maine.

Just some info. So if people want they can read more than one take.

===

The Korean War

http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-152

Summary and Keywords

On June 25, 1950, North Korea’s invasion of South Korea ignited a conventional war that had origins dating from at least the end of World War II. In April 1945, President Harry S. Truman abandoned a trusteeship plan for postwar Korea in favor of seeking unilateral U.S. occupation of the peninsula after an atomic attack forced Japan’s prompt surrender. Soviet entry into the Pacific war led to a last minute agreement dividing Korea at the 38th parallel into zones of occupation. Two Koreas emerged after Soviet-American negotiations failed to agree on a plan to end the division. Kim Il Sung in the north and Syngman Rhee in the south both were determined to reunite Korea, instigating major military clashes at the parallel in the summer of 1949. Moscow and Washington opposed their clients’ invasion plans until April 1950 when Kim persuaded Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin that with mass support in South Korea, he would achieve a quick victory.

At first, Truman hoped that South Korea could defend itself with more military equipment and U.S. air support. Commitment of U.S. ground forces came after General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. occupation commander in Japan, visited the front and advised that the South Koreans could not halt the advance. Overconfident U.S. soldiers would sustain defeat as well, retreating to the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula. On September 15, MacArthur staged a risky amphibious landing at Inchon behind enemy lines that sent Communist forces fleeing back into North Korea. The People’s Republic of China viewed the U.S. offensive for reunification that followed as a threat to its security and prestige. In late November, Chinese “volunteers” attacked in mass. After a chaotic retreat, U.S. forces counterattacked in February 1951 and moved the line of battle just north of the parallel. After two Chinese offensives failed, negotiations to end the war began in July 1951, but stalemated in May 1952 over the issue of repatriation of prisoners of war. Peace came because of Stalin’s death in March 1953, rather than President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s veiled threat to stage nuclear strikes against China.

Scholars have disagreed about many issues surrounding the Korean War, but the most important debate continues to center on whether the conflict had international or domestic origins. Initially, historians relied mainly on U.S. government publications to write accounts that ignored events prior to North Korea’s attack, endorsing an orthodox interpretation assigning blame to the Soviet Union and applauding the U.S. response. Declassification of U.S. government documents and presidential papers during the 1970s led to the publication of studies assigning considerable responsibility to the United States for helping to create a kind of war in Korea before June 1950. Moreover, left revisionist writers labeled the conflict a classic civil war. Release of Chinese and Soviet sources after 1989 established that Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong approved the North Korean invasion, prompting right revisionist scholars to reassert key orthodox arguments. This essay describes how and why recent access to Communist documents has not settled the disagreements among historians about the causes, course, and consequences of the Korean War.

Keywords: 38th parallel, border clashes, North Korea’s attack, Pusan Perimeter, Inchon Landing, Chinese intervention, truce talks, prisoner repatriation, left revisionism, right revisionism

Popular wisdom dates the start of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, when a North Korean Communist army invaded South Korea. Another assumption holds that the Soviet Union ordered the attack as part of its plan to use military means to achieve global conquest. President Harry S. Truman provided support for this perception just two days after the hostilities began. On June 27, he told the American people that North Korea’s attack on South Korea demonstrated that world “communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.”1 This assessment reflected Truman’s conviction that North Korea, like the nations of Eastern Europe, was a puppet of the Soviet Union and its leader Kim Il Sung was acting on instructions from Moscow. Top administration officials, as well as the general public, fully shared these assumptions.2 Prior to the 1970s, few histories of the war challenged this traditional explanation, providing only brief, if any, coverage of events in Korea before the day of North Korea’s attack. Once scholars began to gain access to primary sources, however, they reached a firm consensus that the origins of the Korean War date from at least the end of World War II. Moreover, the new evidence revealed that developments inside Korea were as important as international factors in determining the causes, course, and consequences of the conflict.

Origins of the Korean War

Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910 created the circumstances that led ultimately to the Korean conflict. As a result of Japan’s conquest, Korea’s liberation necessarily became an objective of the Allies in World War II. Before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, the United States had no vital interests in this remote East Asian country and was largely indifferent to its fate, although it had been the first Western nation to sign a treaty with Korea in 1882. After December 7, 1941, however, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, recognizing the importance of this strategic peninsula for the preservation of future peace in the Pacific, advocated a postwar trusteeship to achieve Korea’s independence. At the end of the Cairo Conference in December 1943, Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and China’s Jiang Jieshi announced that the Allies, “mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”3 Some writers have faulted Washington for not supporting Korean exiles in China and recognizing their Korean Provisional Government (KPG), but others argue that the United States was realistic in promoting a multinational trusteeship to manage Korea’s postwar transition to independence.4

Korea would not regain its sovereignty after World War II. For years after the Korean War began, the standard narrative was that at the Yalta Conference early in 1945, Roosevelt struck a deal with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin to divide Korea.5 In fact, at that meeting, the president gained Stalin’s endorsement for his four-power trusteeship plan to avert a revival of past Sino-Russian competition for control over the peninsula. The emerging Soviet-American rivalry, however, would produce a different and unfortunate outcome. When Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, he expected Soviet actions in Korea to mirror Stalin’s expansionist policies in Eastern Europe. Almost immediately, he began to search for an alternative to trusteeship that would remove any chance for a repetition of “sovietization.” The atomic bomb seemed to offer a solution. Japan’s prompt surrender after an atomic attack would preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific war and allow the United States to occupy Korea unilaterally. But Truman’s gamble failed. When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8 and sent the Red Army into Korea before U.S. leaders expected Moscow to do so, Truman proposed and Stalin accepted Korea’s division into Soviet and American zones of military occupation at the 38th parallel.6

U.S. military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945. Historians continue to debate whether the U.S. Army deserves either direct or indirect responsibility for the violent clashes that disrupted the U.S. zone for five years after the end of World War II. Without much preparation, the War Department had redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea to accept the surrender of Japanese forces. While the hasty U.S. occupation was a tactical military success, the U.S. government’s failure to provide Hodge with a specific plan for reunification and civil administration contributed to creating conditions resulting in the emergence of a Korean civil war. Comprised of approximately forty-five thousand soldiers who were ignorant about Korea’s history or culture, the U.S. occupation force was unable to maintain order because Koreans wanted independence, rather than occupation. But the onset of the Cold War in Europe, historians agree, raised the odds against realizing the U.S. objective of creating the foundation for postwar prosperity and democracy in a united Korea.

