The setup for the above is important, of course:
I’ve argued in the past that John Locke’s classical liberalism can be used to justify slavery and serfdom and the expropriation of indigenous nations. This reading aligns with Locke’s own role in Britain’s slave trading and colonial activities. But it leaves open the possibility that we might separate Locke’s theory of property from the philosopher’s own moral failings.
But after setting aside Locke’s less savory characteristics, we still have to contend with Locke’s claim that property can be justly acquired through labor. The crucial element — what’s called the Lockean proviso — holds that one person’s acquisition of property should leave “enough and as good” for everyone else.
In the European context, where every inch of land had been occupied since time immemorial, this was obviously a theoretical fiction. North America, however, seemed different.
One obvious takeaway being how the Lockean Proviso only works theoretically, when land is basically infinite — or, when the population can never reach numbers that would end surplus land, “enough and as good” for whomever wants it.
The entire propertarian ethos rests on that impossibility, basically.