Recent Forum Topics › Forums › The Rams Huddle › PFF on the superbowl … including a long breakdown of The Playcall
- This topic has 5 replies, 4 voices, and was last updated 9 years, 10 months ago by Dak.
-
AuthorPosts
-
February 3, 2015 at 8:03 pm #17892znModerator
ReFo: Patriots vs. Seahawks, Super Bowl XLIX
Ben Stockwell | February 2, 2015
https://www.profootballfocus.com/blog/2015/02/02/refo-patriots-vs-seahawks-super-bowl-xlix/
The Seahawks went down swinging, with Marshawn Lynch and Michael Bennett leading the way with dominant performances on offense and defense respectively. However, they couldn’t repeat their heroics from the conference championship victory, even though Jermaine Kearse’s catch to take them to the five must have been ominous for Patriots fans. In the end the Patriots just made one play more than the Seahawks when it counted.
New England Patriots – Performances of Note
Malcolm Butler, CB: +3.3
Breakdown: The undrafted free agent had only played 202 snaps all season before entering last night’s game midway through the third quarter for Kyle Arrington (3-for-3, 122 yards allowed) but as is so often the way in the Super Bowl, the unknown undrafted player had a telling impact on the outcome of the game. Targeted six times by Russell Wilson the only long completion Butler allowed was the miracle long ball to Jermaine Kearse to put Seattle at New England’s 5-yard line. On his other five targets he allowed one completion for 6 yards to Kearse, breaking up another deep ball to Kearse immediately after the two-minute warning.
Signature Play: Butler more than made up for his misfortune on Kearse’s bouncing gain with that interception of Russell Wilson that will doubtless go down in history as one of the greatest and most memorable plays in Super Bowl history.
Jamie Collins, ILB: +0.1
Breakdown: A mixed day for Collins who was pivotal in the Patriots’ attempts to disrupt and divert Marshawn Lynch. Collins struggled in coverage in the open field, notably against Lynch. From very early on Collins had the measure of Max Unger and was used to attack the middle of the Seahawks’ offensive line forcing Lynch to cutback his runs and not allowing him to read and make a choice, though that clear gameplan didn’t necessary limit Lynch’s gains.
Signature Stat: Collins led both teams with three missed tackles, two on Lynch and one crucially allowing Russell Wilson to escape outside on an option keeper with 24 seconds left in the first half to help setup the Seahawks’ quick-fire touchdown.
Rob Gronkowski, TE: +0.2
Breakdown: This victory was not about dominance and control for the Patriots, it was about key plays and key drives. Perhaps no one’s performance better exemplifies that than Rob Gronkowski’s. He didn’t make a massive volume of plays and struggled as a run blocker, consistently controlled on first contact, but made a trio of plays as a receiver in key moments to help the Patriots get the victory.
Signature Play: Gronkowski snagged two first downs on the game-winning drive, the first beating Kam Chancellor on a slant for 20 yards at 4:47 to help put New England back on the front foot after Danny Amendola’s offensive pass interference penalty had pushed them backward.
Seattle Seahawks – Performances of Note
Michael Bennett, DE: +3.7
Breakdown: Widely talked up as the man that could play a Justin Tuck role and derail the Patriots’ offense, Bennett proved to be exactly that disruptive force. He racked up five hits on Brady including two in the first three plays of the game. As disruptive as Bennett was, however, Brady and Josh McDaniels didn’t allow him to become destructive. The Patriots’ offensive linemen couldn’t handle him one on one but through a consistently speedy release (74.5% of Brady’s drop-backs saw a pass released in less than 2.5 seconds) Brady ensured that Bennett could do no lasting damage to the Patriots’ chances of success.
Signature Play: On top of his pressures Bennett also drew a holding penalty from Bryan Stork on the first play after Seattle established a two-score lead (3rd Qtr 4:48) to help force a three-and-out from New England.
