Recent Forum Topics › Forums › The Public House › (on the virus): Here’s how we got here (w/ Washington Post analysis)
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March 27, 2020 at 3:22 am #113022znModerator
The US now has more confirmed coronavirus cases than anywhere else in the world
Here’s how we got here — and what to do next.https://www.vox.com/2020/3/26/21194153/us-confirmed-coronavirus-cases-world
March 26 marked an unhappy milestone for the United States: We’re now No. 1 in confirmed coronavirus cases.
China, where the novel coronavirus originated, was the previous leader. The country reported 81,782 cases as of Thursday near 6 pm on the coronavirus case counter by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University. Until now, second place was held by Italy, which has reported 80,589 cases.
Now the US leapfrogged them both with 82,404 cases. And it’s only going to get worse from here.
In late February, there were 80,000 cases in China and nascent outbreaks in Japan, South Korea, Iran, and Italy. But things in the US were still looking pretty good — at least, on the surface. The US on February 20 reported only 15 cases, all travel-related.
But once officials started testing in earnest for Covid-19, the cases started coming — and coming and coming. On March 1, there were 75. On March 7, 435. On March 14, 2,770. On March 21, 24,192. Now it’s at 82,404 — and those numbers are only going to go up in the coming weeks.
How did things go so wrong so fast? Much of the answer is that when we were reporting very few cases, things were already getting bad under the radar. A disastrously mismanaged February, during which government officials, much of the media, and even some experts assured Americans there was nothing to fear, let the virus spread until it was too big to ignore. By that time, it was also too big to stop without heavy-handed social distancing measures — and their attendant catastrophic economic costs.
Much of the blame lies with the president, who stripped public health agencies of the staffing, resources, and authority they needed to function, and then addressed the crisis in his usual fashion: with misinformation and bluster. It’s worked well for him against many of the scandals of his administration, but the virus was unimpressed.
But the failure wasn’t just the president’s. As Zeynep Tufekci, who has been urging us to do more for months, put it, “a soothing message got widespread traction, not just with Donald Trump and his audience, but among traditional media in the United States, which exhorted us to worry about the flu instead, and warned us against overreaction.” Even with the government sleeping on the job, there were signs from other countries that a catastrophe was arriving on our shores. But very few people said it out loud, and the ones who did were assured they were overreacting. Most people took public health experts’ reassurances at face value and assumed the low numbers of reported cases reflected reality.
Meanwhile, the virus spread.
Now, the world’s most powerful country has one of the world’s worst disasters on its hands. The question now is: Is it too late to turn things around?
The most confirmed cases in the world: What it means and what it doesn’t
The US has more confirmed cases than anywhere else in the world. It’s a sign that our coronavirus situation is very grave indeed. However, it doesn’t necessarily mean that we have the world’s worst coronavirus outbreak.
For one thing, while the US is still undertesting (people with milder cases are typically told to stay home and not be tested), other countries are probably undertesting by even more. Iran, by some estimates, may have millions of coronavirus cases, most of which the government has not reported.
Other hotspots that worry global development researchers include India and Indonesia — both populous countries with weak health systems and high poverty that are likely underreporting their coronavirus outbreaks by a significant margin. One study found that Indonesia is probably reporting around 10 percent of its symptomatic cases, and India between 10 percent and 30 percent.
Another important consideration is population. The US is the third-most populous country in the world. That means that, while our outbreaks are not yet worse per capita than many of the outbreaks in Europe, the top-line numbers look worse. Italy, for example, has reported one case for every 750 citizens. The US has reported one for every 4,000 (though 1 in every 400 New York City residents). Per capita numbers may better reflect how overwhelmed a country’s health system is and how badly it is impacted by the virus.
But overall numbers matter, too. Tens of thousands of people suffering and many of them dying isn’t less tragic if it happens in a large country where they’re a smaller share of the population.
So, while the US situation is very bad news, it’s the combination of a high population, a disastrous outbreak, and high testing capacity (in the last few days, we’ve finally — if belatedly — started testing on a large scale) that propelled America into the No. 1 slot. We should take our situation seriously.
But it’s a misinterpretation to claim that America has the worst outbreak in the world just because we have the most reported cases in the world. (To be clear, we could still end up with the worst outbreak in the world — but we’re not there yet.) When you test more, you’ll get more cases — but testing more is a good thing, and the United States, despite the desperate situation, is in a much better position to turn things around because of all the tests that we have run in the last week.
How coronavirus got a foothold in America
In late January, China locked down the country as hospitals and intensive care units (ICUs) in Wuhan were overwhelmed by coronavirus patients. In response, the United States banned foreign nationals who had recently traveled to China. That “resulted in a significant delay in the number of people coming in with infection,” Dr. Tom Frieden, former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), has said. “That bought time in the US to better prepare.”
Then, we squandered it. “Every other step of the government response was badly fumbled,” Frieden concluded.
Budget cuts and mismanagement by the Trump administration had gutted many of the agencies that were meant to address the crisis. The CDC started work on a test that would identify the novel coronavirus, but shipped the test out to labs with incorrect reagents, meaning that the test didn’t work. Guidance on when there’d be a new test was slow in coming.
Independent researchers at Seattle’s Flu Study, a research project studying flu in the Seattle region, sought permission to run their own test. They were denied it. “We felt like we were sitting, waiting for the pandemic to emerge,” said Dr. Helen Chu, who led the project. “We could help. We couldn’t do anything.” Labs around the country sought the Food and Drug Administration’s approval for their own test and met delays.
Strict rules about who could be tested for the virus were put into place. To be tested, someone had to have recently traveled from China or have been exposed to someone who tested positive. In hindsight, it’s easy to spot the Catch-22. If someone got coronavirus while traveling in South Korea, Iran, Italy, or any of the growing number of countries experiencing outbreaks, they could not be tested. If they infected anyone, those people couldn’t be tested either. Because we’d banned travel from China and would only test travelers from China (or those who had been exposed to a person who’d tested positive), we had rendered it impossible to notice whether the virus was spreading in America.
It was. Virologist Trevor Bradford estimates by comparing patient genomes that the coronavirus started spreading in Washington State in mid-January. By the end of February, it had been introduced to a nursing home, and patients started rapidly dying.
In the meantime, even people who should have known better took the CDC’s low case numbers at face value. There’s no community spread in the United States, public health officials around the country reassured us.
The risk of coronavirus in the US is “just minuscule,” National Institutes of Health official Anthony Fauci, now one of the most trusted authorities leading the response, said on February 17. “We have more kids dying of flu this year at this time than in the last decade or more,” he added.
We were told that risk in our communities “remains low.” Media outlets wrote articles about how we were at greater risk from the flu — a serious mistake in hindsight, to be sure, but an accurate representation of what they were hearing from America’s top public health authorities.
Bedford estimates that there were more than 7,000 cases in the US near the end of February (as opposed to 68 confirmed cases), when a lab in California first detected a community-acquired coronavirus case. If we’d known about them, we could have taken the extensive but not economy-shattering measures that countries like South Korea and Taiwan have taken to stop the virus — testing extensively, aggressively tracing contacts of everyone who tests positive, increasing production of masks and making them widely available.
Instead, we proceeded as if we were safe, while the least invasive ways to beat back the virus steadily slipped out of our reach.
Always a bit behind the curve
By March, it was obvious that there was community transmission in multiple cities across America. But our response was still slow. The FDA only slowly authorized more labs to conduct testing, and revisions to make their guidelines stricter forced some labs to destroy tests they’d already collected. US testing increased, but the prevalence of the virus was increasing, too.
States, counties, and cities had to decide one by one whether to shut their schools, declare a state of emergency, urge social distancing measures, or go into lockdowns. They did so haphazardly, with insufficient data because there was still limited testing in their communities. Italy closed all its schools on March 4 and locked down the country when they had fewer than 10,000 cases; the US surpassed the 10,000 case mark (March 19) and the 20,000 case mark (March 21) and the 50,000 case mark (March 24) without any national order to reduce nonessential activities.
Some local and state officials — like San Francisco Mayor London Breed and Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine — acquitted themselves well, taking strong early measures to reduce the spread of the virus. Some didn’t, like Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, who argued that we shouldn’t take economically damaging measures because if asked “are you willing to take a chance on your survival in exchange for keeping the America that all America loves for your children and grandchildren?” grandparents around the nation would agree to risk letting the virus spread.
