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    Trump administration changes definition of national stockpile after Kushner remarks

    https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/491037-trump-administration-changes-definition-of-national-stockpile-after?fbclid=IwAR2lHXc3N0KElN6ArXDF6KNCj5wN8h6nnMywBferCCTm2EeVZ_qVHi0C65Y&fbclid=IwAR076Nbty2YJqqQD7RvJUTomb0X_2Y8qBDKg6fXyamKYKGHLES5-T2hNKCU

    The Trump administration quietly changed an online description of the country’s Strategic National Stockpile following a press briefing with White House adviser Jared Kushner.

    Previously, according to the federal public health emergency website, the Strategic National Stockpile was described as “the nation’s largest supply of life-saving pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for use in a public health emergency severe enough to cause local supplies to run out.”

    The description continued: “When state, local, tribal, and territorial responders request federal assistance to support their response efforts, the stockpile ensures that the right medicines and supplies get to those who need them most during an emergency.”

    That definition disappeared from the site on Friday.

    The new, one-paragraph description says the stockpile is meant as a “short-term stopgap.”

    “The Strategic National Stockpile’s role is to supplement state and local supplies during public health emergencies. Many states have products stockpiled, as well. The supplies, medicines, and devices for life-saving care contained in the stockpile can be used as a short-term stopgap buffer when the immediate supply of adequate amounts of these materials may not be immediately available,” the website now says.

    In a statement posted to the HHS Public Affairs Twitter account, the agency said it “first began working to update this text a week ago to more clearly explain the role of the Strategic National Stockpile. HHS has been using this same language in statements to the press for weeks now.”

    The language more closely matches what Kushner said on Thursday when he made his coronavirus task force briefing debut.

    Kushner, a senior adviser and the president’s son-in-law, was recently directed to work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) on supply chain issues related to the coronavirus outbreak. He is said to have assumed the role roughly two weeks ago.

    Kushner said states should be more resourceful in procuring supplies for themselves, and not be relying on the federal government for assistance.

    “The notion of the federal stockpile was it’s supposed to be our stockpile, it’s not supposed to be the state’s stockpile that they then use,” Kushner said.

    Kushner accused some state officials of requesting supplies without knowing what they need.

    “Some governors you speak to, or senators, and they don’t know what’s in their state,” Kushner said when asked by a reporter what it takes for a state to receive ventilators from the national stockpile.

    “Don’t ask us for things when you don’t know what you have in your own state. Just because you’re scared, you ask your medical professionals and they don’t know. You have to take inventory of what you have in your own state and then you have to be able to show that there’s a real need,” Kushner said.

    The COVID-19 pandemic has forced the federal government to deplete much of its reserves as states and hospitals nationwide struggle with a surge of critical patients. FEMA officials recently told a House panel that the government has fewer than 10,000 ventilators in stock.

    Governors have been pleading with the Trump administration for help, and have continually said they are not receiving nearly enough supplies from the stockpile to address the surge in hospitalizations.

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    The Coronavirus’s Unique Threat to the South
    More young people in the South seem to be dying from COVID-19. Why?

    https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronavirus-unique-threat-south-young-people/609241/?fbclid=IwAR1coFYUSsDUD4MjqqI_maioBfb41N1l55xUWxHXbNcB-DJCpKTU6otC1QY

    In a matter of weeks, the coronavirus has gone from a novel, distant threat to an enemy besieging cities and towns across the world. The burden of COVID-19 and the economic upheaval wrought by the measures to contain it feel epochal. Humanity now has a common foe, and we will grow increasingly familiar with its face.

    Yet plenty of this virus’s aspects remain unknown. The developing wisdom—earned the hard way in Wuhan, Washington, and Italy—has been that older people and sicker people are substantially more likely to suffer severe illness or die from COVID-19 than their younger, healthier counterparts. Older people are much more likely than young people to have lung disease, kidney disease, hypertension, or heart disease, and those conditions are more likely to transform a coronavirus infection into something nastier. But what happens when these assumptions don’t hold up, and the young people battling the pandemic share the same risks?

    The world is about to find out. So far, about one in 10 deaths in the United States from COVID-19 has occurred in the four-state arc of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, according to data assembled by the COVID Tracking Project, a volunteer collaboration incubated at The Atlantic. New Orleans is on pace to become the next global epicenter of the pandemic. The virus has a foothold in southwestern Georgia, and threatens to overwhelm hospitals in the Atlanta metropolitan area. The coronavirus is advancing quickly across the American South. And in the American South, significant numbers of younger people are battling health conditions that make coronavirus outbreaks more perilous.

    The numbers emerging seem to indicate that more young people in the South are dying from COVID-19. Although the majority of coronavirus-related deaths in Louisiana are still among victims over 70 years old, 43 percent of all reported deaths have been people under 70. In Georgia, people under 70 make up 49 percent of reported deaths. By comparison, people under 70 account for only 20 percent of deaths in Colorado. “Under 70” is a broad category, not really useful for understanding what’s going on. But digging deeper reveals more concerning numbers. In Louisiana, people from the ages of 40 to 59 account for 22 percent of all deaths. The same age range in Georgia accounts for 17 percent of all deaths. By comparison, the same age group accounts for only about 10 percent of all deaths in Colorado, and 6 percent of all deaths in Washington State. These statistics suggest that middle-aged and working-age adults in the two southern states are at much greater risk than their counterparts elsewhere; for some reason, they are more likely to die from COVID-19.

    All data in this stage of the pandemic are provisional and incomplete, and all conclusions are subject to change. But a review of the international evidence shows that, as far as we know, the outbreaks currently expanding in the American South are unique—and mainly because of how many people in their working prime are dying. Spain’s official accounting of the pandemic last week showed that deaths among people under 70 years old make up only about 12 percent of total deaths in the country. Case-fatality rates around the world are notoriously tricky because they are based in part on the extent of testing, but a recent study of the outbreak in Wuhan, China, found a case-fatality rate of 0.5 percent among adults from the ages of 30 to 59. The current estimate of fatality rates in the same age range in Louisiana is about four times that.

    A recent analysis from the Kaiser Family Foundation might shed some light on what’s going on here. The paper, drawing on the CDC guidelines, identifies people who may be at risk of serious complications from COVID-19. Kaiser’s at-risk group includes all people over 60 years old and all adults younger than 60 who also have heart disease, cancer, lung disease, or diabetes. In each state, older people are the majority of the people considered to be at risk of complications. But the Deep South and mid-South form a solid bloc of states where younger adults are much more at risk. In Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi, relatively young people make up over a quarter of the vulnerable population. Compare that with the coronavirus’s beachhead in Washington State, where younger adults make up only about 19 percent of the risk group.

    Tricia Neuman, a senior vice president at the Kaiser Family Foundation, says this analysis points to the underlying issues that might complicate or worsen the pandemic in the South. “Due to high rates of conditions like lung disease and heart disease and obesity, the people living in these states are at risk if they get the virus,” Neuman told me. These aren’t “people who are sick, but these are people who have underlying comorbidities that put them at higher risk of serious illness if they get infected.”