Studies of the American occupation of southern Korea from 1945 to 1948 have advanced very different assessments of the performance of the U.S. military. Hodge’s defenders blame his failures on U.S. officials in Washington, who waited until nine months after arrival before providing him with detailed instructions to govern his operations. Moreover, despite very limited resources, the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was successful in its efforts to relieve human suffering, revive the economy, and introduce an administrative infrastructure. In addition, the USAMGIK promoted land reform, while American military advisors built a constabulary force after 1946 that became the nucleus for a future national army.7 Some scholars, however, fault the USAMGIK for not acting promptly to bring the KPG back from exile in China and placing it in power in the south alone. The United States then could have avoided the ill-advised decision to resurrect a trusteeship that ignited internal warfare among the people of southern Korea.8

Serious mistakes, however, would have a greater impact than the USAMGIK’s positive accomplishments. For example, the U.S. military established in southern Korea an authoritarian government that imitated the Japanese colonial model. American occupation officials also relied for advice on rich landlords and businessmen who could speak English, leading to appointment of them to top positions in an interim government. Many of these individuals had collaborated with the Japanese and were insensitive to the demands of Korean peasants and workers for economic and social reforms.9 Ultimate responsibility for the failures of the occupation rests with Hodge as a consequence of his administrative inexperience, instinctive anti-communism, and fixation with maintaining security. Sharing his fears, U.S. military advisors recruited rightwing extremists who had served in the Japanese army as officers in the Korean constabulary army. Determination to build an anti-Communist bulwark in South Korea explained the USAMGIK’s toleration of rightist paramilitary groups waging a reign of terror against leftist politicians and alleged supporters.10

Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime, acted purposefully to build popular support. U.S. government publications for two decades after World War II emphasized that the Soviet Union had entered Korea with a pre-conceived plan to create in northern Korea a Stalinist state modeled after those it was installing in Eastern Europe. Adding to this orthodox interpretation, initial historical accounts would define Stalin’s postwar goals in Korea as first to realize an historic Russian objective of acquiring warm-water ports and second to create a buffer zone against an expected revival of Japanese aggression.11 Subsequent release of Soviet documents showed, however, that Stalin had not developed plans for postwar Korea because he did not expect to occupy the country.12 Upon arrival, Soviet occupation officials, in contrast to their American counterparts, recognized the authority of local people’s committees that the Koreans had formed after Japan’s surrender. But they also put selected leaders in places of national authority, notably wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung.

During the fall of 1945, Soviet occupation officials rejected U.S. requests for cooperation and coordination across the 38th parallel. Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe reinforced Moscow’s determination to consolidate Communist control in northern Korea. Hoping to prevent Korea’s permanent division, the United States persuaded the Soviet Union to accept a revived trusteeship formula at the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Bilateral negotiations in the spring of 1946 in Korea’s capital at Seoul failed to reach an agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to allow and Washington insisted upon consultation with anti-Soviet politicians who opposed trusteeship. Talks adjourned in early May with neither side willing to acquiesce in an agreement that might strengthen its adversary in Korea. By then, Soviet occupation officials, partnering with Korean Communists, implemented comprehensive political, social, and economic changes. The reform program included expropriation of land that belonged to Japanese collaborators, large landlords, and the church. In addition to nationalization of all industry, transportation, communications, and banking, it also mandated an eight-hour workday and declared sexual equality.

Two Koreas in Conflict

Reform measures in northern Korea had a dramatic negative impact on southern Korea, as members of the propertied classes fled southward and added to escalating distress in the U.S. zone. Unable to halt political and economic deterioration, U.S. occupation officials strongly urged Washington to order prompt withdrawal. Intensifying pressure on the United States to leave was a steady decline in defense spending as part of postwar demobilization. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added weight to the argument for withdrawal when, in response to a State Department request, they advised that Korea had little strategic significance for the United States. But with Communist power growing in China, the Truman administration was reluctant to desert southern Korea, fearful of political criticism at home and damage to U.S. credibility abroad. Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the United States decided to refer the Korean dispute to the United Nations in September 1947, which resulted in passage of a resolution on November 14 calling for reunification of Korea after internationally supervised nationwide elections.

Predictably, the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with this plan, denying UN access to northern Korea. The Truman administration anticipated this action, having shifted its policy after Soviet-American negotiations to reunite Korea collapsed in August 1947 to pursuing formation of a separate government in southern Korea ultimately capable of defending itself. While the United States provided military and economic assistance, a stamp of legitimacy from the United Nations would enhance further South Korea’s prospects for survival. Bowing to intense American pressure, the United Nations supervised and certified as valid elections in the south alone during May 1948, resulting in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union followed suit, sponsoring creation in September of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). And so the postwar great powers created two Koreas. In the south, President Syngman Rhee built a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime, while Kim Il Sung emulated the Stalinist model for political, economic, and social development in the north.

These events amplified the need for prompt U.S. withdrawal, as did a UN request for both occupiers to leave Korea. Stalin raised the ante when he announced that Soviet troops, fulfilling a DPRK request, would leave the north by the end of 1948. The Truman administration already had taken steps to provide the ROK with the ability to defend itself against anything less than a full-scale invasion. U.S. military advisors had supervised the formation and training of a National Police Force in South Korea. Also, a U.S. Army advisory team had trained and equipped an army cadre of twenty-five thousand men. Despite these internal security forces and the continuing presence of U.S. troops, Rhee’s new government faced violent opposition within weeks after its creation, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. U.S. military advisors played a central role in helping purge leftists from South Korea’s military. The Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), comprised of about five hundred U.S. officers and enlisted men, then supervised a dramatic improvement in the ROK Army before and after the departure of U.S. forces. Postponing plans to leave South Korea at the end of 1948, U.S. military withdrawal did not occur until June 29, 1949.