Lockdowns are economically devastating, but the death of thousands of Americans in overwhelmed hospitals and the decimation of our health care workforce will not be any less economically devastating for the states that take that route.
In New York, which discovered as they ramped up testing that local cases were terrifyingly out of control, Mayor Bill de Blasio and Gov. Andrew Cuomo sparred over whether the city would have a shelter-in-place order like the one implemented earlier in the California Bay Area. Epidemiologists urged us to employ social distancing, but disorganization, unclear communication from political leaders, and ongoing lack of testing likely reduced compliance rates.
That said, it would be wrong to say that the US hasn’t taken strong measures to stop the virus. School closures were ordered. They were extended to restaurants and bars. California, home to 40 million people and one-fifth of the country’s GDP, ordered its population to stay at home. Nineteen other states have followed. When all the measures go into effect, more than half the country will have been ordered to stay at home (and similar measures may go into effect in more states as the situation worsens).
But we took these steps belatedly — again, in part because of lack of testing capacity. That meant each measure wasn’t sufficient on its own, and we had to keep escalating. It is still not clear we’ve done enough for desperate situations like New York, New Orleans, and Atlanta, which are already running out of ICU beds.
Our ugly start put us at an enormous disadvantage for the next phase of the coronavirus fight, and we spent most of March on the defensive while case numbers grew and grew.
So, how does this end?
When every day the news gets worse, it’s easy to start to despair — or to start thinking we should give up, write off 3 percent of our population, and try to, as Bill Gates condemned the idea, “ignore that pile of bodies over in the corner” as we go back to work.
We should not do that.
But we shouldn’t resign ourselves to another year and a half in lockdown, either — though it’s true that it will be a long time before the country or the world returns to normal. There are lots of promising options available, and pursuing some combination of them will likely allow us to ease up on some of the costliest current restrictions.
“Suppression will minimally require a combination of social distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members,” an influential report from the Imperial College London argued, and then more than a year of maintaining “this type of intensive intervention package — or something equivalently effective at reducing transmission.” Other researchers have criticized specific assumptions underlying that model, but there’s wider agreement on the general premise that we need to find an “intervention package” that keeps transmission low.
But the details of that intensive intervention package are up to us, and some possibilities could be improvements over the current lockdowns. Countries are exploring a wide range of options for reducing transmission with minimal human costs.
One option, based on South Korea’s success at managing the virus, is called “test and trace.” The idea is to get much much better at testing so that we can identify sick people sooner, isolate them and all of their contacts, and let other people go about their daily lives.
That’s the approach favored by the WHO, based on what’s worked best so far in the countries that have controlled their outbreaks. “To suppress and control the epidemic, countries must isolate, test, treat, and trace,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus argued last week.
“Everyone staying home is just a very blunt measure. That’s what you say when you’ve got really nothing else,” Emily Gurley of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health told NPR. “Being able to test folks is really the linchpin in getting beyond what we’re doing now.”
Accomplishing this will require making testing much more widespread. Tactics like test pooling, which Nebraska has started using and which other states may copy, can be employed to let us test more patients with the same number of tests. Developing tests with faster turnaround time will mean that sick people get answers within an hour instead of waiting for weeks. We’re a long way away from this, but that doesn’t mean that it couldn’t happen fast with enough focused attention and funding.
Another option, serological tests, will let us check who has already recovered from the virus, so some people will know they’ve developed immunity and can return to normal. The UK is aggressively exploring this option and says they plan to make millions of serological tests available within “days rather than weeks or months,” says Sharon Peacock, the director of the national infection service at Public Health England.
Lockdowns affect lots of people who could be at work. Once we have better testing, we can lock down only people who’ve been exposed for the period of time that they’re at risk of spreading the virus (most countries require 14 days of self-quarantine).
Better treatments, too, might change the dynamic of our fight against the coronavirus. Several promising drugs are undergoing trials right now, including a multi-nation, thousands-of-patients, multi-drug randomized trial organized by the WHO called SOLIDARITY. The president has controversially highlighted chloroquine, an antimalarial drug, but others showing promising early results include Japanese flu drug favipiravir, HIV medication remdesivir, and others. If a successful treatment that makes the illness much less dangerous is discovered, we could return sooner to normal life.
To be clear, it’s a mistake to hype any one of these drugs as a cure-all (and please, don’t hoard them at home). And the president certainly hasn’t helped by touting them as miracle cures despite mixed early evidence.
But it’s not unlikely that our treatment options will improve dramatically as we learn more. “We need more data at every level,” UCSF biologist Nevan Krogan, who is researching drug treatments for the disease, said in March.
Finally, our manufacturing can scale up production of personal protective equipment and ventilators, and we can rapidly train more people to care for coronavirus patients, increasing our hospital capacity and our ability to cope with the virus.
“Let’s figure out testing, let’s get enough PPE [personal protective equipment] for first responders,” Tara Smith, who studies infectious disease at Kent State University, told my colleague Brian Resnick. “Let’s get enough swabs. Let’s buy more ventilators, build more ventilators — to have this second chance at not messing things up.”
While all that’s happening, researchers like Stephen Kissler of Harvard have proposed that we might alternate periods of social distancing, trying to keep society functioning and our mental health acceptable while not overloading our hospitals. “Intermittent social distancing — triggered by trends in disease surveillance — may allow interventions to be relaxed temporarily in relative short time windows, but measures will need to be reintroduced if or when case numbers rebound,” the Imperial College London report concluded.
So while life as normal might be a long way off, we shouldn’t expect to be sitting in lockdown for the next year. This is a painful, temporary, weeks-long (maybe months-long) step while we progress as fast as possible on all of those fronts.
There are now two months of coronavirus response behind us. We spent one of them unaware that we were under attack, and the second trying to figure out how to respond. By the time we had a good picture of the problem in front of us, we had a problem on an unprecedented scale.
But it’s not all hopeless. If the world is at war with the coronavirus, it’s encouraging to remember that the US has historically been incompetent in the early stages of a global war — but unstoppable once we set ourselves to the task at hand. This isn’t over — it is, in fact, barely getting started — and it’s up to all of us to decide how it ends.
April 5, 2020 at 10:01 am #113348znModeratorThe U.S. was beset by denial and dysfunction as the coronavirus raged
From the Oval Office to the CDC, political and institutional failures cascaded through the system and opportunities to mitigate the pandemic were lost.By the time Donald Trump proclaimed himself a wartime president — and the coronavirus the enemy — the United States was already on course to see more of its people die than in the wars of Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq combined.
The country has adopted an array of wartime measures never employed collectively in U.S. history — banning incoming travelers from two continents, bringing commerce to a near-halt, enlisting industry to make emergency medical gear, and confining 230 million Americans to their homes in a desperate bid to survive an attack by an unseen adversary.
Despite these and other extreme steps, the United States will likely go down as the country that was supposedly best prepared to fight a pandemic but ended up catastrophically overmatched by the novel coronavirus, sustaining heavier casualties than any other nation.
It did not have to happen this way. Though not perfectly prepared, the United States had more expertise, resources, plans and epidemiological experience than dozens of countries that ultimately fared far better in fending off the virus.
The failure has echoes of the period leading up to 9/11: Warnings were sounded, including at the highest levels of government, but the president was deaf to them until the enemy had already struck.
The Trump administration received its first formal notification of the outbreak of the coronavirus in China on Jan. 3. Within days, U.S. spy agencies were signaling the seriousness of the threat to Trump by including a warning about the coronavirus — the first of many — in the President’s Daily Brief.
And yet, it took 70 days from that initial notification for Trump to treat the coronavirus not as a distant threat or harmless flu strain well under control, but as a lethal force that had outflanked America’s defenses and was poised to kill tens of thousands of citizens. That more-than-two-month stretch now stands as critical time that was squandered.
33 times Trump downplayed the coronavirus
Trump’s baseless assertions in those weeks, including his claim that it would all just “miraculously” go away, sowed significant public confusion and contradicted the urgent messages of public health experts.
“While the media would rather speculate about outrageous claims of palace intrigue, President Trump and this Administration remain completely focused on the health and safety of the American people with around the clock work to slow the spread of the virus, expand testing, and expedite vaccine development,” said Judd Deere, a spokesman for the president. “Because of the President’s leadership we will emerge from this challenge healthy, stronger, and with a prosperous and growing economy.”