    The KFF analysis doesn’t include potential complications from hypertension—which is also suspected to be driving coronavirus-linked hospitalizations—but the data are predictable on that front. If you define Oklahoma as part of the South, southern states fill out the entirety of the top ten states in percentage of population diagnosed with hypertension by a doctor. Southerners are more likely to suffer from chronic diseases than other Americans—even as Americans are more likely to suffer from chronic disease than citizens of other countries with comparable wealth. According to Neuman, these estimates don’t include people with cancer or who are immunocompromised — groups that are also at high risk for serious illness from COVID-19. And cancer mortality rates are highest in southern states.

    These differences are not innate to southerners; they are the result of policy. Health disparities tend to track both race and poverty, and the states in the old domain of Jim Crow have pursued policies that ensure those disparities endure. The South is the poorest region in the country. The poor, black, Latino, or rural residents who make up large shares of southern populations tend to lack access to high-quality doctors and care. According to the State Health Access Data Assistance Center, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana all spend less than $25 per person on public health a year, compared to $84 per person in New York. Nine of the 14 states that have refused to expand Medicaid to poor residents under the Affordable Care Act are in the South. And many of those states are led by Republican leaders who have imitated President Donald Trump’s dallying and flip-flopping, and now find themselves flat-footed.

    The slow response from those governors will be even more ruinous in a region with so many challenges. Chronic disease and the apparent increased risk for younger people from COVID-19 are only part of the story in the South. Other factors could complicate its pandemic response. Advocates have drawn attention to the extreme vulnerability of people in prison to the coronavirus—and the South incarcerates a larger proportion of its population than anywhere else in the United States. A federal prison in Louisiana has already seen a spike in COVID-19 cases this week. Also, a global fear in this pandemic is that it will sicken health professionals and doctors, and leave them unable to contend with waves of hospitalizations. Southern states have some of the lowest ratios of active physicians to patients in the country.

    In all, the South seems likely to be a new kind of battleground, one in which distancing and isolation are going to be especially important in stopping the virus. Centuries of policy gave the pandemic a head start—and younger targets—in the South. Now there are mere days to change course.

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    Protective gear in national stockpile is nearly depleted, DHS officials say

    https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/protective-gear-in-national-stockpile-is-nearly-depleted-dhs-officials-say/ar-BB122cFl

    The government’s emergency stockpile of respirator masks, gloves and other medical supplies is running low and is nearly exhausted due to the coronavirus outbreak, leaving the Trump administration and the states to compete for personal protective equipment in a freewheeling global marketplace rife with profiteering and price-gouging, according to Department of Homeland Security officials involved in the frantic acquisition effort.

    As coronavirus hotspots flare from coast to coast, the demand for safety equipment — also known as personal protective equipment (PPE) — is both immediate and widespread, with health officials, hospital executives and governors saying that their shortages are critical and that health-care workers are putting their lives at risk while trying to help the surging number of patients.

    Two DHS officials said the stores kept in the Department of Health and Human Service’s Strategic National Stockpile are nearly gone, despite assurances from the White House that there is availability.

    “The stockpile was designed to respond to handful of cities. It was never built or designed to fight a 50-state pandemic,” said a DHS official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak publicly about the stockpile. “This is not only a U.S. government problem. The supply chain for PPE worldwide has broken down, and there is a lot of price-gouging happening.”

    President Trump said during Tuesday’s White House briefing that the administration has nearly 10,000 ventilators on reserve and that authorities are ready to deploy the lifesaving equipment rapidly to coronavirus hotspots in coming weeks. He also said large amounts of PPE were being shipped directly from manufacturers to hospitals. But the DHS officials said the stockpile has not been able to handle the load.

    Hospitals and states face a real risk of running out of supplies, one of the officials said. “If you can’t protect the people taking care of us, it gets ugly.”

    Several reports in recent days have documented a Wild West-style online marketplace for bulk medical supplies dominated by intermediaries and hoarders who are selling N95 respirator masks and other gear at huge markups. Forbes reported that U.S. vendors have sold 280 million masks — mostly into the export market — and that U.S. states and local governments were outbid in the frenzy.

    There are few signs the Trump administration is making efforts to stop the export shipments or seize the supplies for use in U.S. hospitals, despite statements from Attorney General William P. Barr last week that U.S. wholesalers hoarding masks and other supplies would get “a knock on your door.”

    Governors have been pleading with federal authorities to ship more equipment and protective gear. Distribution of the supplies has happened unevenly, with some states saying they’ve received a fraction of the supplies they desperately need and some cities having received no assistance from their state governments.

    The world is battling the COVID-19 outbreak that the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic, which has claimed more than 4,720 lives and infected more than 211,698 people in the U.S.

    Officials at the Federal Emergency Management Agency said the government had anticipated the Strategic National Stockpile would be exhausted, and the administration is moving swiftly to procure and distribute medical supplies.

    “FEMA planning assumptions for COVID-19 pandemic response acknowledged that the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) alone could not fulfill all requirements at the State and tribal level,” Janet Montesi, a FEMA spokeswoman, said in a statement. “The federal government will exhaust all means to identify and attain medical and other supplies needed to combat the virus.”

    a group of shoes on the floor: N95 particulate respirator masks and procedure face masks shown at a Dealmed-Park Surgical supply facility in Lakewood, N.J.© Victor J. Blue/Bloomberg N95 particulate respirator
    masks and procedure face masks shown at a Dealmed-Park Surgical supply facility in Lakewood, N.J.
    The government has more than $16 billion available to make the acquisitions, she said.

    “We remain committed to helping ensure key medical supplies expeditiously arrive at the front lines for our health care workers,” Montesi said.

    According to the White House, FEMA had shipped or delivered 11.6 million N95 respirator masks, 26 million surgical masks, 5.2 million face shields, 4.3 million surgical gowns, 22 million gloves and 8,100 ventilators as of March 28.

    A stockpile of 1.5 million expired N95 masks that U.S. Customs and Border Protection has in storage will be distributed to the Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, CBP said in a statement. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has issued guidelines for the safe use of masks with expiration dates that have passed, potentially leaving their elastic bands too loose to form a proper face seal.

    Rep. Nanette Barragán (D-Calif.) said this week she and other lawmakers were told some of the expired CBP masks would be given to hospitals.

    “Officials confirmed that the masks would indeed go to healthcare workers and be prioritized by highest need such as NY and NJ. I will follow up to make sure this happens!” the lawmaker tweeted Sunday.

    A CBP official on Wednesday confirmed to The Washington Post that the masks would go to ICE agents and TSA officers instead, not to FEMA staff or medical personnel.

    The government has long viewed the national stockpile supplies as a holdover during an emergency so the government could buy time for manufacturers to boost output and for new supply chains to solidify, according to a senior administration official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to speak publicly. Having the medical supplies sitting in a warehouse doesn’t serve any purpose, the official said, even though the administration has been holding back thousands of ventilators.

    Asked about concerns that the government will not be able to keep pace with the demand for PPE supplies, the official said the government has planes coming in from Asia every day for the next few weeks ferrying new materials, noting that a planeload with 80 tons of PPE arrived from China on Sunday.