KMAG training of the ROK Army succeeded in building confidence among South Korean officers, who unfortunately began to stage aggressive assaults northward across the 38th parallel during the summer of 1949. These attacks ignited a number of clashes with North Korean forces that often saw fighting between battalion-sized units. Warfare between the Koreas therefore was already underway before June 1950 when North Korea’s invasion started the conventional phase of the conflict. Fearful that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification, the Truman administration denied ROK requests for tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes. Many writers have claimed that the U.S. failure to build a stronger South Korean military force invited an attack from North Korea.13 Others counter that limited resources required Washington to implement a policy of qualified containment in Korea. Rather than shirking its responsibilities in South Korea, the Truman administration had undertaken a commitment to train, equip, and supply a security force strong enough to maintain internal order and deter an attack from the north. It also submitted to Congress a three-year program of economic aid for recovery and self-sufficient growth.14

On January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson attempted to generate support in Congress for the Korean assistance package during an address before the National Press Club where he offered an optimistic assessment of the ROK’s future. Six months later, critics charged that his exclusion of South Korea from the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in the Pacific gave a “green light” to the Communists to launch an invasion. Defenders of the Truman administration at that time stressed as more important initial congressional rejection of the Korean aid bill as a more influential motivator, while other observers noted Democratic Senator Tom Connally’s publicized comment in May that the demise of the ROK was certain. Nevertheless, many historians persist in highlighting Acheson’s Press Club speech as a key trigger for the Korean War, while countless South Koreans accept this explanation as an article of faith. Soviet documents have confirmed, however, that Acheson’s words had almost no impact on Communist planning for the invasion.15

Stalin in fact was worried throughout 1949 about South Korea’s threat to North Korea’s survival. Consequently, he consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Developments in South Korea during the first six months of 1950 provided additional justification for the Soviet leader to be concerned, as the U.S. policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to halt spiraling inflation and genuinely free elections in May gave control over the legislature to Rhee’s opponents. Just as important, the ROK Army virtually had eliminated guerrilla operations disrupting domestic order, causing the Truman administration to consider a significant increase in military aid. While Washington was willing to wait for Moscow’s artificial client state in the north to collapse, Rhee publicly stated his intention to pursue military reunification. Given its rising strength, the ROK posed a real threat to the DPRK’s survival.

By early 1950, Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War the prior fall placed pressure on Stalin to support a similar outcome in Korea. Late in January, he discussed with Kim Il Sung in Moscow plans for an invasion, but the Soviet dictator still withheld final consent. However, he did approve a major expansion of the DPRK’s military capabilities. At another Moscow meeting in late April, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin, who feared U.S. intervention, that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee’s regime. The Soviet leader authorized the attack, but on the condition that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) also agreed. In May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing and obtained Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s reluctant approval, who had no choice but to support Stalin’s decision and Communist “liberation” of Korea. Like Stalin, he expected the United States would act to defend South Korea, threatening his aspirations to establish Chinese regional hegemony. Then, on the eve of the attack, fear that the war might not be won fast enough to avert U.S. entry led Stalin to modify the invasion plan that provided for a limited strike to provoke a counterattack before a full-scale invasion. On June 21, word that the ROK had learned of the impending attack caused Stalin to approve Kim’s proposal to launch the massive, tank-led assault that would cause U.S. and West European leaders to equate it with Nazi Germany’s attacks igniting World War II.

Koreans Invade Korea

Truman and Acheson gave no thought to the domestic origins of North Korea’s decision to invade South Korea. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of the president and his advisors, as they instantly concluded that Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his new plan for military conquest of the world. “Communism,” Truman explained later in his memoirs, “was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.”16 Acting on the history lesson learned in the 1930s, Truman concluded that inaction would constitute appeasement and only encourage more Soviet-inspired aggression. Early accounts of the war would heap praise on the president for acting with swiftness and courage to halt the Communist invasion, but he in fact delayed for a week before committing U.S. ground forces after U.S. aerial attacks on invading army proved ineffectual. Instead, Truman referred the matter to the UN Security Council. At a meeting with his top advisors on June 25, 1950, to consider the Korean crisis, he approved air support for evacuation of Americans from Korea, sending a survey team, and shipment of more military supplies to the ROK Army, which he hoped could repel the North Koreans on its own.

On June 25, the UN Security Council passed its first resolution, calling upon North Korea to halt its invasion, accept a ceasefire, and withdraw from South Korea, but the Korean People’s Army (KPA) continued its advance. Two days later, a second resolution requested that member nations provide support for the ROK’s defense. On June 29, Truman, still optimistic that he could avoid full military intervention, agreed during a press conference with a newsman’s description of the conflict as a “police action.” His actions were consistent with the policy in place of seeking to block Communist expansion in Asia without using U.S. military power, thereby avoiding enlarged defense expenditures. General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. occupation commander in Japan, provided support for the president in his desire to stay the course when, after a visit to the Korean battlefield on June 29, he reported that the ROK Army had regrouped and was fighting effectively. But early the next day, Truman reluctantly approved deployment of U.S. ground troops to Korea after MacArthur advised in a new report that not doing so guaranteed Communist destruction of the ROK.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council passed a resolution providing for creation of the United Nations Command (UNC) and authorizing Truman to appoint the UNC’s commander, who immediately selected MacArthur. The resolution required the UNC commander to submit periodic reports to the United Nations on developments in the war. Truman had vetoed a proposal for the formation of a UN committee that could contact the UNC commander directly, instead adopting a procedure whereby U.S. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins would convey instructions to MacArthur and receive reports from him on behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Since MacArthur’s reports to the United Nations required U.S. government approval, they in practice were after-action summaries of information that was common knowledge because newspapers already had printed coverage of the same developments. Although the UNC would consist of military units from fifteen other nations, the United States and the ROK contributed 90 percent of the manpower. Moreover, the United States provided the weapons, equipment, and logistical support to save South Korea.