The president’s behavior and combative statements were merely a visible layer on top of deeper levels of dysfunction.
The most consequential failure involved a breakdown in efforts to develop a diagnostic test that could be mass produced and distributed across the United States, enabling agencies to map early outbreaks of the disease, and impose quarantine measures to contain them. At one point, a Food and Drug Administration official tore into lab officials at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, telling them their lapses in protocol, including concerns that the lab did not meet the criteria for sterile conditions, were so serious that the FDA would “shut you down” if the CDC were a commercial, rather than government, entity.
Other failures cascaded through the system. The administration often seemed weeks behind the curve in reacting to the viral spread, closing doors that were already contaminated. Protracted arguments between the White House and public health agencies over funding, combined with a meager existing stockpile of emergency supplies, left vast stretches of the country’s health-care system without protective gear until the outbreak had become a pandemic. Infighting, turf wars and abrupt leadership changes hobbled the work of the coronavirus task force.
It may never be known how many thousands of deaths, or millions of infections, might have been prevented with a response that was more coherent, urgent and effective. But even now, there are many indications that the administration’s handling of the crisis had potentially devastating consequences.
Even the president’s base has begun to confront this reality. In mid-March, as Trump was rebranding himself a wartime president and belatedly urging the public to help slow the spread of the virus, Republican leaders were poring over grim polling data that suggested Trump was lulling his followers into a false sense of security in the face of a lethal threat.
The poll showed that far more Republicans than Democrats were being influenced by Trump’s dismissive depictions of the virus and the comparably scornful coverage on Fox News and other conservative networks. As a result, Republicans were in distressingly large numbers refusing to change travel plans, follow “social distancing” guidelines, stock up on supplies or otherwise take the coronavirus threat seriously.
“Denial is not likely to be a successful strategy for survival,” GOP pollster Neil Newhouse concluded in a document that was shared with GOP leaders on Capitol Hill and discussed widely at the White House. Trump’s most ardent supporters, it said, were “putting themselves and their loved ones in danger.”
Trump’s message was changing as the report swept through the GOP’s senior ranks. In recent days, Trump has bristled at reminders that he had once claimed the caseload would soon be “down to zero.”
More than 7,000 people have died of the coronavirus in the United States so far, with about 240,000 cases reported. But Trump has acknowledged that new models suggest that the eventual national death toll could be between 100,000 and 240,000.
Beyond the suffering in store for thousands of victims and their families, the outcome has altered the international standing of the United States, damaging and diminishing its reputation as a global leader in times of extraordinary adversity.
“This has been a real blow to the sense that America was competent,” said Gregory F. Treverton, a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, the government’s senior-most provider of intelligence analysis. He stepped down from the NIC in January 2017 and now teaches at the University of Southern California. “That was part of our global role. Traditional friends and allies looked to us because they thought we could be competently called upon to work with them in a crisis. This has been the opposite of that.”
This article, which retraces the failures over the first 70 days of the coronavirus crisis, is based on 47 interviews with administration officials, public health experts, intelligence officers and others involved in fighting the pandemic. Many spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information and decisions.
Scanning the horizon
Public health authorities are part of a special breed of public servant — along with counterterrorism officials, military planners, aviation authorities and others — whose careers are consumed with contemplating worst-case scenarios.
The arsenal they wield against viral invaders is powerful, capable of smothering a new pathogen while scrambling for a cure, but easily overwhelmed if not mobilized in time. As a result, officials at the Department of Health and Human Services, the CDC and other agencies spend their days scanning the horizon for emerging dangers.
The CDC learned of a cluster of cases in China on Dec. 31 and began developing reports for HHS on Jan. 1. But the most unambiguous warning that U.S. officials received about the coronavirus came Jan. 3, when Robert Redfield, the CDC director, received a call from a counterpart in China. The official told Redfield that a mysterious respiratory illness was spreading in Wuhan, a congested commercial city of 11 million people in the communist country’s interior.
Redfield quickly relayed the disturbing news to Alex Azar, the secretary of HHS, the agency that oversees the CDC and other public health entities. Azar, in turn, ensured that the White House was notified, instructing his chief of staff to share the Chinese report with the National Security Council.
From that moment, the administration and the virus were locked in a race against a ticking clock, a competition for the upper hand between pathogen and prevention that would dictate the scale of the outbreak when it reached American shores, and determine how many would get sick or die.
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The initial response was promising, but officials also immediately encountered obstacles.On Jan. 6, Redfield sent a letter to the Chinese offering to send help, including a team of CDC scientists. China rebuffed the offer for weeks, turning away assistance and depriving U.S. authorities of an early chance to get a sample of the virus, critical for developing diagnostic tests and any potential vaccine.
China impeded the U.S. response in other ways, including by withholding accurate information about the outbreak. Beijing had a long track record of downplaying illnesses that emerged within its borders, an impulse that U.S. officials attribute to a desire by the country’s leaders to avoid embarrassment and accountability with China’s 1.3 billion people and other countries that find themselves in the pathogen’s path.
China stuck to this costly script in the case of the coronavirus, reporting Jan. 14 that it had seen “no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission.” U.S. officials treated the claim with skepticism that intensified when the first case surfaced outside China with a reported infection in Thailand.
A week earlier, senior officials at HHS had begun convening an intra-agency task force including Redfield, Azar and Anthony S. Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases. The following week, there were also scattered meetings at the White House with officials from the National Security Council and State Department, focused mainly on when and whether to bring back government employees in China.
U.S. officials began taking preliminary steps to counter a potential outbreak. By mid-January, Robert Kadlec, an Air Force officer and physician who serves as assistant secretary for preparedness and response at HHS, had instructed subordinates to draw up contingency plans for enforcing the Defense Production Act, a measure that enables the government to compel private companies to produce equipment or devices critical to the country’s security. Aides were bitterly divided over whether to implement the act, and nothing happened for many weeks.
On Jan. 14, Kadlec scribbled a single word in a notebook he carries: “Coronavirus!!!”
Despite the flurry of activity at lower levels of his administration, Trump was not substantially briefed by health officials about the coronavirus until Jan.18, when, while spending the weekend at Mar-a-Lago, he took a call from Azar.
Even before the heath secretary could get a word in about the virus, Trump cut him off and began criticizing Azar for his handling of an aborted federal ban on vaping products, a matter that vexed the president.
At the time, Trump was in the throes of an impeachment battle over his alleged attempt to coerce political favors from the leader of Ukraine. Acquittal seemed certain by the GOP-controlled Senate, but Trump was preoccupied with the trial, calling lawmakers late at night to rant, and making lists of perceived enemies he would seek to punish when the case against him concluded.
In hindsight, officials said, Azar could have been more forceful in urging Trump to turn at least some of his attention to a threat that would soon pose an even graver test to his presidency, a crisis that would cost American lives and consume the final year of Trump’s first term.
But the secretary, who had a strained relationship with Trump and many others in the administration, assured the president that those responsible were working on and monitoring the issue. Azar told several associates that the president believed he was “alarmist” and Azar struggled to get Trump’s attention to focus on the issue, even asking one confidant for advice.
Within days, there were new causes for alarm.
On Jan. 21, a Seattle man who had recently traveled to Wuhan tested positive for the coronavirus, becoming the first known infection on U.S. soil. Then, two days later, Chinese authorities took the drastic step of shutting down Wuhan, turning the teeming metropolis into a ghost city of empty highways and shuttered skyscrapers, with millions of people marooned in their homes.
“That was like, whoa,” said a senior U.S. official involved in White House meetings on the crisis. “That was when the Richter scale hit 8.”
It was also when U.S. officials began to confront the failings of their own efforts to respond.
Azar, who had served in senior positions at HHS through crises including the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the outbreak of bird flu in 2005, was intimately familiar with the playbook for crisis management.
He instructed subordinates to move rapidly to establish a nationwide surveillance system to track the spread of the coronavirus — a stepped-up version of what the CDC does every year to monitor new strains of the ordinary flu.
But doing so would require assets that would elude U.S. officials for months — a diagnostic test that could accurately identify those infected with the new virus and be produced on a mass scale for rapid deployment across the United States, and money to implement the system.
Azar’s team also hit another obstacle. The Chinese were still refusing to share the viral samples they had collected and were using to develop their own tests. In frustration, U.S. officials looked for other possible routes.