    #113149

    In reply to: the testing fiasco

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    The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to Covid-19
    Aggressive screening might have helped contain the coronavirus in the United States. But technical flaws, regulatory hurdles and lapses in leadership let it spread undetected for weeks.

    link https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-pandemic.html

    WASHINGTON — Early on, the dozen federal officials charged with defending America against the coronavirus gathered day after day in the White House Situation Room, consumed by crises. They grappled with how to evacuate the United States consulate in Wuhan, China, ban Chinese travelers and extract Americans from the Diamond Princess and other cruise ships.

    The members of the coronavirus task force typically devoted only five or 10 minutes, often at the end of contentious meetings, to talk about testing, several participants recalled. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, its leaders assured the others, had developed a diagnostic model that would be rolled out quickly as a first step.

    But as the deadly virus from China spread with ferocity across the United States between late January and early March, large-scale testing of people who might have been infected did not happen — because of technical flaws, regulatory hurdles, business-as-usual bureaucracies and lack of leadership at multiple levels, according to interviews with more than 50 current and former public health officials, administration officials, senior scientists and company executives.

    The result was a lost month, when the world’s richest country — armed with some of the most highly trained scientists and infectious disease specialists — squandered its best chance of containing the virus’s spread. Instead, Americans were left largely blind to the scale of a looming public health catastrophe.

    The absence of robust screening until it was “far too late” revealed failures across the government, said Dr. Thomas Frieden, the former C.D.C. director. Jennifer Nuzzo, an epidemiologist at Johns Hopkins, said the Trump administration had “incredibly limited” views of the pathogen’s potential impact. Dr. Margaret Hamburg, the former commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, said the lapse enabled “exponential growth of cases.”

    And Dr. Anthony S. Fauci, a top government scientist involved in the fight against the virus, told members of Congress that the early inability to test was “a failing” of the administration’s response to a deadly, global pandemic. “Why,” he asked later in a magazine interview, “were we not able to mobilize on a broader scale?”

    Across the government, they said, three agencies responsible for detecting and combating threats like the coronavirus failed to prepare quickly enough. Even as scientists looked at China and sounded alarms, none of the agencies’ directors conveyed the urgency required to spur a no-holds-barred defense.

    Dr. Robert R. Redfield, 68, a former military doctor and prominent AIDS researcher who directs the C.D.C., trusted his veteran scientists to create the world’s most precise test for the coronavirus and share it with state laboratories. When flaws in the test became apparent in February, he promised a quick fix, though it took weeks to settle on a solution.

    The C.D.C. also tightly restricted who could get tested and was slow to conduct “community-based surveillance,” a standard screening practice to detect the virus’s reach. Had the United States been able to track its earliest movements and identify hidden hot spots, local quarantines might have confined the disease.

    Dr. Stephen Hahn, 60, the commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, enforced regulations that paradoxically made it tougher for hospitals, private clinics and companies to deploy diagnostic tests in an emergency. Other countries that had mobilized businesses were performing tens of thousands of tests daily, compared with fewer than 100 on average in the United States, frustrating local health officials, lawmakers and desperate Americans.

    Alex M. Azar II, who led the Department of Health and Human Services, oversaw the two other agencies and coordinated the government’s public health response to the pandemic. While he grew frustrated as public criticism over the testing issues intensified, he was unable to push either agency to speed up or change course.

    Mr. Azar, 52, who chaired the coronavirus task force until late February, when Vice President Mike Pence took charge, had been at odds for months with the White House over other issues. The task force’s chief liaison to the president was Mick Mulvaney, the acting White House chief of staff, who was being forced out by Mr. Trump. Without high-level interest — or demands for action — the testing issue festered.

    At the start of that crucial lost month, when his government could have rallied, the president was distracted by impeachment and dismissive of the threat to the public’s health or the nation’s economy. By the end of the month, Mr. Trump claimed the virus was about to dissipate in the United States, saying: “It’s going to disappear. One day — it’s like a miracle — it will disappear.”

    By early March, after federal officials finally announced changes to expand testing, it was too late. With the early lapses, containment was no longer an option. The tool kit of epidemiology would shift — lockdowns, social disruption, intensive medical treatment — in hopes of mitigating the harm.

    Now, the United States has more than 100,000 coronavirus cases, the most of any country in the world. Deaths are rising, cities are shuttered, the economy is sputtering and everyday life is upended. And still, many Americans sickened by the virus cannot get tested.

    In a statement, Judd Deere, a White House spokesman, said that “any suggestion that President Trump did not take the threat of Covid-19 seriously or that the United States was not prepared is false.” He added that at Mr. Trump’s direction, the administration had “expanded testing capacities.”

    Dr. Bruce Aylward, a senior adviser at the World Health Organization, led an expert team to China last month to research the mysterious new virus. Testing, he said, was “absolutely vital” for understanding how to defeat a disease — what distinguishes it from others, the spectrum of illness and, most important, its path through populations.

    “You want to know whether or not you have it,” Dr. Aylward said. “You want to know whether the people around you have it. Because you know what? Then you could stop it.”

    “You can’t stop it,” he warned, “if you can’t see it.”

    A Startling Setback

    The first time Dr. Robert Redfield heard about the severity of the virus from his Chinese counterparts was around New Year’s Day, when he was on vacation with his family. He spent so much time on the phone that they barely saw him. And what he heard rattled him; in one grim conversation about the virus days later, George F. Gao, the director of the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention, burst into tears.

    Dr. Redfield, a longtime AIDS researcher, had never run a government agency before his appointment to lead the C.D.C. in 2018. Until then, his biggest priorities had been fighting the opioid epidemic and the spread of H.I.V. Suddenly, a man who preferred treating patients in Haiti or Africa to being in the public glare was facing a new pandemic threat.

    At first, Dr. Redfield’s agency moved quickly.

    On Jan. 7, the C.D.C. created an “incident management system” for the coronavirus and advised travelers to Wuhan to take precautions. By Jan. 20, just two weeks after Chinese scientists shared the genetic sequence of the virus, the C.D.C. had developed its own test, as usual, and deployed it to detect the country’s first coronavirus case.

    “That’s our prime mission,” Dr. Redfield said later in an interview, “to get eyes on this thing.”

    Assessing the virus would prove challenging. It was so new that scientists had little information to work with. China provided limited data, and rebuffed an early attempt by Mr. Azar and Dr. Redfield to send C.D.C. experts there to learn more. That the virus could cause no symptoms and still spread — something not initially known — made it all the more difficult to understand.

    To identify the virus, the C.D.C. test used three small genetic sequences to match up with portions of a virus’s genome extracted from a swab. A German-developed test that the W.H.O. was distributing to other countries used just two, potentially making it less precise.

    But soon after the F.D.A. cleared the C.D.C. to share its test kits with state health department labs, some discovered a problem. The third sequence, or “probe,” gave inconclusive results. While the C.D.C. explored the cause — contamination or a design issue — it told those state labs to stop testing.

    The startling setback stalled the C.D.C.’s efforts to track the virus when it mattered most. By mid-February, the nation was testing only about 100 samples per day, according to the C.D.C.’s website.