On June 27, the KPA occupied Seoul, located thirty miles below the 38th parallel. On July 5, the KPA routed U.S. forces in their first military engagement, initiating a string of humiliating defeats. By July 20, the North Korean invaders had shattered five U.S. battalions and moved one hundred miles south of Seoul. Six days later, MacArthur went to Korea to deliver an ultimatum to Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, that further retreat was unacceptable. In response, Walker issued a “stand or die” order to his troops, but the KPA’s advance continued. As the United States delivered more troops, equipment, arms, and supplies, U.S. forces established defensive positions along the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula. By then, Walker was the target of blame for battlefield defeats. Later historians instead would fault MacArthur for sending into battle untrained and poorly armed troops who suffered from low morale and had no sense of purpose. Furthermore, they criticized him for running the war by “remote control” from Tokyo and not relieving ineffective officers.17

Despite the UNC’s seemingly desperate situation in July, MacArthur devised plans during that month for a counteroffensive in coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines. The JCS had serious reservations about his intention to land at the coastal port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of its narrow access, high tides, mudflats, and seawalls. MacArthur insisted that surprise alone guaranteed success. Justifying his optimism, the Inchon Landing on September 15 was a stunning triumph that reversed the course of the Korean War. It allowed Walker’s forces to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to join with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks later and forcing a routed KPA to retreat above the parallel. Orthodox writers would credit MacArthur’s brilliance for the success at Inchon. Since the landing—labeled “Operation Common Knowledge” in press reports at the time—was no secret, they insist that this military victory was the direct result of the superior planning, leadership, courage, determination, and luck of MacArthur.18 More recently, scholars have dismissed as exaggerated claims that the operation was risky, while maintaining that MacArthur crushed an already beaten enemy.19

During the last week of September 1950, UNC forces were in position to advance across the 38th parallel. Historians concur that the subsequent UNC offensive into North Korea was an extraordinary blunder because it provoked Chinese intervention. Truman administration officials later tried to shift blame to MacArthur for the disastrous consequences of invading North Korea, which transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. Early writers would attribute the U.S. decision to cross the parallel to “military momentum” and “a surge of optimism” after the exhilarating Inchon Landing.20 Scholars now blame Truman. Some identify a political motivation, arguing that the president was hoping to boost his party’s prospects in the November elections.21 For others, the motive was to score a geopolitical victory in the Cold War.22 One more reason was maintaining U.S. credibility, which required pursuit of Korea’s reunification.23 Finally, Truman’s decision may have been the result of his belief that eliminating the DPRK would allow a united Korea to choose freely to follow the U.S. model of economic, social, and political development.24

To be sure, MacArthur was determined to “compose and unite” Korea. However, several State Department officials had begun to lobby during July for forcible reunification once the UNC had pushed Communist forces back into North Korea. They advocated pursuit and destruction of the North Korean army, which then would allow the United Nations to sponsor free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. On July 17, Truman instructed his staff to consider what to do when UNC forces reached the border at the 38th parallel. Acheson, who initially had defined the U.S. goal as restoring the prewar status quo, soon endorsed an offensive into North Korea. U.S. military leaders, however, were hesitant to support this drastic change in war aims, worrying that it would trigger Soviet intervention. But after defensive lines in Korea stabilized, the JCS advised Truman on July 31 that occupying North Korea would be desirable. During early August, Truman authorized the development of plans to achieve forcible reunification. On August 17, Warren R. Austin, in a speech at the United Nations where he was U.S. ambassador, asked this question: “Shall only a part of this country be assured that freedom?” His answer was “I think not!”25

An Entirely New War

U.S. leaders realized that extending hostilities northward risked Soviet or Chinese entry and possibly a global war. Therefore, the U.S. plan for elimination of the DPRK, which Truman approved on September 1, 1950, included two significant precautions. First, only Korean forces would occupy the most northern provinces. Second, Washington would obtain explicit UN support for reunification. Perhaps unwittingly, General George C. Marshall, newly appointed secretary of defense, proceeded to undermine the Truman administration’s emphasis on a cautious approach. On September 27, he sent an ill-advised cable to MacArthur affirming his orders to invade North Korea. Marshall then elaborated that his superiors “want you to feel unhampered strategically and tactically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.” He advised MacArthur against advance announcements that might precipitate a premature vote in the United Nations. After the DPRK refused to surrender, the United Nations passed a resolution of October 7, providing specific authorization for MacArthur to “ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.”26

China considered U.S. actions in Korea a serious threat to its national security. Worse, on June 27, Truman moved the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, preventing the PRC from destroying its Guomindang rival on Taiwan. MacArthur visited the island in late July and stated plans to strengthen the military capabilities of Jiang Jieshi’s regime. Much to Truman’s chagrin, the militant anti-Communist general then sent a message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, which seemed to threaten China. Nevertheless, Beijing attempted to avoid war. On October 2, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would join the fighting in Korea if U.S. forces entered North Korea. U.S. officials thought the Chinese were bluffing. At a meeting on Wake Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not intervene. Four days later, the Chinese People’s Volunteers Force crossed the Yalu. Even after the first clash between UNC troops and Chinese forces later that month, MacArthur remained supremely confident.