A biocontainment lab at the University of Texas medical branch in Galveston had a research partnership with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Kadlec, who knew the Galveston lab director, hoped scientists could arrange a transaction on their own without government interference. At first, the lab in Wuhan agreed, but officials in Beijing intervened Jan. 24 and blocked any lab-to-lab transfer.
There is no indication that officials sought to escalate the matter or enlist Trump to intervene. In fact, Trump has consistently praised Chinese President Xi Jinping despite warnings from U.S. intelligence and health officials that Beijing was concealing the true scale of the outbreak and impeding cooperation on key fronts.
The CDC had issued its first public alert about the coronavirus Jan. 8, and by the 17th was monitoring major airports in Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York, where large numbers of passengers arrived each day from China.
In other ways, though, the situation was already spinning out of control, with multiplying cases in Seattle, intransigence by the Chinese, mounting questions from the public, and nothing in place to stop infected travelers from arriving from abroad.
Trump was out of the country for this critical stretch, taking part in the annual global economic forum in Davos, Switzerland. He was accompanied by a contingent of top officials including national security adviser Robert O’Brien, who took a trans-Atlantic call from an anxious Azar.
Azar told O’Brien that it was “mayhem” at the White House, with HHS officials being pressed to provide nearly identical briefings to three audiences on the same day.
Azar urged O’Brien to have the NSC assert control over a matter with potential implications for air travel, immigration authorities, the State Department and the Pentagon. O’Brien seemed to grasp the urgency, and put his deputy, Matthew Pottinger, who had worked in China as a journalist for the Wall Street Journal, in charge of coordinating the still-nascent U.S. response.
But the rising anxiety within the administration appeared not to register with the president. On Jan. 22, Trump received his first question about the coronavirus in an interview on CNBC while in Davos. Asked whether he was worried about a potential pandemic, Trump said, “No. Not at all. And we have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China. . . . It’s going to be just fine.”
Spreading uncontrollably
\The move by the NSC to seize control of the response marked an opportunity to reorient U.S. strategy around containing the virus where possible and procuring resources that hospitals would need in any U.S. outbreak, including such basic equipment as protective masks and ventilators.
But instead of mobilizing for what was coming, U.S. officials seemed more preoccupied with logistical problems, including how to evacuate Americans from China.
In Washington, then-acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and Pottinger began convening meetings at the White House with senior officials from HHS, the CDC and the State Department.
The group, which included Azar, Pottinger and Fauci, as well as nine others across the administration, formed the core of what would become the administration’s coronavirus task force. But it primarily focused on efforts to keep infected people in China from traveling to the United States even while evacuating thousands of U.S. citizens. The meetings did not seriously focus on testing or supplies, which have since become the administration’s most challenging problems.
The task force was formally announced on Jan. 29.
“The genesis of this group was around border control and repatriation,” said a senior official involved in the meetings. “It wasn’t a comprehensive, whole-of-government group to run everything.”
The State Department agenda dominated those early discussions, according to participants. Officials began making plans to charter aircraft to evacuate 6,000 Americans stranded in Wuhan. They also debated language for travel advisories that State could issue to discourage other travel in and out of China.
On Jan. 29, Mulvaney chaired a meeting in the White House Situation Room in which officials debated moving travel restrictions to “Level 4,” meaning a “do not travel” advisory from the State Department. Then, the next day, China took the draconian step of locking down the entire Hubei province, which encompasses Wuhan.
That move by Beijing finally prompted a commensurate action by the Trump administration. On Jan. 31, Azar announced restrictions barring any non-U.S. citizen who had been in China during the preceding two weeks from entering the United States.
Trump has, with some justification, pointed to the China-related restriction as evidence that he had responded aggressively and early to the outbreak. It was among the few intervention options throughout the crisis that played to the instincts of the president, who often seems fixated on erecting borders and keeping foreigners out of the country.
But by that point, 300,000 people had come into the United States from China over the previous month. There were only 7,818 confirmed cases around the world at the end of January, according to figures released by the World Health Organization — but it is now clear that the virus was spreading uncontrollably.
Pottinger was by then pushing for another travel ban, this time restricting the flow of travelers from Italy and other nations in the European Union that were rapidly emerging as major new nodes of the outbreak. Pottinger’s proposal was endorsed by key health-care officials, including Fauci, who argued that it was critical to close off any path the virus might take into the country.
This time, the plan met with resistance from Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and others who worried about the impact on the U.S. economy. It was an early sign of tension in an area that would split the administration, pitting those who prioritized public health against those determined to avoid any disruption in an election year to the run of expansion and employment growth.
Those backing the economy prevailed with the president. And it was more than a month before the administration issued a belated and confusing ban on flights into the United States from Europe. Hundreds of thousands of people crossed the Atlantic during that interval.
A wall of resistance
While fights over air travel played out in the White House, public health officials began to panic over a startling shortage of critical medical equipment including protective masks for doctors and nurses, as well as a rapidly shrinking pool of money needed to pay for such things.
By early February, the administration was quickly draining a $105 million congressional fund to respond to infectious disease outbreaks. The coronavirus threat to the United States still seemed distant if not entirely hypothetical to much of the public. But to health officials charged with stockpiling supplies for worst-case-scenarios, disaster appeared increasingly inevitable.
A national stockpile of N95 protective masks, gowns, gloves and other supplies was already woefully inadequate after years of underfunding. The prospects for replenishing that store were suddenly threatened by the unfolding crisis in China, which disrupted offshore supply chains.
Much of the manufacturing of such equipment had long since migrated to China, where factories were now shuttered because workers were on order to stay in their households. At the same time, China was buying up masks and other gear to gird for its own coronavirus outbreak, driving up costs and monopolizing supplies.
In late January and early February, leaders at HHS sent two letters to the White House Office of Management and Budget asking to use its transfer authority to shift $136 million of department funds into pools that could be tapped for combating the coronavirus. Azar and his aides also began raising the need for a multibillion-dollar supplemental budget request to send to Congress.
Yet White House budget hawks argued that appropriating too much money at once when there were only a few U.S. cases would be viewed as alarmist.
Joe Grogan, head of the Domestic Policy Council, clashed with health officials over preparedness. He mistrusted how the money would be used and questioned how health officials had used previous preparedness funds.
Azar then spoke to Russell Vought, the acting director of the White House Office of Management and Budget, during Trump’s State of the Union speech on Feb. 4. Vought seemed amenable, and told Azar to submit a proposal.
Azar did so the next day, drafting a supplemental request for more than $4 billion, a sum that OMB officials and others at the White House greeted as an outrage. Azar arrived at the White House that day for a tense meeting in the Situation Room that erupted in a shouting match, according to three people familiar with the incident.
A deputy in the budget office accused Azar of preemptively lobbying Congress for a gigantic sum that White House officials had no interest in granting. Azar bristled at the criticism and defended the need for an emergency infusion. But his standing with White House officials, already shaky before the coronavirus crisis began, was damaged further.
Trump on his ‘natural ability’ for medical science: ‘I really get it’
White House officials relented to a degree weeks later as the feared coronavirus surge in the United States began to materialize. The OMB team whittled Azar’s demands down to $2.5 billion, money that would be available only in the current fiscal year. Congress ignored that figure, approving an $8 billion supplemental bill that Trump signed into law March 6.
But again, delays proved costly. The disputes meant that the United States missed a narrow window to stockpile ventilators, masks and other protective gear before the administration was bidding against many other desperate nations, and state officials fed up with federal failures began scouring for supplies themselves.
In late March, the administration ordered 10,000 ventilators — far short of what public health officials and governors said was needed. And many will not arrive until the summer or fall, when models expect the pandemic to be receding.
“It’s actually kind of a joke,” said one administration official involved in deliberations about the belated purchase.
Inconclusive tests
Although viruses travel unseen, public health officials have developed elaborate ways of mapping and tracking their movements. Stemming an outbreak or slowing a pandemic in many ways comes down to the ability to quickly divide the population into those who are infected and those who are not.
Doing so, however, hinges on having an accurate test to diagnose patients and deploy it rapidly to labs across the country. The time it took to accomplish that in the United States may have been more costly to American efforts than any other failing.