Tharold Simon, CB: -4.7
Breakdown: A rough playoff run for Simon who was pressed into action on short notice for the second time in three weeks with similar results to the first time. After Jeremy Lane was forced from the game after his interception, Brady went to work on Simon targeting him 11 times to collect 91 yards and two scores against the second-year corner. Further adding to Simon’s struggles were two missed tackles, one each from Brandon LaFell and Julian Edelman.
Signature Stat: In his two playoff appearances Simon was targeted a combined 21 times, surrendering 17 catches for 205 yards and four touchdowns; totting up to a passer rating of 146.9.
Marshawn Lynch, RB: +3.1
Breakdown: The Patriots did their best to manipulate where Marshawn Lynch was running the ball but that didn’t stop Lynch powering through tackles in another spectacular playoff display. Lynch collected more than 2.5 yards per carry after contact for the 13th time in 19 games this season and with eight missed tackles forced on the ground, took his season total to 130. But we were left only to wonder what might have been had been handed the ball just one more time at the end of the game.
Signature Play: Lynch’s best run of the night came with 6:23 left in the third and perfectly displayed his terrifying blend of agility and power. The footwork to shake off Jamie Collins in the gap so quickly followed up by the power to stay on his feet through a double hit from Devin McCourty and Vince Wilfork is a truly special and rare play, fitting for Super Bowl Sunday.
PFF Game Ball
The Super Bowl is all about the unlikely hero and in Malcolm Butler the Patriots found a player off the bench to turn the tide and get the big play that counted from the Seahawks after Seattle had so much success going after the player Butler replaced.
===============
================
Analysis Notebook: Super Bowl XLIX — That PlaySam Monson
https://www.profootballfocus.com/blog/2015/02/02/analysis-notebook-super-bowl-xlix-that-play/
I hadn’t been planning on doing this article at all, but when the entire Super Bowl gets decided on one play so controversial at the end of a thrilling game, it was hard not to dive into the play itself.
After Seattle had surrendered a two-score lead they found themselves in the hole, but with time to drive and win the game. Russell Wilson connected with a nice pass to Marshawn Lynch and then a freak bobbling catch down the right sideline set the team up deep in New England territory needing a score.
From there, Marshawn Lynch did what Marshawn Lynch does and rumbled down to the half-yard line, giving us our scenario. On 2nd-and-goal from the half-yard line Seattle decided not to back to Lynch, instead they passed the ball, leading to this tweet and plenty of others as twitter practically exploded:
Seattle had time, a time out, a half yard to get, and Marshawn Lynch. They just threw the Super Bowl away.
But now in the cold light of day let’s take a look at the play itself. The first and most obvious thing to note is that you can see exactly why Seattle wanted to pass the ball. Even though they had three wide receivers on the field, the Patriots were almost completely selling out to stop the run.
Take a look at the highlighted box. Despite three wide receivers in the formation the Patriots have eight guys on the line of scrimmage in position to defend the run and a ninth in the form of the middle linebacker keying heavily on run-first. If I was calling plays in this situation I’d still run the ball, but I can absolutely see the logic in the pass. The Patriots, in effect, were daring them to do it, and this Seattle Seahawks team doesn’t back down from being dared too often. So if we can get past the notion of the play call itself we can get a look at the execution, which is the key to all of it.
Malcolm Butler, who missed out on the MVP award but did receive PFF’s Game Ball for his performance and largely because of this play, told reporters after the game that the Patriots had run this play with the scout team in practice in preparation for the Super Bowl and he had been beaten by it. It is a designed pick play with the receiver at the top of the stack supposed to cause traffic in front of the corner behind it and prevent him from getting to the slant.
One of the keys to this play is that Brandon Browner crushes the top of the stack with his press coverage. That receiver is supposed to drive him off the line and into the path of Butler, but Browner’s strength ensures he doesn’t even get off the line. Butler ends up with a straight shot through to the football, which turns a potential pass break-up and Super Bowl-saving play into a Super Bowl-winning one.
Without Browner’s part in this play, Malcolm Butler doesn’t become a Super Bowl hero. The biggest point to think about, though, is what that story from Butler says about New England’s preparation for the game. They knew this play was coming.