Early in November, the PRC delivered a final warning when Chinese forces launched a sharp attack against advancing UNC and ROK units, then broke contact and retreated into the mountains. In response, MacArthur ordered air assaults on the bridges over the Yalu without seeking approval from Washington. Upon learning this, the JCS suspended the decision until Truman gave his approval. MacArthur then asked permission for U.S. pilots to engage in “hot pursuit” of enemy aircraft fleeing from Korea into Manchuria. After MacArthur predicted that allowing the enemy free movement of men and supplies into North Korea risked destruction of his forces, Truman approved the strikes, but only against the Korean side of the bridges. Strenuous opposition from U.S. allies, however, led to dropping the “hot pursuit” proposal over the objections of U.S. military leaders. These decisions infuriated MacArthur. Desperate to avoid a total war with China, Britain advanced a “buffer zone” proposal that would halt the UNC offensive short of the Yalu. MacArthur was livid when informed of what he judged a proposal for appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “Home by Christmas Offensive” to the Yalu with U.S. troops in the vanguard. The JCS questioned, but did not countermand, the general’s breech of Truman’s instructions. The Chinese then counterattacked in force with an estimated 300,000 troops, sending UNC forces into helter skelter retreat southward. On November 28, the National Security Council met to consider what MacArthur reported was “an entirely new war” and Truman decided to pursue a ceasefire. At a press conference two days later, the president, responding to a newsman’s question, divulged that his civilian and military advisors had use of atomic bombs in Korea under consideration since the outset of the war. MacArthur, he elaborated, would decide whether to use these weapons against the Chinese. Truman’s comments ignited panic among U.S. allies who feared nuclear war was at hand. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee hurried across the Atlantic to Washington to express European anxieties that use of atomic weapons in Korea would widen the conflict. Attlee suggested ending the war through negotiations with Moscow and Beijing resulting in a UN seat for the PRC, a proposal that Truman flatly rejected. Attlee left with only the promise from the president that he would try to consult with U.S. allies before ordering any escalation.

During early December 1950, MacArthur publicly defended his advance to the Yalu as a “reconnaissance in force” that had exposed a Communist trap and averted a military disaster. He also complained about the extraordinary limits on his command, highlighting his inability to attack sanctuaries in Manchuria. Truman later explained that he should have fired MacArthur at that juncture, but did not want to embarrass the general in the aftermath of defeat. Amid deep pessimism, he sent General Collins to Korea to provide him with a firsthand assessment. Upon his return, Collins reported that the UNC would halt the enemy’s advance. Truman now thought that he could fight a “limited war” in Korea to restore the prewar status quo. As for MacArthur, he approved issuance on December 6 of a directive, clearly aimed at the general, that informed all U.S. officials that State Department approval was required for any public comments about the war.

On December 29, the JCS sent new instructions to MacArthur to retreat to defensible positions with the goal of avoiding evacuation of the peninsula. In reply, MacArthur pressed for adoption of his “Plan for Victory” that called for blockading China’s coast, air assaults on military installations in Manchuria, deploying Chinese Nationalist ground troops in Korea, and assaulting China’s mainland from Taiwan. Despite later denials, the JCS seriously considered implementing MacArthur’s proposals. In fact, on January 12, 1951, they finished a draft memorandum listing possible future courses of action that included all these recommendations. In its response to MacArthur, however, the JCS only repeated the most recent directive, advising him that he would receive no reinforcements. On January 10, MacArthur had shifted responsibility back to Washington, stating that complying with these instructions was impossible without lifting the “extraordinary limitations” on his command. He insisted that escalation or evacuation were the only options in Korea.

Meanwhile, in Korea, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, having replaced Walker who died in a jeep accident late in December, was displaying astonishing leadership in restoring the discipline and fighting spirit of American forces. After ending “bug-out fever” and halting the UNC retreat, he ordered the first counterattacks. At the end of February, UNC forces were near reoccupying Seoul. Truman no longer faced a choice between abandoning Korea or escalation of the war, but instead could focus on punishing the enemy to force it to accept a ceasefire. The president also could ignore the now discredited “Sage of Inchon.” Indeed, from this point onward, the JCS contacted Ridgway directly about the conduct of the war. Then, on March 7, Ridgway staged a major offensive that pushed enemy forces above the parallel. Truman and his advisors saw this as creating the opportunity to achieve an armistice. The administration’s preparations to end the Korean War short of total victory set the stage for Truman’s final clash with MacArthur.

Talking and Fighting for Peace

On April 11, 1951, Truman relieved MacArthur of his commands in Korea and Japan in response to two acts of insubordination. On March 20, the general’s issuance to the Chinese of a demeaning public ultimatum demanding their immediate surrender scuttled Truman’s planned peace initiative. Then, two weeks later, Republican Congressman Joseph W. Martin Jr. read a letter from MacArthur on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives charging the Truman administration with appeasement in Korea. This directly violated the December 6, 1950, directive requiring clearance for public comments on the war. Historians reached an early consensus that still commends Truman for preserving the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military.27 But more important reasons related to military strategy and alliance politics. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wanted to make atomic weapons available to the commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) to counter a major enemy escalation in Korea, but feared that MacArthur might provoke an incident to widen the war. Also, U.S. allies never would consent to providing the UNC commander with discretion to order atomic retaliation so long as MacArthur held the position.

MacArthur’s recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against Truman and the war. The general returned home to ticker-tape parades and, in a televised address before a joint session of Congress, defended his actions, declaring that there was “no substitute for victory.” Republicans and critics of Truman’s China policy demanded an investigation that resulted in a hearing before members of two Senate committees. The first witness on May 3, 1951, was MacArthur himself, who testified for three days. He insisted that the JCS was in full agreement with him on policy, but Truman and Acheson had made it impossible to win the war. Thereafter, six administration witnesses, including Marshall and the members of the JCS, refuted his testimony, emphasizing the importance of fighting a limited war in Korea and the necessity for civilian control over the military. U.S. Army General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, stated succinctly that doing what MacArthur advocated would lead to “the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”

In April and May 1951, the UNC repulsed two massive Chinese offensives, establishing defensive positions just north of the 38th parallel. The ensuing military stalemate on the battlefield persuaded the combatants to seek an armistice. On June 23, two days before the conclusion of the MacArthur Hearings, Soviet UN Ambassador Jacob A. Malik advocated in a radio address a ceasefire in the Korean War. Armistice negotiations opened on July 10 at Kaesong, just north of the 38th parallel. The Truman administration was determined to limit the discussions to military matters alone, thus preventing the PRC from exploiting the talks to gain admission to the United Nations or control over Taiwan. As a consequence, the belligerents appointed military officers, rather than diplomats, as the main negotiators, reducing prospects for flexibility and compromise. Archival records demonstrate that both sides arrived at Kaesong expecting rapid achievement of a settlement. Instead, the negotiations would be highly rancorous, resulting in regular temporary adjournments. More than two years would pass before an armistice ended the Korean War.