“If you had the testing, you could say, ‘Oh my god, there’s circulating virus in Seattle, let’s jump on it. There’s circulating virus in Chicago, let’s jump on it,’ ” said a senior administration official involved in battling the outbreak. “We didn’t have that visibility.”
The first setback came when China refused to share samples of the virus, depriving U.S. researchers of supplies to bombard with drugs and therapies in a search for ways to defeat it. But even when samples had been procured, the U.S. effort was hampered by systemic problems and institutional hubris.
Among the costliest errors was a misplaced assessment by top health officials that the outbreak would probably be limited in scale inside the United States — as had been the case with every other infection for decades — and that the CDC could be trusted on its own to develop a coronavirus diagnostic test.
The CDC, launched in the 1940s to contain an outbreak of malaria in the southern United States, had taken the lead on the development of diagnostic tests in major outbreaks including Ebola, zika and H1N1. But the CDC was not built to mass-produce tests.
The CDC’s success had fostered an institutional arrogance, a sense that even in the face of a potential crisis there was no pressing need to involve private labs, academic institutions, hospitals and global health organizations also capable of developing tests.
Yet some were concerned that the CDC test would not be enough. Stephen Hahn, the FDA commissioner, sought authority in early February to begin calling private diagnostic and pharmaceutical companies to enlist their help.
FDA leaders were split on whether it would be bad optics for Hahn to be personally calling companies he regulated. When FDA officials consulted leaders at HHS, they understood it as a direction to stand down.
At that point, Azar, the HHS secretary, seemed committed to a plan he was pursuing that would keep his agency at the center of the response effort: securing a test from the CDC and then building a national coronavirus surveillance system by relying on an existing network of labs used to track the ordinary flu.
In task force meetings, Azar and Redfield pushed for $100 million to fund the plan, but were shot down because of the cost, according to a document outlining the testing strategy obtained by The Washington Post.
Relying so heavily on the CDC would have been problematic even if it had succeeded in quickly developing an effective test that could be distributed across the country. The scale of the epidemic, and the need for mass testing far beyond the capabilities of the flu network, would have overwhelmed the plan, which didn’t envision engaging commercial lab companies for up to six months.
The effort collapsed when the CDC failed its basic assignment to create a working test and the task force rejected Azar’s plan.
On Feb. 6, when the World Health Organization reported that it was shipping 250,000 test kits to labs around the world, the CDC began distributing 90 kits to a smattering of state-run health labs.
Almost immediately, the state facilities encountered problems. The results were inconclusive in trial runs at more than half the labs, meaning they couldn’t be relied upon to diagnose actual patients. The CDC issued a stopgap measure, instructing labs to send tests to its headquarters in Atlanta, a practice that would delay results for days.
The scarcity of effective tests led officials to impose constraints on when and how to use them, and delayed surveillance testing. Initial guidelines were so restrictive that states were discouraged from testing patients exhibiting symptoms unless they had traveled to China and come into contact with a confirmed case, when the pathogen had by that point almost certainly spread more broadly into the general population.
The limits left top officials largely blind to the true dimensions of the outbreak.
In a meeting in the Situation Room in mid-February, Fauci and Redfield told White House officials that there was no evidence yet of worrisome person-to-person transmission in the United States. In hindsight, it appears almost certain that the virus was taking hold in communities at that point. But even the country’s top experts had little meaningful data about the domestic dimensions of the threat. Fauci later conceded that as they learned more their views changed.
At the same time, as the president’s subordinates were growing increasingly alarmed, Trump continued to exhibit little concern. On Feb. 10, he held a political rally in New Hampshire attended by thousands where he declared that “by April, you know, in theory, when it gets a little warmer, it miraculously goes away.”
The New Hampshire rally was one of eight that Trump held after he had been told by Azar about the coronavirus, a period when he also went to his golf courses six times.
A day earlier, on Feb. 9, a group of governors in town for a black-tie gala at the White House secured a private meeting with Fauci and Redfield. The briefing rattled many of the governors, bearing little resemblance to the words of the president. “The doctors and the scientists, they were telling us then exactly what they are saying now,” Maryland Gov. Larry Hogan (R) said.
That month, federal medical and public health officials were emailing increasingly dire forecasts among themselves, with one Veterans Affairs medical adviser warning, ‘We are flying blind,’” according to emails obtained by the watchdog group American Oversight.
Later in February, U.S. officials discovered indications that the CDC laboratory was failing to meet basic quality-control standards. On a Feb. 27 conference call with a range of health officials, a senior FDA official lashed out at the CDC for its repeated lapses.
Jeffrey Shuren, the FDA’s director for devices and radiological health, told the CDC that if it were subjected to the same scrutiny as a privately run lab, “I would shut you down.”
On Feb. 29, a Washington state man became the first American to die of a coronavirus infection. That same day, the FDA released guidance, signaling that private labs were free to proceed in developing their own diagnostics.
Another four-week stretch had been squandered.
Life and death
One week later, on March 6, Trump toured the facilities at the CDC wearing a red “Keep America Great” hat. He boasted that the CDC tests were nearly perfect and that “anybody who wants a test will get a test,” a promise that nearly a month later remains unmet.
He also professed to have a keen medical mind. “I like this stuff. I really get it,” he said. “People here are surprised that I understand it. Every one of these doctors said, ‘How do you know so much about this?’ ”
In reality, many of the failures to stem the coronavirus outbreak in the United States were either a result of, or exacerbated by, his leadership.
For weeks, he had barely uttered a word about the crisis that didn’t downplay its severity or propagate demonstrably false information. He dismissed the warnings of intelligence officials and top public health officials in his administration.
At times, he voiced far more authentic concern about the trajectory of the stock market than the spread of the virus in the United States, railing at the chairman of the Federal Reserve and others with an intensity that he never seemed to exhibit about the possible human toll of the outbreak.
In March, as state after state imposed sweeping new restrictions on their citizens’ daily lives to protect them — triggering severe shudders in the economy — Trump second-guessed the lockdowns.
The common flu kills tens of thousands each year and “nothing is shut down, life & the economy go on,” he tweeted March 9. A day later, he pledged that the virus would “go away. Just stay calm.”
Two days later, Trump finally ordered the halt to incoming travel from Europe that his deputy national security adviser had been advocating for weeks. But Trump botched the Oval Office announcement so badly that White House officials spent days trying to correct erroneous statements that triggered a stampede by U.S. citizens overseas to get home.
“There was some coming to grips with the problem and the true nature of it — the 13th of March is when I saw him really turn the corner. It took a while to realize you’re at war,” Sen. Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) said. “That’s when he took decisive action that set in motion some real payoffs.”
Trump spent many weeks shuffling responsibility for leading his administration’s response to the crisis, putting Azar in charge of the task force at first, relying on Pottinger, the deputy national security adviser, for brief periods, before finally putting Vice President Pence in the role toward the end of February.
Other officials have emerged during the crisis to help right the United States’ course, and at times, the statements of the president. But even as Fauci, Azar and others sought to assert themselves, Trump was behind the scenes turning to others with no credentials, experience or discernible insight in navigating a pandemic.
Foremost among them was his adviser and son-in-law, Jared Kushner. A team reporting to Kushner commandeered space on the seventh floor of the HHS building to pursue a series of inchoate initiatives.
One plan involved having Google create a website to direct those with symptoms to testing facilities that were supposed to spring up in Walmart parking lots across the country, but which never materialized. Another centered on an idea advanced by Oracle chairman Larry Ellison to use software to monitor the unproven use of anti-malaria drugs against the coronavirus pathogen.
So far, the plans have failed to come close to delivering on the promises made when they were touted in White House news conferences. The Kushner initiatives have, however, often interrupted the work of those under immense pressure to manage the U.S. response.
Current and former officials said that Kadlec, Fauci, Redfield and others have repeatedly had to divert their attentions from core operations to contend with ill-conceived requests from the White House they don’t believe they can ignore. And Azar, who once ran the response, has since been sidelined, with his agency disempowered in decision-making and his performance pilloried by a range of White House officials, including Kushner.
“Right now Fauci is trying to roll out the most ambitious clinical trial ever implemented” to hasten the development of a vaccine, said a former senior administration official in frequent touch with former colleagues. And yet, the nation’s top health officials “are getting calls from the White House or Jared’s team asking, ‘Wouldn’t it be nice to do this with Oracle?’ ”
If the coronavirus has exposed the country’s misplaced confidence in its ability to handle a crisis, it also has cast harsh light on the limits of Trump’s approach to the presidency — his disdain for facts, science and experience.