They ran this play in practice specifically to prepare their defensive backs for it. Nothing in football gives you an edge like knowing exactly what is coming. People have called this play a great read by Butler, but if you take a look at his reactions, he is playing nothing else. He knew this play was coming and that’s all he was planning to defend. If the Seahawks had run a whip route – faking a slant and then spinning back out to the sideline – like the Seahawks were beaten by Julian Edelman on earlier in the game, Butler would have been completely screwed.
That knowledge is even more impressive because that is only the third time all year Seattle have run that formation on short yardage. The Patriots clearly excel at doing their homework and weren’t fooled by the Seahawks trying to throw them off with an unusual formation. While the formation differed, their tendencies remained the same. Take a look:
He is moving before Ricardo Lockette even cuts inside. As soon as he makes that cut step Butler is already driving on the ball. It is great recognition by Butler, but the key to this was the Patriots defensive preparation and the fact they were expecting this play from Seattle.
If the Seahawks had changed it up with a new route wrinkle, they would have had success, but the slant was the one route that Butler was determined to stop. Then we come to how Butler finishes the play. Driving on the slant is impressive enough. Nine times out of 10 in the NFL this route combination leaves the corner nowhere, trailing behind and just trying to get a play on the receiver to dislodge the ball after he has caught it.
Between the practice preparation and Browner’s jam at the line, Butler now found himself in position not just to defend the pass, but to pick it off and essentially end the game. Watch the way he doesn’t just go for the football, but actually shields it from Lockette by throwing his shoulder in that direction as he positions his arms to make the catch. I doubt this was deliberate, rather pure instinct, but it’s a crucial element to this catch that is likely the difference between a pass that is almost intercepted and one that was.
The bottom line in all of this is that this wasn’t some embarrassing debacle, a sad way to end an otherwise thrilling Super Bowl. This was a fantastic play that made logical sense to the offense, and was just defeated by better defensive play and stellar preparation from the New England Patriots.
If ever one play was going to define a Super Bowl this is a pretty fitting one to do so.
February 3, 2015 at 8:58 pm #17895wvParticipantThe actual catch by Butler is the most impressive
thing to me. He kinda twisted his body and threw
himself at the WR and took the Jolt,
and somehow still kept his eyes on the ball
and latched onto it.One of the best football plays of the year, regardless
of the time and place.w
vFebruary 4, 2015 at 12:20 am #17905MackeyserModeratorI disagree with the basic premise of the analysis.
Pete Carroll/Darrell Bevell got too cute by half. Take the TO if you have to and go heavy and run it in, but do NOT throw it into traffic.
On the other play at the end of the half, Wilson threw it where either it would have been caught, tipped out of bounds or incomplete. There were 3 Pats around that ball and only 1 Seahawk.
Even going heavy, the Pats had struggled to stop the Seahawks in the 2nd half. Was dumb not to call the TO and reset.
Sports is the crucible of human virtue. The distillate remains are human vice.
February 4, 2015 at 7:00 am #17910wvParticipantI disagree with the basic premise of the analysis.
Pete Carroll/Darrell Bevell got too cute by half. Take the TO if you have to and go heavy and run it in, but do NOT throw it into traffic.
On the other play at the end of the half, Wilson threw it where either it would have been caught, tipped out of bounds or incomplete. There were 3 Pats around that ball and only 1 Seahawk.
Even going heavy, the Pats had struggled to stop the Seahawks in the 2nd half. Was dumb not to call the TO and reset.
I dunno. Folks seem to think bad things can happen with a pass
but nothing bad can happen with a run. But the Pats were stacked
for Run-defense. And the Beast could have lost two yards. Then
its third and two-and-a-half.After watchin it twenty times in slo-mo,
I blame Martz.w
vFebruary 4, 2015 at 10:27 am #17914znModeratorTo me the key to the article is the fact that the Patz practiced against this play.
They ran this play in practice specifically to prepare their defensive backs for it. … That knowledge is even more impressive because that is only the third time all year Seattle have run that formation on short yardage.