There were several reasons for the failure to reach a prompt agreement on the terms for peace. First, the main belligerents had no direct contact between governments. Second, the conference site was isolated and austere. Third, cultural and ideological differences contributed to misperceptions and distrust. Fourth, domestic politics on both sides restricted options. Most important, sharply divergent national interests made compromise difficult. The Communist side created an acrimonious atmosphere at the outset with efforts to humiliate its adversary, but the United States raised the first major roadblock when it proposed a demilitarized zone extending deep into North Korea. The Communists suspended the talks in August after fabricating a UNC violation of the neutral zone. Two months later, talks resumed at Panmunjom, six miles east of Kaesong, after Ridgway demanded a new negotiating site. Expeditious agreement followed that the line of battle would divide the center of the demilitarized zone. Negotiators then approved inspection procedures to enforce the cease-fire and a postwar political conference to arrange for withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification. Ten months after talks began, negotiators reached a deadlock on repatriating prisoners of war (POWs), preventing them from signing an armistice.

For Americans who served on the UNC delegation, negotiating with the Communists at the Korean armistice talks was an exasperating experience. Without exception, they condemned the Chinese and North Koreans for tenacious rigidity in delaying a settlement. In his account of the negotiations, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, chief UNC negotiator until May 1952, also criticized the Truman administration for instructing him to make needless concessions at the truce table. Other U.S. participants shared Joy’s disgruntlement, blaming Washington for imposing limitations both on the negotiators and on the battlefield that prevented a more aggressive stand against the Communists, preventing an early settlement and unnecessarily prolonging the war.28 Rosemary Foot, in her authoritative account, exposes these assessments as exaggerated, describing how the Communists made many major concessions. She instead characterizes the United States as obstreperous because, accustomed to total victory, it had no interest in serious negotiations with an enemy that had demonstrated its ability to resist U.S. military power. Raising a different issue, other historians have faulted the United States for ignoring the United Nations in determining both the conduct of military operations and the course of the peace negotiations in Korea.29

Events at the armistice negotiations influenced how U.S. civilian and military leaders made decisions about conducting the war. For example, after the Communist side adjourned the talks in August 1951, Washington ordered U.S. B-29 bombers to stage mock atomic bombing test flights over North Korea in September and October to scare Communist negotiators into resuming negotiations and accepting UNC demands. For its part, the PRC began to publicize accusations early in 1952 that the United States was waging bacteriological warfare in Korea. Secretary of State Acheson vehemently denied these allegations and demanded an international investigation, but North Korea and China stymied International Red Cross efforts to do so. Historians initially endorsed as accurate U.S. denials of the Communist accusations that the UNC was using both biological and chemical warfare, but some later scholars pointed to evidence of American guilt.30 Soviet documents have shown, however, that China’s germ warfare charges were false. Moscow even told its Korean and Chinese allies to cease making unsubstantiated accusations.

Truman was responsible for the UNC delegation assuming an inflexible position against forcing unwilling Communist POWs to return to China or North Korea, arguing that humanitarian principles required providing them with asylum. Orthodox works on the Korean War judged his decision as correct and his justification as sincere. More recent writers, however, have asserted that the president’s main goal was to win a propaganda victory in the Cold War, which required misrepresenting the facts. Voluntary repatriation directly contradicted the Geneva Convention, which mandated, as the Communist side demanded, return of all POWs. Far worse, the Truman administration encouraged the belief that those Communist prisoners rejecting repatriation were defecting to the “Free World.”31 In fact, thousands of Chinese prisoners were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China who now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. As for the North Korean POWs, a large majority were actually South Koreans who either had joined the KPA voluntarily or been conscripted. U.S. supervisors at UNC camps also allowed Chinese Nationalist guards to wage a terrorist “reeducation” campaign to force POWs to refuse repatriation, beating or killing resisters. Non-repatriates even tattooed prisoners wanting to return home with anti-Communist slogans.

A Substitute for Victory

Stalemate in the truce tent and at the fighting front in Korea frustrated U.S. leaders. In May 1952, the UNC’s brutal suppression of a Communist prisoner uprising at the UNC’s Koje-do POW compound seemed to substantiate the Communist side’s charges of inhumane treatment. That summer, massive UNC bombing raids devastated North Korea, but brought no changes in the Communist negotiating position at Panmunjom. Despite intense efforts at the United Nations, the armistice talks adjourned in October 1952. The next month, angry American voters elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president largely because they expected him to end what had become the very unpopular “Mr. Truman’s War.” Fulfilling a campaign promise, the general visited the Korean battlefront in December, concluding that a new ground offensive would be pointless. Meanwhile, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution proposing the formation of a neutral commission to resolve the prisoner dispute. Rather than support the plan, Eisenhower, after assuming office in January 1953, seriously considered staging nuclear strikes on China to force a settlement.

Eisenhower initiated a new confrontational approach toward China on February 2 when he ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to withdraw from the Taiwan Strait, implying that he supported a Guomindang attack on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating domestic impact of the war. By summer 1952, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) faced enormous internal economic problems and probably had decided to seek peace after Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation motivated Pyongyang to advocate an armistice even earlier. But Stalin ordered his allies to continue fighting because the war weakened the United States. By early 1953, however, both China and North Korea were ready to resume the truce negotiations, although they wanted the Americans to initiate the process. That came on February 22 when the UNC, reviving a Red Cross proposal of the previous fall, suggested exchanging sick and wounded POWs.