    Dr. Redfield played down the problem in task force meetings and conversations with Mr. Azar, assuring him it would be fixed quickly, several administration officials said.

    With capacity so limited, the C.D.C.’s criteria for who was tested remained extremely narrow for weeks to come: only people who had recently traveled to China or had been in contact with someone who had the virus.

    A string of critical errors.

    The lack of tests in the states also meant local public health officials could not use another essential epidemiological tool: surveillance testing. To see where the virus might be hiding, nasal swab samples from people screened for the common flu would also be checked for the coronavirus.

    The C.D.C. announced a plan on Feb. 14 to perform the screening in five high-risk cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle. An agency official said it could provide “an early warning signal to trigger a change in our response strategy.” But most of the cities could not carry it out.

    “Had we had done more testing from the very beginning and caught cases earlier,” said Dr. Nuzzo, of Johns Hopkins, “we would be in a far different place.”

    The consequences became clear by the end of February. For the first time, someone with no known exposure to the virus or history of travel tested positive, in the Seattle area, where the U.S.’s first case had been detected more than a month earlier. The virus had probably been spreading there and elsewhere for weeks, researchers later concluded. Without a more complete picture of who had been infected, public health workers could not do “contact tracing” — finding all those with whom any contagious people had interacted and then quarantining them to stop further transmission.

    The C.D.C. gave little thought to adopting the test being used by the W.H.O. The C.D.C.’s test was working in its own lab — still processing samples from states — which gave agency officials confidence. Dr. Anne Schuchat, the agency’s principal deputy director, would later say that the C.D.C. did not think “we needed somebody else’s test.”

    And the German-designed W.H.O. test had not been through the American regulatory approval process, which would take time.

    Throughout February, Dr. Redfield shuttled between Atlanta, where the C.D.C. is based, and Washington, holding multiple calls every day with Mr. Azar and participating in the coronavirus task force.

    Mr. Azar’s take-charge style contrasted with the more deliberative manner of Dr. Redfield, who lacked the kind of commanding television presence that impressed Mr. Trump. He was “a consensus person,” as one colleague described him, who sought to avoid conflict. He relied heavily on some of the C.D.C.’s career scientists, like Dr. Schuchat and Dr. Nancy Messonnier, the director of the agency’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases.

    Under scrutiny from Congress, Dr. Redfield offered reassurances. Responding on Feb. 24 to a letter from 49 members of Congress about the need for testing in the states, he wrote, “CDC’s aggressive response enables us to identify potential cases early and make sure that they are properly handled.”

    Days later, his agency provided a workaround, telling state and local health department labs that they could finally begin testing. Rather than awaiting replacements, they should use their C.D.C. test kits and leave out the problematic third probe.

    Meanwhile, the agency’s epidemiologists were growing more concerned as the virus spread in South Korea and Italy. On Feb. 25, Dr. Messonnier gave a briefing with a much blunter warning than usual. “Disruption to everyday life might be severe,” she said.

    Mr. Trump, returning from a trip to India, was furious, according to senior administration officials. Later that day, Mr. Azar seemed to be tamping down the level of concern. All Dr. Messonnier had meant, he said at a news conference, was that people should “start thinking about, in their own lives, what that might involve.”

    “Might,” Mr. Azar repeated emphatically. “Might involve.”

    Barriers to Testing

    Dr. Stephen Hahn’s first day as F.D.A. commissioner came just six weeks before Mr. Azar declared a public health emergency on Jan. 31. A radiation oncologist and researcher who helped turn around MD Anderson in Houston, one of the nation’s leading cancer centers, Dr. Hahn had come to Washington to oversee a sprawling federal agency that regulates everything from lifesaving therapies to dog food.

    But overnight, his mission — to manage 15,000 employees in a culture defined by precision and caution — was upended. A pathogen that Mr. Trump would later call the “invisible enemy” was hurtling toward the United States. It would fall to the newly arrived Dr. Hahn to help build a huge national capacity for testing by academic and private labs.

    Instead, under his leadership, the F.D.A. became a significant roadblock, according to current and former officials as well as researchers and doctors at laboratories around the country.

    Private-sector tests were supposed to be the next tier after the C.D.C. fulfilled its obligation to jump-start screening at public labs. In other countries hit hard by the coronavirus, governments acted quickly to speed tests to their populations. In South Korea, for example, regulators in early February summoned executives from 20 medical manufacturers, easing rules as they demanded tests.

    But Dr. Hahn took a cautious approach. He was not proactive in reaching out to manufacturers, and instead deferred to his scientists, following the F.D.A.’s often cumbersome methods for approving medical screening.

    Even the nation’s public health labs were looking for the F.D.A.’s help. “We are now many weeks into the response with still no diagnostic or surveillance test available outside of C.D.C. for the vast majority of our member laboratories,” Scott Becker, chief executive of the Association of Public Health Laboratories, wrote to Mr. Hahn in late February. “We believe a more expeditious route is needed at this time.”

    Ironically, it was Mr. Azar’s emergency declaration that established the rules Dr. Hahn insisted on following. Designed to make it easier for drugmakers to pursue vaccines and other therapies during a crisis, such a declaration lets the F.D.A. speed approvals that could otherwise take a year or more.

    But the emergency announcement created a new barrier for hospitals and laboratories that wanted to create their own tests to diagnose the coronavirus. Usually, they faced minimal federal regulation. But once Mr. Azar took action, they were subject to an F.D.A. process called an “emergency use authorization.”

    Even though researchers around the country quickly began creating tests that could diagnose Covid-19, many said they were hindered by the F.D.A.’s approval process. The new tests sat unused at labs around the country.

    Stanford was one of them. Researchers at the world-renowned university had a working test by February, based on protocols published by the W.H.O. The organization had already delivered more than 250,000 of the German-designed tests to 70 laboratories around the world, and doctors at the Stanford lab wanted to be prepared for a pandemic.

    “Even if it didn’t come, it would be better to be ready than not to be ready,” said Dr. Benjamin Pinsky, the lab’s medical director.

    But in the face of what he called “relatively tight” rules at the F.D.A., Dr. Pinsky and his colleagues decided against even trying to win permission. The Stanford clinical lab would not begin testing coronavirus samples until early March, when Dr. Hahn finally relaxed the rules.

    Executives at bioMérieux, a French diagnostics company, had a similar experience. The company makes a countertop testing system, BioFire, that is routinely used to check for the flu and other respiratory illnesses in 1,700 hospitals around the country. It can provide results in about 45 minutes.

    “A lot of us said, you know, your typical E.U.A. is just much too demanding,” said Dr. Mark Miller, the company’s chief medical officer, referring to the emergency approval. “It’s going to take much too much time. And can’t you do something to shorten that?”

    Officials at the F.D.A. tried to be responsive, Dr. Miller said. But rather than throw out the rules, the agency only modified the regulatory requirements, still requiring weeks of discussions and negotiations.

    After conversations with the F.D.A. in mid-February, the company received emergency approval for its BioFire test on March 24. (The company also began talking to the F.D.A. in January about another type of test, but decided not to pursue it in the United States for now.) Dr. Miller said that while he was ultimately satisfied with the F.D.A.’s actions, the overall response by the government was too slow, especially when it came to logistical questions like getting enough testing supplies to those who needed them.