He has survived other challenges to his presidency — including the Russia investigation and impeachment — by fiercely contesting the facts arrayed against him and trying to control the public’s understanding of events with streams of falsehoods.
The coronavirus may be the first crisis Trump has faced in office where the facts — the thousands of mounting deaths and infections — are so devastatingly evident that they defy these tactics.
After months of dismissing the severity of the coronavirus, resisting calls for austere measures to contain it, and recasting himself as a wartime president, Trump seemed finally to succumb to the coronavirus reality. In a meeting with a Republican ally in the Oval Office last month, the president said his campaign no longer mattered because his reelection would hinge on his coronavirus response.
“It’s absolutely critical for the American people to follow the guidelines for the next 30 days,” he said at his March 31 news conference. “It’s a matter of life and death.”
April 14, 2020 at 3:50 am #113618znModeratorWhat went wrong with the media’s coronavirus coverage?
And can we do better?The coronavirus pandemic has crippled America. So far, the virus has killed more than 20,000 people in the United States and has sickened more than 500,000 people.
It’s clear now that the US government was woefully unprepared for the pandemic, and that’s been reflected in its messaging to the public since the start.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for instance, didn’t tell the country to stop gathering in groups until March 15 — weeks after a top CDC official announced that the virus would begin spreading throughout the US. And after telling Americans for months that they should not wear masks unless they are sick, the government formally flipped that advice on April 3 and said that everyone should wear some kind of covering on their face in certain public settings.
Much of the mainstream media amplified this slow and muddled reaction to the rapidly spreading virus. Since alarming reports about Covid-19 began to emerge from China in January, the media often provided information to Americans that later proved to be wrong, or at least inadequate.
For instance: While President Trump has been correctly pilloried for describing the coronavirus as less dangerous than the flu, that message was commonplace in mainstream media outlets throughout February. And journalists — including my colleagues at Vox — were dutifully repeating exhortations from public health officials not to wear masks for much of 2020.
As we head into the next phase of the pandemic, and as the stakes mount, it’s worth looking back to ask how the media could have done better as the virus broke out of China and headed to the US.
Why didn’t we see this coming sooner? And once we did, why didn’t we sound the alarm with more vigor?
If you read the stories from that period, not just the headlines, you’ll find that most of the information holding the pieces together comes from authoritative sources you’d want reporters to turn to: experts at institutions like the World Health Organization, the CDC, and academics with real domain knowledge.
The problem, in many cases, was that that information was wrong, or at least incomplete. Which raises the hard question for journalists scrutinizing our performance in recent months: How do we cover a story where neither we nor the experts we turn to know what isn’t yet known? And how do we warn Americans about the full range of potential risks in the world without ringing alarm bells so constantly that they’ll tune us out?
“Not just saying what we do know, but what we don’t know”
Let’s be clear: Journalists have been doing crucial reporting about what the US government got wrong as the pandemic advanced, and what US leaders could have done to prepare America. They provided analysis that put the news in context. And they have also provided important on-the-ground dispatches from places around the world that have been devastated by the disease — often at great personal risk — starting at its epicenter in Wuhan, China.
But when it came to grappling with a new disease they knew nothing about, journalists most often turned to experts and institutions for information, and relayed what those experts and institutions told them to their audience.
And given that the Covid-19 coronavirus is brand new, even the best-meaning experts and institutions gave conflicting information, some of which now has proven to be inaccurate or up for debate. That includes National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases director Anthony Fauci, who is now the most trusted official in the federal government when it comes to the Covid-19 response, but as late as February was calling the risk from coronavirus “minuscule” and warning people to worry instead about “influenza outbreak, which is having its second wave.”
“There’s a line between doing aggressive reporting and acting in the role of a public health agency”
“There’s a line between doing aggressive reporting and kind of acting in the role of a public health agency,” Joe Kahn, the New York Times’s managing editor, told Recode. “And you never have a degree of complete certainty about the medical analysis, and the epidemiology.”
That degree of uncertainty is much larger when it comes to a new virus that moves around the world as quickly as a plane. It’s a problem that comes built into the reporting. Perhaps the only solution journalists have is to simply say: The experts we talked to aren’t sure, but they’re trying to find out.
Laura Helmuth, who was the health and science editor at the Washington Post and recently left to become editor-in-chief of Scientific American, says acknowledging gaps in knowledge is crucial but not easy.
“One thing that science journalists have been getting better at is not just saying what we do know, but what we don’t know,” she says. “But most journalists aren’t accustomed to doing that.”
And that assumes the journalists themselves have the expertise to ask the right experts. Mainstream journalists who know how to read and understand academic research reports are a select group and have been for decades. Many midsize newspapers once employed dedicated science journalists, but those jobs have been dwindling for years. (One reason that Stat, a publication that launched in 2015, which specializes in medical and science reporting, has been so valuable during this crisis is that it employs dozens of expert journalists who once did this work for other outlets.)
But Zeynep Tufekci, a professor at the University of North Carolina’s School of Information and Library Science who specializes in the intersection between technology and society, argues that the mainstream media should have been able to understand the threat facing the country much earlier.
Writing in the Atlantic on March 24, she says the threat should have been obvious as early as January 29, when a New England Journal of Medicine paper described the virus’s speed, cunning, and lethality. Tufekci shared the paper on Twitter and said that “with an urgent enormous effort, this could be contained.” But back then, widespread lockdowns and enforced social distancing for everyone regardless of their symptoms were hard to imagine, even for Tufekci. “For all of us, washing hands often and not touching one’s face and self-isolating if feverish are the sensible steps—as in any flu season,” she tweeted.
Tufekci’s critique is that many journalists who covered the outbreak in the first couple of months of the year weren’t analytical enough: “Thus from the end of January through most of February, a soothing message got widespread traction, not just with Donald Trump and his audience, but among traditional media in the United States, which exhorted us to worry about the flu instead, and warned us against overreaction. It seemed sensible, grown-up, and responsible.”
Some of that advice shows up in memes that highlight headlines from a range of respected media outlets that now seem terribly misleading after new information came to light. (You won’t find any Vox headlines in the collage below on flu comparisons, but as many people have pointed out, my colleagues at Vox published some stories and tweets with similar angles.)
But, again: Those stories didn’t just materialize out of reporters’ heads. They were informed by experts trying to make sense of something they hadn’t seen before.
For instance, Maimuna Majumder, an epidemiologist at Harvard Medical School, told BuzzFeed News in late January — in a story originally titled “Don’t Worry About The Coronavirus. Worry About The Flu” — that some worst-case projections about the disease’s velocity were “absolutely premature and hyperbolic.”
A January 29 piece from Axios explained, “Why we panic about coronavirus, but not the flu.” It quoted an infectious diseases physician at the University of Nebraska, an epidemiologist at the University of Michigan, and a professor of preventive medicine at Vanderbilt University to make the argument that the flu should be Americans’ real concern.
The same was true for a much-discussed Recode piece from February 13 that looked at the way Silicon Valley was responding to the virus. That story relied on information from the CDC as well as an infectious disease physician at Stanford Health Care, who said that “the chances are astonishingly low that you would come into contact with a coronavirus infection” at work or in a public setting. Building on those interviews, it repeated the argument that “the fact remains that, so far, the flu has impacted far more people.” Though true at the time, this clearly missed where the virus was headed.
But even now, months after we first learned about the virus, scientists are still learning the nitty-gritty of how it spreads and the extent to which it lingers in airborne droplets and aerosols that can infect others. That makes it hard to answer a question like, “can you contract the virus just by breathing in the same space as someone who’s infected?” We don’t know the full answer and may not for some time, and that’s why the institutions that employ these experts have been giving journalists and the public contradictory advice along the way.
That back-and-forth can be jarring, even if we’ve become accustomed to continual contradictions from our government leaders. The Trump administration has conditioned Americans to a reality where the president routinely announces something in the morning, backtracks it shortly afterward, and later pretends he never said it. So when he does say something, it’s pored over immediately to check for falsehoods and (usually) treated with appropriate skepticism.
You can argue that American newsrooms should use the same kind of scrutiny when it comes to pronouncements from institutions — including ones like the CDC, which generally don’t make news. But it’s not a stance Americans are used to seeing, particularly in the middle of a catastrophe, when people want reassurance and guidance.