A critical turning point arrived on March 5 when Stalin suddenly died. His successors, in a policy reversal, urged the Chinese and North Koreans to act on their desire for peace. On March 28, Communist negotiators accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, Zhou Enlai publicly proposed that a neutral state assume responsibility for POWs rejecting repatriation. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, began and six days later negotiators reconvened at Panmunjom. Pointed differences then emerged about the final details of the truce agreement. Late in May, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles allegedly told India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that unless there was progress toward peace, the United States would end the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. Some historians still accept as valid Eisenhower’s claim later that the Chinese, in response to this veiled nuclear threat, agreed to an armistice on U.S. terms, although no documentary evidence currently exists to validate his assertion. Nehru, for his part, denied that he conveyed the U.S. warning to the Chinese.

Washington and Beijing moved toward ending the Korean War in the spring of 1953 for a number of reasons. First, they both had grown weary of the economic burdens and military losses, as well as the political and military constraints ruling out options to break the deadlock. Second, they worried about the consequences of accidentally expanding the war. Third, pressure from allies and the world community pushed the belligerents toward ending the unpopular conflict. For the United States, continuation of the Korean War threatened to inflict irrevocable damage on its relations with allies in Western Europe and non-aligned members of the United Nations. Most recently, in May 1953, there was an outburst of world criticism in reaction to U.S. air assaults on North Korea’s dams and irrigation system. Later that month and early in June, Chinese forces staged powerful attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus displayed its persistent resolve, utilizing military means to convince its adversary to make concessions on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee released twenty-seven thousand North Korean POWs in an attempt to bulldoze the impending truce. Eisenhower bought Rhee’s acceptance of the armistice with promises of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

Many historians consider the conflict in Korea the most important event in world affairs after World War II because it dramatically altered the course of the Cold War. In response, U.S. leaders implemented enormous increases in defense spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearmament of West Germany. In East Asia, it prevented the demise of Jiang Jieshi’s regime on Taiwan and made South Korea a long-term client of the United States. U.S. relations with the PRC were hostile for two decades, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations on February 1, 1951, to condemn China as an aggressor in Korea. Ironically, the war aided Mao’s regime in consolidating control in China, while elevating its regional prestige. U.S. leaders, acting on what they thought was Korea’s primary lesson, resorted to military means to meet this emerging challenge, leading infamously to the disastrous intervention in Vietnam.

Discussion of the Literature

Harry S. Truman explained in his memoirs that North Korea’s attack on June 25, 1950, “was a new and bold Communist challenge” because “for the first time since the end of World War II, the Communists openly and defiantly embarked upon military force and invasion.”32 For the next twenty years, nearly every study of the Korean War endorsed the president’s description of the reasons for the conflict. Cold War assumptions influenced these authors in affirming the traditional interpretation of the Korean War prior to the declassification of archival documents. During the first decade after the armistice, accounts of the conflict congratulated the United States for acting to halt Soviet-inspired Communist expansionism.33 T. R. Fehrenbach established the initial interpretive baseline in 1963 when he argued in his account that the United States was not prepared militarily or mentally to fight a limited war in Korea. Nevertheless, he applauded military intervention as necessary to preserve U.S. credibility and prestige. British historian David Rees conducted research in documents available at the time to publish in 1964 what would be the standard history of the conflict for two decades. He praised the Truman administration for successfully waging a limited war that defeated aggression.34 During the next decade, histories of the Korean War affirmed conventional wisdom, as writers seemed to think that they had received the last word on the reasons for the conflict, as Korea earned its nickname as the forgotten war.35

Surprisingly, a few writers during the Korean War rejected the Truman administration’s description of the conflict’s origins. One dissenter claimed that North Korea “jumped the gun” and attacked South Korea before the date the Soviet Union had selected for the invasion. For proof, he pointed to the Soviet boycott of the UN Security Council that prevented Moscow from blocking UN measures to defend the ROK. I. F. Stone, the famous leftist journalist, published a book in which he charged that Rhee purposely had initiated a border clash to provoke a North Korean retaliatory attack. He depicted the orderly retreat of South Korean forces as a military debacle to dupe the United States into saving his corrupt regime.36 Revival of these arguments came after former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reported in 1970 that Stalin approved the invasion with great hesitancy because he feared U.S. intervention.37 A new study soon claimed that Moscow and Pyongyang had decided on August 15, 1950, as an invasion date, but the attack came two months earlier because of a power struggle in North Korea. Some writers even boldly charged that South Korea struck first and North Korea counterattacked in self-defense.38 Lack of supporting primary source evidence weakened the validity of these first revisionist accounts.

Early histories of the Korean War devoted little attention to discussing events prior to the North Korean invasion of South Korea because authors assumed that Stalin made the decision to attack for reasons having nothing to do with Korea. Historical explanations for the Korean War would experience a fundamental shift in the 1970s, as classified U.S. documents for the prewar years through 1950 became available. Soon, scholars were asserting that the origins of the war dated from at least the start of World War II, emphasizing the centrality of domestic factors in fueling an existing conflict. Rejecting Truman’s characterization of North Korea’s attack as the result of external aggression, Bruce Cumings insisted that in 1945, the United States intruded on a civil war in the first postwar act of containment, preventing the triumph of a leftist revolution on the peninsula and then imposing a reactionary regime on southern Korea, which would lead to the conventional war that started on June 25, 1950.39 Others writers who reassessed postwar U.S. policy toward Korea arrived at less harsh conclusions. Referencing U.S. documents, they wrote detailed studies of U.S. involvement in Korea from the start of World War II to the North Korean invasion that dismissed Truman’s simplistic description of the causes of the Korean War.40