    “You’ve got other countries — and I’m sorry, unfortunately, the U.S. is one of those — where they’ve been slow, disorganized,” he said. “There are still not enough tests available there to test everybody who needs it.”

    In an emailed statement, Dr. Hahn maintained that his agency had moved as quickly as it safely could to ensure that tests would be accurate. “Since the early days of this pandemic,” he said, “the F.D.A.’s doors have always been and still remain open to test developers.”

    A Lack of Trust

    Alex Azar had sounded confident at the end of January. At a news conference in the hulking H.H.S. headquarters in Washington, he said he had the government’s response to the new coronavirus under control, pointing out high-ranking jobs he had held in the department during the 2003 SARS outbreak and other infectious threats.

    “I know this playbook well,” he told reporters.

    A Yale-trained lawyer who once served as the top attorney at the health department, Mr. Azar had spent a decade as a top executive at Eli Lilly, one of the world’s largest drug companies. But he caught Mr. Trump’s attention in part because of other credentials: After law school, Mr. Azar was a clerk for some of the nation’s most conservative judges, including Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court. And for two years, he worked as Ken Starr’s deputy on the Clinton Whitewater investigation.

    As Mr. Trump’s second health secretary, confirmed at the beginning of 2018, Mr. Azar has been quick to compliment the president and focus on the issues he cares about: lowering drug prices and fighting opioid addiction. On Feb. 6 — even as the W.H.O. announced that there were more than 28,000 coronavirus cases around the globe — Mr. Azar was in the second row in the White House’s East Room, demonstrating his loyalty to the president as Mr. Trump claimed vindication from his impeachment acquittal the day before and lashed out at “evil” lawmakers and the F.B.I.’s “top scum.”

    As public attention on the virus threat intensified in January and February, Mr. Azar grew increasingly frustrated about the harsh spotlight on his department and the leaders of agencies who reported to him, according to people familiar with the response to the virus inside the agencies.

    Described as a prickly boss by some administration officials, Mr. Azar has had a longstanding feud with Seema Verma, the Medicare and Medicaid chief, who recently became a regular presence at Mr. Trump’s televised briefings on the pandemic. Mr. Azar did not include Dr. Hahn on the virus task force he led, though some of the F.D.A. commissioner’s aides participated in H.H.S. meetings on the subject.

    And tensions grew between the secretary and Dr. Redfield as the testing issue persisted. Mr. Azar and Dr. Redfield have been on the phone as often as a half-dozen times a day. But throughout February, as the C.D.C. test faltered, Mr. Azar became convinced that Dr. Redfield’s agency was providing him with inaccurate information about testing that the secretary repeated publicly, according to several administration officials.

    In one instance, Mr. Azar appeared on Sunday morning news programs and said that more than 3,600 people had been tested for the virus. In fact, the real number was much smaller because many patients were tested multiple times, an error the C.D.C. had to correct in congressional testimony that week. One health department official said Mr. Azar was repeatedly assured that the C.D.C.’s test would be widely available within a week or 10 days, only to be given the same promise a week later.

    Asked about criticism of his agency’s response to the pandemic, Dr. Redfield said: “I’m personally not focused on whether they’re pointing fingers here or there. We’re focused on doing all we can to get through this outbreak as quickly as possible and keep America safe.”

    For all Mr. Azar’s complaints, however, he continued to defer to the scientists at the two agencies, according to several administration officials. Mr. Azar’s allies said he was told by Dr. Redfield and Dr. Fauci that the C.D.C. had the resources it needed, that there was no reason to believe the virus was spreading through the country from person to person and that it was important to test only people who met certain criteria.

    But even in the face of a crescendo of complaints from doctors and health care researchers around the country, Mr. Azar failed to push those under him to do the one thing that could have helped: broader testing.

    In a statement, Caitlin Oakley, Mr. Azar’s spokeswoman, said that the secretary had “empowered and followed the guidance of world-renowned U.S. scientists” on the testing issue. “Any insinuation that Secretary Azar did not respond with needed urgency to the response or testing efforts,” she said, “are just plain wrong and disproven by the facts.”

    By Feb. 26, Dr. Fauci was concerned that the stalled testing had become an urgent issue that needed to be addressed. He called Brian Harrison, Mr. Azar’s chief of staff, and asked him to gather the group of officials overseeing screening efforts.

    Around noon on Feb. 27, Dr. Hahn, Dr. Redfield and top aides from the F.D.A. and H.H.S. dialed in to a conference call. Mr. Harrison began with an ultimatum: No one leaves until we resolve the lag in testing. We don’t have answers and we need them, one senior administration official recalled him saying. Get it done.

    By the end of the day, the group agreed that the F.D.A. should loosen regulations so that hospitals and independent labs could move forward quickly with their own tests.

    But the evening before, Mr. Azar had been effectively removed as the leader of the task force when Mr. Trump abruptly put Mr. Pence in charge, a decision so last-minute that even the top health officials in the White House learned of it while watching the announcement.

    Previous presidents have moved quickly to confront disease threats from inside the White House by installing a “czar” to manage the effort.

    During an outbreak of the Ebola virus in 2014, President Barack Obama tapped Ron Klain, his vice president’s former chief of staff, to direct the response from the West Wing. Mr. Obama later created an office of global health security inside the National Security Council to coordinate future crises.

    “If you look historically in the United States when it is challenged with something like this — whether it’s H.I.V. crises, whether it’s pandemic, whether it’s whatever — man, they pull out all the stops across the system and they make it work,” said Dr. Aylward, the W.H.O. epidemiologist.

    But faced with the coronavirus, Mr. Trump chose not to have the White House lead the planning until nearly two months after it began. Mr. Obama’s global health office had been disbanded a year earlier. And until Mr. Pence took charge, the task force lacked a single White House official with the power to compel action.

    Since then, testing has ramped up quickly, with nearly 100 labs at hospitals and elsewhere performing it. On Friday, the health care giant Abbott said it had received emergency approval for a portable test that could detect the virus in five minutes.

    The president boasted on Tuesday that the United States had “created a new system that now we are doing unbelievably big numbers” of tests for the virus. The U.S., he said, had done more testing for the coronavirus in the last eight days than South Korea had done in eight weeks.

    Yet hospitals and clinics across the country still must deny tests to those with milder symptoms, trying to save them for the most serious cases, and they often wait a week for results. In tacit acknowledgment of the shortage, Mr. Trump asked South Korea’s president on Monday to send as many test kits as possible from the 100,000 produced there daily, more than the country needs.

    Public health experts reacted positively to the increased capacity. But having the ability to diagnose the disease three months after it was first disclosed by China does little to address why the United States was unable to do so sooner, when it might have helped reduce the toll of the pandemic.

    “Testing is the crack that split apart the rest of the response, when it should have tied everything together,” said Dr. Nahid Bhadelia, ​the medical director of the Special Pathogens Unit at Boston University School of Medicine.

    “It seeps into every other aspect of our response, touches all of us,” she said. “The delay of the testing has impacted the response across the board.”