But then, how many times was Seattle in short yardage during the season? 3rd and less than 2. I don’t have an exact number on that, though Lynch ran from 3rd and less 19 times all season, and Wilson both ran and passed from 3rd and less 18 times. So that’s 37 times all season, give or take. For argument’s sake let’s just say 37. So they ran that play 8% of the time in that situation.
Is that super duper unreal prophetic game-planning to practice against a play Seattle ran 8% of the time in that situation? No…all you have to do is spot that that play represents a problem, especially with the pick on the other CB. You watch 37 plays from the season and say, hey, on that particular one, our regular defensive reactions won’t work.
Now on the playcall? Lynch is actually not very good running on short yardage inside the 2. And btw, Wilson is not tops either. Wilson was 28% for TDs to attempts inside the 10…which is mediocre (Bradford in comparison was nearly 50%). In fact Wilson’s sack percentage on those plays is about 10% (Bradford in comparison was 4%).
Sando’s stats in another thread are interesting. http://theramshuddle.com/topic/101-23-sando/#post-17894 . This is the 5th time since 2001 a team down by 4-8 pts had 2nd/GL from 1 w/20-40 sec left and 1 timeout. 2 ran and fell short. 2 threw TDs. SEA threw INT. Teams this season threw 66 TD passes with 1 INT on passes from the 1-yard line. That 1 INT was Seattle. Since 2012 Seahawks rank 31st in RB TD pct from 1YL.
I think the main argument people have that is if they failed running with Lynch, no one would criticize them–they would go, you gave it a shot with your key player and got beat. So the 2nd guessing metric would not be as bad if they ran it and failed.
February 4, 2015 at 5:23 pm #17925DakParticipantTo me the key to the article is the fact that the Patz practiced against this play.
They ran this play in practice specifically to prepare their defensive backs for it. … That knowledge is even more impressive because that is only the third time all year Seattle have run that formation on short yardage.
But then, how many times was Seattle in short yardage during the season? 3rd and less than 2. I don’t have an exact number on that, though Lynch ran from 3rd and less 19 times all season, and Wilson both ran and passed from 3rd and less 18 times. So that’s 37 times all season, give or take. For argument’s sake let’s just say 37. So they ran that play 8% of the time in that situation.
Is that super duper unreal prophetic game-planning to practice against a play Seattle ran 8% of the time in that situation? No…all you have to do is spot that that play represents a problem, especially with the pick on the other CB. You watch 37 plays from the season and say, hey, on that particular one, our regular defensive reactions won’t work.
Now on the playcall? Lynch is actually not very good running on short yardage inside the 2. And btw, Wilson is not tops either. Wilson was 28% for TDs to attempts inside the 10…which is mediocre (Bradford in comparison was nearly 50%). In fact Wilson’s sack percentage on those plays is about 10% (Bradford in comparison was 4%).
Sando’s stats in another thread are interesting. http://theramshuddle.com/topic/101-23-sando/#post-17894 . This is the 5th time since 2001 a team down by 4-8 pts had 2nd/GL from 1 w/20-40 sec left and 1 timeout. 2 ran and fell short. 2 threw TDs. SEA threw INT. Teams this season threw 66 TD passes with 1 INT on passes from the 1-yard line. That 1 INT was Seattle. Since 2012 Seahawks rank 31st in RB TD pct from 1YL.
I think the main argument people have that is if they failed running with Lynch, no one would criticize them–they would go, you gave it a shot with your key player and got beat. So the 2nd guessing metric would not be as bad if they ran it and failed.
Those are all good points.
I don’t even have a problem with throwing the ball, really. But, the Patz were all stacked up in the middle already to defend the run. Throwing there was much more dangerous.
I’d consider getting Wilson out on the edge for a throw or run. Stress the defense and let Wilson make a play or throw the ball away. That could be deemed dangerous, too, I guess. I just didn’t like the play call, not necessarily the throw, because Seattle’s WRs are really not that strong. It’s hard to lose going to the weaker players on your team.
-
AuthorPosts
- You must be logged in to reply to this topic.