During the 1980s, many historians, after reading new primary sources, agreed with Cumings that the Korean conflict was a classic civil war. Several writers published histories of the war stressing its domestic origins, as well as insisting that North Korea made the decision to attack South Korea.41 In 1988, Cumings and coauthor Jon Halliday, reviving Stone’s argument, made the provocative claim that South Korea attacked northward across the parallel first to incite a Communist invasion that would prompt U.S. intervention and open the way for its conquest of North Korea. Two years later, Cumings described this “trap theory” in more detail in the second volume of his The Origins of the Korean War.42 Release of Soviet documents after 1991 revealed, however, that contrary to these left revisionist claims, Stalin played a central role in approving and supporting North Korea’s attack. Almost immediately, a right revisionist perspective on the Korean War emerged which reemphasized the significance of international factors, resulting in a revival of key orthodox arguments. For these writers, domestic causes were less important than Stalin’s obsession with aggressive expansion in explaining the origins of the conflict.43 But other scholars who read the same sources disagreed. They insisted that Kim Il Sung made the decision to attack. An unenthusiastic Stalin gave his consent after concluding that any further delay only would lead to the emergence of a South Korea strong enough to absorb North Korea.44

During the 1980s, scholars armed with primary sources wrote new histories of the Korean War challenging orthodox judgments about the conventional phase of the conflict from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953. British historians Callum MacDonald, Max Hastings, and Rosemary Foot discredited the traditional portrayal of it as an example of the United States using its power with wisdom and restraint to prevent Communist expansion.45 Later writers also questioned accounts that either lauded MacArthur for his success at Inchon or damned him for his reckless advance to the Yalu and insubordination in trying to escalate the war.46 That MacArthur no longer occupies a central place in histories of the Korean War constitutes a significant shift in the literature on the conflict. But China’s rationale for entering the Korean War has emerged as a subject of intense debate, with recent studies minimizing Allen S. Whiting’s traditional explanation that preserving national security was the main motivation. Chinese scholars instead emphasize Mao’s desire to display ideological purity, consolidate domestic authority, and assert regional hegemony, as well as to repay the North Koreans for their help in the Chinese Civil War.47 Whether Eisenhower’s atomic threat ended the war remains contested terrain, but recent studies have advanced alternate reasons for an armistice.48 Publication of two new histories of the Korean War in 2014 and 2015 indicates that scholars have not reached a consensus on explanations for most of the events and issues in the conflict.49

Primary Sources

Historians have an enormous array of primary sources available to them in the English language to explain the origins of the Korean War, as well as specific issues and events during the conflict. Unquestionably the most important collections are located at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, which houses U.S. government documents. The records of the State Department, U.S. Army, Defense Department, and Central Intelligence Agency in descending order have the highest valuable. Rebecca L. Collier has compiled a comprehensive guide that describes all holdings related to the Korean War at National Archives II.50 Much more accessible are a selection of these same U.S. government documents that the U.S. State Department has reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Annual volumes for Korea, China, and the East Asia region present cables, policy papers, and meeting minutes primarily from State Department records that relate to U.S. policy toward Korea from 1941 to 1951, with documents on Korea for the last two years of the war reprinted in a single volume. The University of Wisconsin Library had made available electronic access to these FRUS volumes.

Manuscript collections of the central U.S. decision makers during the Korean War are located at the presidential libraries of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower in Independence, Missouri, and Abilene, Kansas, respectively. In addition to the papers of each president, holdings include the records of the National Security Council and major foreign policy advisors. Selected documents and other primary sources are accessible electronically at both repositories.51 The private papers of several influential U.S. military officers who commanded troops in the Korean War are located at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Of particular value are the manuscript collections at the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Library in Norfolk, Virginia. In addition, the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California, holds useful personal papers of individuals involved with U.S. policy toward Korea from 1941 to 1953. British archives at Kew Garden in London contain the most valuable primary sources among other nations who participated in the conflict.

Researchers also will find helpful the multivolume official U.S. Army history of the Korean War, which references primary documents related to the conduct of military operations. Two initial volumes provide coverage of the first five months of the Korean War from different perspectives, the first describing the military engagements and the second explaining the development and direction of U.S. military strategy. A third book traces events during the next nine months of the war. The last volume covers the war’s final two years, discussing the truce talks and continued intense fighting at the front.52 Another U.S. Army publication provides details on the activities of the Korean Military Advisory Group in training South Korea’s army before and after the North Korean invasion.53 Also featuring citations of primary documents are the official histories that describe the contributions of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force, as well as the military operations of the U.S. Marines.54 Historians still find useful the third volume of the official history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which exceeds the U.S. Army studies in value because it references a fuller array of primary sources. A volume in the official history of the Office of Secretary of Defense also cites key telegrams and policy papers in presenting a different perspective on mainly the first year of the Korean War.55

Writers of the early histories of the Korean War had to rely on published primary sources that remain valuable for those researching the conflict. The State Department, for example, published several pamphlets presenting narratives describing the events leading to North Korea’s attack from the U.S. government’s perspective, often including a selection of reprinted documents. Perhaps the most insightful of these publications is North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, which presented evidence allegedly proving that North Korea was a Soviet satellite.56 Before and during the war, the U.S. Department of State’s Bulletin reprinted speeches, meetings summaries, and policy decisions related to Korea. Similarly, the annual volumes of the Public Papers of the Presidents contain reprints of Truman’s and Eisenhower’s presidential addresses and transcripts of their press conferences. Finally, contemporary newspapers, especially the New York Times, are a valuable source of primary information, reporting events in Korea before the North Korean attack and on the course of the war thereafter.

Access to Soviet and Chinese primary sources about the Korean War are far more limited, while North Korea has released none at all. The ROK government has published a three-volume history of the Korean War that includes references to South Korean documents.57 The PRC government has published in the Chinese language a selection of archival documents concerning its involvement in a number of official collections that include reprints of telegrams, letters, and the minutes of meetings. Firsthand accounts are available in the published memoirs of Chinese directly involved in the war, some in English translations.58 With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian government began releasing documents confirming Stalin’s direct involvement in planning the North Korean invasion.59 In June 1994, Russian President Boris Yeltsin presented to the ROK government a collection of additional Soviet documents related to the Korean War. The next year, the Russian government allowed the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Columbia University’s Korea Research Center to obtain copies of approximately twelve hundred pages of high-level documents on the war, which was twice as large as the Yeltsin gift. The CWIHP has printed English translations of the most important of these documents in its Bulletin. These primary sources are essential for understanding the Korean War.60