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    The US now has more confirmed coronavirus cases than anywhere else in the world
    Here’s how we got here — and what to do next.

    https://www.vox.com/2020/3/26/21194153/us-confirmed-coronavirus-cases-world

    March 26 marked an unhappy milestone for the United States: We’re now No. 1 in confirmed coronavirus cases.

    China, where the novel coronavirus originated, was the previous leader. The country reported 81,782 cases as of Thursday near 6 pm on the coronavirus case counter by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering at Johns Hopkins University. Until now, second place was held by Italy, which has reported 80,589 cases.

    Now the US leapfrogged them both with 82,404 cases. And it’s only going to get worse from here.

    In late February, there were 80,000 cases in China and nascent outbreaks in Japan, South Korea, Iran, and Italy. But things in the US were still looking pretty good — at least, on the surface. The US on February 20 reported only 15 cases, all travel-related.

    But once officials started testing in earnest for Covid-19, the cases started coming — and coming and coming. On March 1, there were 75. On March 7, 435. On March 14, 2,770. On March 21, 24,192. Now it’s at 82,404 — and those numbers are only going to go up in the coming weeks.

    How did things go so wrong so fast? Much of the answer is that when we were reporting very few cases, things were already getting bad under the radar. A disastrously mismanaged February, during which government officials, much of the media, and even some experts assured Americans there was nothing to fear, let the virus spread until it was too big to ignore. By that time, it was also too big to stop without heavy-handed social distancing measures — and their attendant catastrophic economic costs.

    Much of the blame lies with the president, who stripped public health agencies of the staffing, resources, and authority they needed to function, and then addressed the crisis in his usual fashion: with misinformation and bluster. It’s worked well for him against many of the scandals of his administration, but the virus was unimpressed.

    But the failure wasn’t just the president’s. As Zeynep Tufekci, who has been urging us to do more for months, put it, “a soothing message got widespread traction, not just with Donald Trump and his audience, but among traditional media in the United States, which exhorted us to worry about the flu instead, and warned us against overreaction.” Even with the government sleeping on the job, there were signs from other countries that a catastrophe was arriving on our shores. But very few people said it out loud, and the ones who did were assured they were overreacting. Most people took public health experts’ reassurances at face value and assumed the low numbers of reported cases reflected reality.

    Meanwhile, the virus spread.

    Now, the world’s most powerful country has one of the world’s worst disasters on its hands. The question now is: Is it too late to turn things around?

    The most confirmed cases in the world: What it means and what it doesn’t

    The US has more confirmed cases than anywhere else in the world. It’s a sign that our coronavirus situation is very grave indeed. However, it doesn’t necessarily mean that we have the world’s worst coronavirus outbreak.

    For one thing, while the US is still undertesting (people with milder cases are typically told to stay home and not be tested), other countries are probably undertesting by even more. Iran, by some estimates, may have millions of coronavirus cases, most of which the government has not reported.

    Other hotspots that worry global development researchers include India and Indonesia — both populous countries with weak health systems and high poverty that are likely underreporting their coronavirus outbreaks by a significant margin. One study found that Indonesia is probably reporting around 10 percent of its symptomatic cases, and India between 10 percent and 30 percent.

    Another important consideration is population. The US is the third-most populous country in the world. That means that, while our outbreaks are not yet worse per capita than many of the outbreaks in Europe, the top-line numbers look worse. Italy, for example, has reported one case for every 750 citizens. The US has reported one for every 4,000 (though 1 in every 400 New York City residents). Per capita numbers may better reflect how overwhelmed a country’s health system is and how badly it is impacted by the virus.

    But overall numbers matter, too. Tens of thousands of people suffering and many of them dying isn’t less tragic if it happens in a large country where they’re a smaller share of the population.

    So, while the US situation is very bad news, it’s the combination of a high population, a disastrous outbreak, and high testing capacity (in the last few days, we’ve finally — if belatedly — started testing on a large scale) that propelled America into the No. 1 slot. We should take our situation seriously.

    But it’s a misinterpretation to claim that America has the worst outbreak in the world just because we have the most reported cases in the world. (To be clear, we could still end up with the worst outbreak in the world — but we’re not there yet.) When you test more, you’ll get more cases — but testing more is a good thing, and the United States, despite the desperate situation, is in a much better position to turn things around because of all the tests that we have run in the last week.

    How coronavirus got a foothold in America

    In late January, China locked down the country as hospitals and intensive care units (ICUs) in Wuhan were overwhelmed by coronavirus patients. In response, the United States banned foreign nationals who had recently traveled to China. That “resulted in a significant delay in the number of people coming in with infection,” Dr. Tom Frieden, former director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), has said. “That bought time in the US to better prepare.”

    Then, we squandered it. “Every other step of the government response was badly fumbled,” Frieden concluded.

    Budget cuts and mismanagement by the Trump administration had gutted many of the agencies that were meant to address the crisis. The CDC started work on a test that would identify the novel coronavirus, but shipped the test out to labs with incorrect reagents, meaning that the test didn’t work. Guidance on when there’d be a new test was slow in coming.

    Independent researchers at Seattle’s Flu Study, a research project studying flu in the Seattle region, sought permission to run their own test. They were denied it. “We felt like we were sitting, waiting for the pandemic to emerge,” said Dr. Helen Chu, who led the project. “We could help. We couldn’t do anything.” Labs around the country sought the Food and Drug Administration’s approval for their own test and met delays.

    Strict rules about who could be tested for the virus were put into place. To be tested, someone had to have recently traveled from China or have been exposed to someone who tested positive. In hindsight, it’s easy to spot the Catch-22. If someone got coronavirus while traveling in South Korea, Iran, Italy, or any of the growing number of countries experiencing outbreaks, they could not be tested. If they infected anyone, those people couldn’t be tested either. Because we’d banned travel from China and would only test travelers from China (or those who had been exposed to a person who’d tested positive), we had rendered it impossible to notice whether the virus was spreading in America.

    It was. Virologist Trevor Bradford estimates by comparing patient genomes that the coronavirus started spreading in Washington State in mid-January. By the end of February, it had been introduced to a nursing home, and patients started rapidly dying.

    In the meantime, even people who should have known better took the CDC’s low case numbers at face value. There’s no community spread in the United States, public health officials around the country reassured us.

    The risk of coronavirus in the US is “just minuscule,” National Institutes of Health official Anthony Fauci, now one of the most trusted authorities leading the response, said on February 17. “We have more kids dying of flu this year at this time than in the last decade or more,” he added.

    We were told that risk in our communities “remains low.” Media outlets wrote articles about how we were at greater risk from the flu — a serious mistake in hindsight, to be sure, but an accurate representation of what they were hearing from America’s top public health authorities.

    Bedford estimates that there were more than 7,000 cases in the US near the end of February (as opposed to 68 confirmed cases), when a lab in California first detected a community-acquired coronavirus case. If we’d known about them, we could have taken the extensive but not economy-shattering measures that countries like South Korea and Taiwan have taken to stop the virus — testing extensively, aggressively tracing contacts of everyone who tests positive, increasing production of masks and making them widely available.