An obvious but important point: All of the coverage we’re discussing here doesn’t include Fox News and the rest of the pro-Trump media infrastructure, because it would be unrealistic to expect useful coverage from that infrastructure. With the narrow exception of Tucker Carlson, that apparatus simply provided an echo chamber and feedback loop for Trump’s messaging, so that when Trump said he expected the virus to “miraculously” disappear, they said the same, and when he said it was time to take it seriously, they did the same. This did a deadly disservice to an enormous swath of the country, which takes its cues from those outlets. But it’s not surprising. “Misinformation from the Trump administration is the biggest challenge,” Helmuth says. “Really good reporters are wasting a ton of time refuting misinformation from the White House.”
“In a fundamental way, news is bad at communicating risk”
But even if you’re inclined to give the media a pass for its performance before the pandemic hit the US, what about the second phase? When we knew it was coming and that it would be bad?
You can’t argue that Americans had mixed messaging by that point: On February 25, CDC official Nancy Messonnier told reporters that she expected to see the coronavirus appear in the US via “community spread” — meaning people would become infected without knowingly coming into contact with other infected people — and that “disruption to everyday life might be severe.”
But even after that, worrisome news about the spread and effects of the virus, which was moving across Asia and showing up in Europe, competed with coverage of the Democratic primary and other stories of the moment, like Harvey Weinstein’s sentencing for sexual assault. And stories that did cover the virus often focused on the Trump administration’s moves — like his decision to put Mike Pence (theoretically) in charge of a virus response team — instead of plainly telling Americans that they could be facing huge death tolls and a devastated economy.
“I think people were worried about being alarmist,” MSNBC host Chris Hayes told Recode. But Hayes also says that figuring out the right degree of alarm to sound is a basic problem for journalists.
“In a fundamental, definitional way, news is bad at communicating risk,” he said. Telling you about a plane crash is news, but it doesn’t convey the risk of flying — it overstates it, by giving it prominence. The same with local crime stories. Meanwhile, telling you about a pandemic that’s about to overtake the country, kill tens of thousands of people, and crater the economy is very hard to do when it hasn’t happened yet, but there’s a chance it could.
This core challenge for journalists won’t go away after the pandemic: There are always going to be threats that could eventually lead to disaster, but most of them don’t. If we holler every time we see one, we’ll be wrong and no one will listen to us. If we don’t holler when there’s a real one, we will have let down our audience.
I first started poking a few weeks ago at the idea of whether the mainstream media should have been more alarmist about the coronavirus sooner. When I talked to Brian Stelter, CNN’s media reporter, on March 10, he told me he didn’t want to cause “undue fear” in his coverage, and that extended to the way he edited the on-air chyrons that ran during his Reliable Sources show.
For instance, Stelter said at the time that he was stripping out the word “deadly” whenever he saw the phrase “deadly virus.”
“Everyone knows it’s a deadly virus,” he said. “You don’t have to call it ‘deadly virus’ every time. It’s a virus. We don’t call the flu the ‘deadly flu.’”
As Stelter noted, a lot of this comes down to packaging: How and when do you communicate the most important news to people, and how do you balance the need to not scare them prematurely with the need to scare them into action?
“Anything you say in advance of a pandemic seems alarmist. Anything that you’ve done after it starts is inadequate.”
“The media should be screaming about it,” says Laura Helmuth. “They should be saying that the states that don’t have stay-at-home orders are killing people, that politicizing this is killing people.”
In some cases, the screaming was there, but you had to work to hear it. You wouldn’t find it in a headline or the top of a newscast, but if you absorbed the whole thing, you’d find news that would scare you into some kind of action.
My sort-of come-to-Jesus moment started on February 27 when I listened to Times reporter Donald McNeil on the paper’s Daily podcast. He said the worst-case scenario was a repeat of the 1918 flu pandemic, which killed 50 million people worldwide and at least 675,000 in the United States.
In that version, McNeil said calmly: Everybody in the US would “know somebody who dies.”
It’s most gripping in audio form, but I want to pull out a section here:
Donald G. McNeil Jr.
Some big chunk of the country — 30, 40, 50 percent — are likely to get a new virus when it blows through. And if you don’t get it in the first wave, you might get it in the second wave.Michael Barbaro
And 2 percent lethality rate of 50 percent of the country. I don’t want to do that math. It’s really, really awful.McNeil
It’s a lot of people. It means, you know, you don’t die, 80 percent of people have mild cases. But you know somebody who dies.Barbaro
That’s pretty horrible … Okay. Now, the best-case scenario.McNeil
The best-case scenario is one of these drugs works, and basically everybody gets sick next year, but everybody who is hospitalized gets a drug that keeps them from dying and keeps them from going into deep, deep, deep respiratory distress. And we have the equivalent of a bad flu season. And then everybody says, ‘Oh, the media, they blew it out of proportion again.’ You know, it’s all ridiculous. And, you know, I get blamed.That was enough for me — sort of. I didn’t change my plans to travel to Los Angeles the following week, but I did start assuming that the rest of my spring plans were going to be up in the air. And I told my family that we should start buying food — not in panic, but slowly. And I wondered how The Daily’s millions of listeners would respond.
But, again, if you just scanned the title of that day’s Daily episode, you might not realize that a New York Times reporter was projecting that the best-case scenario for America was that “everybody gets sick” over the next year but could be saved from serious illness via yet-to-be-developed drugs. And that the worst case was more American deaths than we suffered in World War II. That Title: “The Coronavirus Goes Global.”
The truth is, there’s no good answer to this. You can be as diligent about your sourcing as possible and still get it wrong if the experts you talk to get it wrong. And you can err on the side of not scaring people, when scaring people into action may be the only thing that saves their lives. I don’t know that we’ll do better next time, and we may just have to live with it — no matter how early the warnings are.
Let’s end by traveling back in time to January 27, to watch an exchange you probably didn’t see when it aired: CNBC’s Brian Sullivan interviewing former Utah Gov. Mike Leavitt, who was also the head of the Department of Health and Human Services from 2005 to 2009.
Leavitt was arguing that if the coronavirus made it to the US, it would be nearly impossible to confine it. But you can see Sullivan struggling, in real time, with how much fear to strike in his audience.
Mike Leavitt
There will be a period of time, if this starts to spread, where people will need to change their behavior. These will be the same kind of provisions that every family, every business, every community, every employer, needs to be thinking about, not just for a pandemic virus but for many kinds of emergencies.Brian Sullivan
But we also have to walk, I would imagine, that very fine and difficult line, Governor, which is: You don’t want to scare people unnecessarily. We do have five cases. Nobody is minimizing any of those five cases or what is happening. But you also don’t want to create a situation where people may begin to act irrational.Leavitt
[Pause] So here’s the problem. Anything you say in advance of a pandemic seems alarmist. Anything that you’ve done after it starts is inadequate.April 14, 2020 at 9:43 am #113621wvParticipantThis is a decade old, but I thought it was interesting. Domesticating animals leads to many viruses infecting humans, i guess.
At about the four minute mark, he alludes to somethin i never thot about: When the Europeans came to America the viruses they brought kilt 90 percent of the Native Americans — but why wasnt it the other way around? Why didnt Native diseases kill the Europeans?
April 14, 2020 at 10:40 am #113622znModeratorAt about the four minute mark, he alludes to somethin i never thot about: When the Europeans came to America the viruses they brought kilt 90 percent of the Native Americans — but why wasnt it the other way around? Why didnt Native diseases kill the Europeans?
There actually is an answer to that.
The greatest concentration of domesticable wildlife in the world was originally in the Fertile Crescent. Whoever first domesticated those animals also caught diseases from them. That means that that population, over time, essentially consisted of the descendents of the survivors of those diseases. Over even more time that means that wherever those descendents–the original Eurasians–went, they brought those diseases with them as immune carriers. So when Europeans came to the western hemisphere, they were the descendents of the original domesticators, and the new world populations they encountered were entirely vulnerable to them.
There is only one domesticable animal native to the entire western hemisphere–the llama.
It’s not just the natives in north america that were wiped out. That was equally true in central and south america.
BTW taming and domestication are of course entirely different things. Just to get that in.