    Instead, we proceeded as if we were safe, while the least invasive ways to beat back the virus steadily slipped out of our reach.

    Always a bit behind the curve

    By March, it was obvious that there was community transmission in multiple cities across America. But our response was still slow. The FDA only slowly authorized more labs to conduct testing, and revisions to make their guidelines stricter forced some labs to destroy tests they’d already collected. US testing increased, but the prevalence of the virus was increasing, too.

    States, counties, and cities had to decide one by one whether to shut their schools, declare a state of emergency, urge social distancing measures, or go into lockdowns. They did so haphazardly, with insufficient data because there was still limited testing in their communities. Italy closed all its schools on March 4 and locked down the country when they had fewer than 10,000 cases; the US surpassed the 10,000 case mark (March 19) and the 20,000 case mark (March 21) and the 50,000 case mark (March 24) without any national order to reduce nonessential activities.

    Some local and state officials — like San Francisco Mayor London Breed and Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine — acquitted themselves well, taking strong early measures to reduce the spread of the virus. Some didn’t, like Texas Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, who argued that we shouldn’t take economically damaging measures because if asked “are you willing to take a chance on your survival in exchange for keeping the America that all America loves for your children and grandchildren?” grandparents around the nation would agree to risk letting the virus spread.

    Lockdowns are economically devastating, but the death of thousands of Americans in overwhelmed hospitals and the decimation of our health care workforce will not be any less economically devastating for the states that take that route.

    In New York, which discovered as they ramped up testing that local cases were terrifyingly out of control, Mayor Bill de Blasio and Gov. Andrew Cuomo sparred over whether the city would have a shelter-in-place order like the one implemented earlier in the California Bay Area. Epidemiologists urged us to employ social distancing, but disorganization, unclear communication from political leaders, and ongoing lack of testing likely reduced compliance rates.

    That said, it would be wrong to say that the US hasn’t taken strong measures to stop the virus. School closures were ordered. They were extended to restaurants and bars. California, home to 40 million people and one-fifth of the country’s GDP, ordered its population to stay at home. Nineteen other states have followed. When all the measures go into effect, more than half the country will have been ordered to stay at home (and similar measures may go into effect in more states as the situation worsens).

    But we took these steps belatedly — again, in part because of lack of testing capacity. That meant each measure wasn’t sufficient on its own, and we had to keep escalating. It is still not clear we’ve done enough for desperate situations like New York, New Orleans, and Atlanta, which are already running out of ICU beds.

    Our ugly start put us at an enormous disadvantage for the next phase of the coronavirus fight, and we spent most of March on the defensive while case numbers grew and grew.

    So, how does this end?

    When every day the news gets worse, it’s easy to start to despair — or to start thinking we should give up, write off 3 percent of our population, and try to, as Bill Gates condemned the idea, “ignore that pile of bodies over in the corner” as we go back to work.

    We should not do that.

    But we shouldn’t resign ourselves to another year and a half in lockdown, either — though it’s true that it will be a long time before the country or the world returns to normal. There are lots of promising options available, and pursuing some combination of them will likely allow us to ease up on some of the costliest current restrictions.

    “Suppression will minimally require a combination of social distancing of the entire population, home isolation of cases and household quarantine of their family members,” an influential report from the Imperial College London argued, and then more than a year of maintaining “this type of intensive intervention package — or something equivalently effective at reducing transmission.” Other researchers have criticized specific assumptions underlying that model, but there’s wider agreement on the general premise that we need to find an “intervention package” that keeps transmission low.

    But the details of that intensive intervention package are up to us, and some possibilities could be improvements over the current lockdowns. Countries are exploring a wide range of options for reducing transmission with minimal human costs.

    One option, based on South Korea’s success at managing the virus, is called “test and trace.” The idea is to get much much better at testing so that we can identify sick people sooner, isolate them and all of their contacts, and let other people go about their daily lives.

    That’s the approach favored by the WHO, based on what’s worked best so far in the countries that have controlled their outbreaks. “To suppress and control the epidemic, countries must isolate, test, treat, and trace,” WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus argued last week.

    “Everyone staying home is just a very blunt measure. That’s what you say when you’ve got really nothing else,” Emily Gurley of the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health told NPR. “Being able to test folks is really the linchpin in getting beyond what we’re doing now.”

    Accomplishing this will require making testing much more widespread. Tactics like test pooling, which Nebraska has started using and which other states may copy, can be employed to let us test more patients with the same number of tests. Developing tests with faster turnaround time will mean that sick people get answers within an hour instead of waiting for weeks. We’re a long way away from this, but that doesn’t mean that it couldn’t happen fast with enough focused attention and funding.

    Another option, serological tests, will let us check who has already recovered from the virus, so some people will know they’ve developed immunity and can return to normal. The UK is aggressively exploring this option and says they plan to make millions of serological tests available within “days rather than weeks or months,” says Sharon Peacock, the director of the national infection service at Public Health England.

    Lockdowns affect lots of people who could be at work. Once we have better testing, we can lock down only people who’ve been exposed for the period of time that they’re at risk of spreading the virus (most countries require 14 days of self-quarantine).

    Better treatments, too, might change the dynamic of our fight against the coronavirus. Several promising drugs are undergoing trials right now, including a multi-nation, thousands-of-patients, multi-drug randomized trial organized by the WHO called SOLIDARITY. The president has controversially highlighted chloroquine, an antimalarial drug, but others showing promising early results include Japanese flu drug favipiravir, HIV medication remdesivir, and others. If a successful treatment that makes the illness much less dangerous is discovered, we could return sooner to normal life.

    To be clear, it’s a mistake to hype any one of these drugs as a cure-all (and please, don’t hoard them at home). And the president certainly hasn’t helped by touting them as miracle cures despite mixed early evidence.

    But it’s not unlikely that our treatment options will improve dramatically as we learn more. “We need more data at every level,” UCSF biologist Nevan Krogan, who is researching drug treatments for the disease, said in March.

    Finally, our manufacturing can scale up production of personal protective equipment and ventilators, and we can rapidly train more people to care for coronavirus patients, increasing our hospital capacity and our ability to cope with the virus.

    “Let’s figure out testing, let’s get enough PPE [personal protective equipment] for first responders,” Tara Smith, who studies infectious disease at Kent State University, told my colleague Brian Resnick. “Let’s get enough swabs. Let’s buy more ventilators, build more ventilators — to have this second chance at not messing things up.”

    While all that’s happening, researchers like Stephen Kissler of Harvard have proposed that we might alternate periods of social distancing, trying to keep society functioning and our mental health acceptable while not overloading our hospitals. “Intermittent social distancing — triggered by trends in disease surveillance — may allow interventions to be relaxed temporarily in relative short time windows, but measures will need to be reintroduced if or when case numbers rebound,” the Imperial College London report concluded.

    So while life as normal might be a long way off, we shouldn’t expect to be sitting in lockdown for the next year. This is a painful, temporary, weeks-long (maybe months-long) step while we progress as fast as possible on all of those fronts.