April 14, 2020 at 6:52 pm #113645wvParticipantAt about the four minute mark, he alludes to somethin i never thot about: When the Europeans came to America the viruses they brought kilt 90 percent of the Native Americans — but why wasnt it the other way around? Why didnt Native diseases kill the Europeans?
There actually is an answer to that.
The greatest concentration of domesticable wildlife in the world was originally in the Fertile Crescent. Whoever first domesticated those animals also caught diseases from them. That means that that population, over time, essentially consisted of the descendents of the survivors of those diseases. Over even more time that means that wherever those descendents–the original Eurasians–went, they brought those diseases with them as immune carriers. So when Europeans came to the western hemisphere, they were the descendents of the original domesticators, and the new world populations they encountered were entirely vulnerable to them.
There is only one domesticable animal native to the entire western hemisphere–the llama.
It’s not just the natives in north america that were wiped out. That was equally true in central and south america.
BTW taming and domestication are of course entirely different things. Just to get that in.
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Well, the Doctor in the Vid answers the question too. I’m not sure if his answer is the same as the one you just laid out, or if its different. He didnt say anything about Fertile Crescents.
Anyway, my favorite part of this Vid (and its awfully good, imho) starts around the 36 minute mark. Just watch about five minutes starting from the 36 min mark. I love the part where he quotes the the CEO from Big-Poultry.
w
vApril 15, 2020 at 6:54 am #113656nittany ramModeratorAt about the four minute mark, he alludes to somethin i never thot about: When the Europeans came to America the viruses they brought kilt 90 percent of the Native Americans — but why wasnt it the other way around? Why didnt Native diseases kill the Europeans?
There actually is an answer to that.
The greatest concentration of domesticable wildlife in the world was originally in the Fertile Crescent. Whoever first domesticated those animals also caught diseases from them. That means that that population, over time, essentially consisted of the descendents of the survivors of those diseases. Over even more time that means that wherever those descendents–the original Eurasians–went, they brought those diseases with them as immune carriers. So when Europeans came to the western hemisphere, they were the descendents of the original domesticators, and the new world populations they encountered were entirely vulnerable to them.
There is only one domesticable animal native to the entire western hemisphere–the llama.
It’s not just the natives in north america that were wiped out. That was equally true in central and south america.
BTW taming and domestication are of course entirely different things. Just to get that in.
====
Well, the Doctor in the Vid answers the question too. I’m not sure if his answer is the same as the one you just laid out, or if its different. He didnt say anything about Fertile Crescents.
Anyway, my favorite part of this Vid (and its awfully good, imho) starts around the 36 minute mark. Just watch about five minutes starting from the 36 min mark. I love the part where he quotes the the CEO from Big-Poultry.
w
vSpeaking of immunity, coronaviruses were first discovered in the 1960’s but have been associated with people for thousands of years. There are deadly ones – MERS, SARS, SARS-CoV-2, but most are relatively harmless and cause nothing more serious than the common cold.
However, many of the strains of “harmless” coronaviruses could have been as deadly or deadlier than the virus that’s causing today’s pandemic. They may have decimated ancient populations. They seem harmless to us only because we are the descendants of the survivors that were immune to those viruses when they first came in contact with humans thousands of years ago.
April 15, 2020 at 8:38 am #113657wvParticipantSpeaking of immunity, coronaviruses were first discovered in the 1960’s but have been associated with people for thousands of years. There are deadly ones – MERS, SARS, SARS-CoV-2, but most are relatively harmless and cause nothing more serious than the common cold.
However, many of the strains of “harmless” coronaviruses could have been as deadly or deadlier than the virus that’s causing today’s pandemic. They may have decimated ancient populations. They seem harmless to us only because we are the descendants of the survivors that were immune to those viruses when they first came in contact with humans thousands of years ago.
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I have a theory, myself. I think a Virus wiped out the Dinosaurs. It was a meteor-virus. A big meteor landed and there was an alien corona-virus on it.
And that was that.w
vApril 15, 2020 at 8:57 am #113659znModeratorI have a theory, myself. I think a Virus wiped out the Dinosaurs. It was a meteor-virus. A big meteor landed and there was an alien corona-virus on it.
And that was that.w
vI’m in a debate with some “elsewhere” who argue that herd immunity will eventually protect us. Not just me debating, I am on a side. Our side argues that herd immunity needs a vaccine, it doesn’t just arise spontaneously. The other side thinks it arises spontaneously. Right now though we don’t even know if you can get this again, and there are signs you can, or some can anyway. They didn’t have a vaccine for the Spanish Flu, and it took 3 years to go away. (Probably because it mutated into something more benign, like, for example, dedicated football fandom).
April 15, 2020 at 11:11 am #113671Billy_TParticipantI have a theory, myself. I think a Virus wiped out the Dinosaurs. It was a meteor-virus. A big meteor landed and there was an alien corona-virus on it.
And that was that.w
vThey didn’t have a vaccine for the Spanish Flu, and it took 3 years to go away. (Probably because it mutated into something more benign, like, for example, dedicated football fandom).
I agree about the fan viruses. Can be benign or highly dangerous. The Rams virus, for instance, doesn’t cause too much misery, unless it mutates into its Warner/Bulger form, in which case patients end up throwing various virtual and inanimate objects at each other, in hopes of deeply wounding or even killing their prey; or, if the Saints virus mutates into the badcall virus, wherein referees are chased out of New Orleans like poor little coyotes; or the Patriots virus, when it becomes mugholtbrucefaulkitis. That one pretty much devastated millions across the land.
April 15, 2020 at 11:24 am #113672wvParticipantI agree about the fan viruses. Can be benign or highly dangerous. The Rams virus, for instance, doesn’t cause too much misery, unless it mutates into its Warner/Bulger form, in which case patients end up throwing various virtual and inanimate objects at each other…
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Ahh. I see you call it the Warner/Bulger Virus. Only an Evil Warnerite would call it the Warner/Bulger virus. The fact is it was the Bulger/Warner Virus.
w
vApril 15, 2020 at 11:49 am #113675Billy_TParticipantI agree about the fan viruses. Can be benign or highly dangerous. The Rams virus, for instance, doesn’t cause too much misery, unless it mutates into its Warner/Bulger form, in which case patients end up throwing various virtual and inanimate objects at each other…
==============
Ahh. I see you call it the Warner/Bulger Virus. Only an Evil Warnerite would call it the Warner/Bulger virus. The fact is it was the Bulger/Warner Virus.
w
vYou West Virginians always stick together, doncha!!
;>)
All seriousness aside, I actually thought Bulger was the one unfairly bashed (at the time) in that food fight. Now, I just wish it had never happened.
Fan boards all over the world were in turmoil. Massive Armeys were conscripted, taking the planet to the brink of annihilation. Trillions of dollars spent, bankrupting future generations forever. Assassinations, coups, black ops galore, not to mention all the Martzian professors and activists blackballed by the notorious HUACT investigations.
Dozens of those poor sots never recovered once Mike McCarthy formed his House Un-American Coryell Tree mob.
Sheesh. Easily one of the worst periods in American history. Easily. We can only look back at it in shame.
April 15, 2020 at 1:51 pm #113683nittany ramModeratorI have a theory, myself. I think a Virus wiped out the Dinosaurs. It was a meteor-virus. A big meteor landed and there was an alien corona-virus on it.
And that was that.w
vI’m in a debate with some “elsewhere” who argue that herd immunity will eventually protect us. Not just me debating, I am on a side. Our side argues that herd immunity needs a vaccine, it doesn’t just arise spontaneously. The other side thinks it arises spontaneously. Right now though we don’t even know if you can get this again, and there are signs you can, or some can anyway. They didn’t have a vaccine for the Spanish Flu, and it took 3 years to go away. (Probably because it mutated into something more benign, like, for example, dedicated football fandom).
Yes, it will require a vaccine to develop herd immunity to this virus. Somewhere around 70% of the population would have to be immune to the virus for herd immunity to develop. Assuming for a moment that people can develop natural immunity to this virus it would only require a few months to infect the required number of people if none of the current precautions were taken. Of course, this would lead to the deaths of millions of people. And even if you can develop natural immunity to this virus, it likely will only last a few months or years based on what we know about other corona viruses. Therefore, maintaining herd immunity will likely require multiple vaccinations over a lifetime.
- This reply was modified 4 years, 7 months ago by nittany ram.
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