    There are now two months of coronavirus response behind us. We spent one of them unaware that we were under attack, and the second trying to figure out how to respond. By the time we had a good picture of the problem in front of us, we had a problem on an unprecedented scale.

    But it’s not all hopeless. If the world is at war with the coronavirus, it’s encouraging to remember that the US has historically been incompetent in the early stages of a global war — but unstoppable once we set ourselves to the task at hand. This isn’t over — it is, in fact, barely getting started — and it’s up to all of us to decide how it ends.

    #112993
    Avatar photoZooey
    Moderator

    Look. I found an article on Venezuela, in English, that says something about it that doesn’t come from CIA talking points.

    Venezuela’s Coronavirus Response Might Surprise You

    https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/14824

    Within a few hours of being launched, over 800 Venezuelans in the U.S. registered for an emergency flight from Miami to Caracas through a website run by the Venezuelan government. This flight, offered at no cost, was proposed by President Nicolás Maduro when he learned that 200 Venezuelans were stuck in the United States following his government’s decision to stop commercial flights as a preventative coronavirus measure. The promise of one flight expanded to two or more flights, as it became clear that many Venezuelans in the U.S. wanted to go back to Venezuela, yet the situation remains unresolved due to the U.S. ban on flights to and from the country.

    Those who rely solely on the mainstream media might wonder who in their right mind would want to leave the United States for Venezuela. Time, The Washington Post, The Hill and the Miami Herald, among others, published opinions in the past week describing Venezuela as a chaotic nightmare. These media outlets painted a picture of a coronavirus disaster, of government incompetence and of a nation teetering on the brink of collapse. The reality of Venezuela’s coronavirus response is not covered by the mainstream media at all.

    Furthermore, what each of these articles shortchanges is the damage caused by the Trump administration’s sanctions, which devastated the economy and healthcare system long before the coronavirus pandemic. These sanctions have impoverished millions of Venezuelans and negatively impact vital infrastructure, such as electricity generation. Venezuela is impeded from importing spare parts for its power plants and the resulting blackouts interrupt water services that rely on electric pumps. These, along with dozens of other implications from the hybrid war on Venezuela, have caused a decline in health indicators across the board, leading to 100,000 deaths as a consequence of the sanctions.

    Regarding coronavirus specifically, the sanctions raise the costs of testing kits and medical supplies, and ban Venezuela’s government from purchasing medical equipment from the U.S. (and from many European countries). These obstacles would seemingly place Venezuela on the path to a worst-case scenario, similar to Iran (also battered by sanctions) or Italy (battered by austerity and neoliberalism). In contrast to those two countries, Venezuela took decisive steps early on to face the pandemic.

    As a result of these steps and other factors, Venezuela is currently in its best-case scenario. As of this writing, 11 days after the first confirmed case of coronavirus, the country has 86 infected people, with 0 deaths. Its neighbors have not fared as well: Brazil has 1,924 cases with 34 deaths; Ecuador 981 and 18; Chile 746 and 2; Peru 395 and 5; Mexico 367 and 4; Colombia 306 and 3. (With the exception of Mexico, those governments have all actively participated and contributed to the U.S.-led regime change efforts in Venezuela.) Why is Venezuela doing so much better than others in the region?

    Skeptics will claim that the Maduro government is hiding figures and deaths, that there’s not enough testing, not enough medicine, not enough talent to adequately deal with a pandemic. But here are the facts:

    First, international solidarity has played a priceless role in enabling the government to rise to the challenge. China sent coronavirus diagnostic kits that will allow 320,000 Venezuelans to be tested, in addition to a team of experts and tons of supplies. Cuba sent 130 doctors and 10,000 doses of interferon alfa-2b, a drug with an established record of helping COVID-19 patients recover. Russia has sent the first of several shipments of medical equipment and kits. These three countries, routinely characterized by the U.S. foreign policy establishment as evil, offer solidarity and material support. The United States offers more sanctions and the IMF, widely known to be under U.S. control, denied a Venezuelan request for $5 billion in emergency funding that even the European Union supports.

    Second, the government quickly carried out a plan to contain the spread of the disease. On March 12, a day before the first confirmed cases, President Maduro decreed a health emergency, prohibited crowds from gathering, and cancelled flights from Europe and Colombia. On March 13, Day 1, two Venezuelans tested positive; the government cancelled classes, began requiring facemasks on subways and on the border, closed theaters, bars and nightclubs, and limited restaurants to take-out or delivery. It bears repeating that this was on Day 1 of having a confirmed case; many U.S. states have yet to take these steps. By Day 4, a national quarantine was put into effect (equivalent to shelter-in-place orders) and an online portal called the Homeland System (Sistema Patria) was repurposed to survey potential COVID-19 cases. By Day 8, 42 people were infected and approximately 90% of the population was heeding the quarantine. By Day 11, over 12.2 million people had filled out the survey, over 20,000 people who reported being sick were visited in their homes by medical professionals and 145 people were referred for coronavirus testing. The government estimates that without these measures, Venezuela would have 3,000 infected people and a high number of deaths.

    Third, the Venezuelan people were positioned to handle a crisis. Over the past 7 years, Venezuela has lived through the death of wildly popular leader, violent right-wing protests, an economic war characterized by shortages and hyperinflation, sanctions that have destroyed the economy, an ongoing coup, attempted military insurrections, attacks on public utilities, blackouts, mass migration and threats of U.S. military action. The coronavirus is a different sort of challenge, but previous crises have instilled a resiliency among the Venezuelan people and strengthened solidarity within communities. There is no panic on the streets; instead, people are calm and following health protocols.

    Fourth, mass organizing and prioritizing people above all else. Communes and organized communities have taken the lead, producing facemasks, keeping the CLAP food supply system running (this monthly food package reaches 7 million families), facilitating house-by-house visits of doctors and encouraging the use of facemasks in public. Over 12,000 medical school students in their last or second-to-last year of study applied to be trained for house visits. For its part, the Maduro administration suspended rent payments, instituted a nationwide firing freeze, gave bonuses to workers, prohibited telecoms from cutting off people’s phones or internet, reached an agreement with hotel chains to provide 4,000 beds in case the crisis escalates, and pledged to pay the salaries of employees of small and medium businesses. Amid a public health crisis – compounded by an economic crisis and sanctions – Venezuela’s response has been to guarantee food, provide free healthcare and widespread testing, and alleviate further economic pressure on the working class.

    The U.S. government has not responded to the Maduro administration’s request to make an exception for Conviasa Airlines, the national airline under sanctions, to fly the Venezuelans stranded in the United States back to Caracas. Given everything happening in the United States, where COVID-19 treatment can cost nearly $35,000 and the government is weighing the option of prioritizing the economy over the lives of people, perhaps these Venezuelans waiting to go home understand that their chances of surviving the coronavirus – both physically and economically – are much better in a country that values health over profits.

    Leonardo Flores is Latin American policy expert and campaigner with CODEPINK.

    #112802

    In reply to: virus math

    Avatar photowv
    Participant

    =======================
    Analysis of outcomes in 50k chinese people with covid-19

    Posted by dan on March 20, 2020, 9:03 pm

    Tweet from @Menon_Cambridge: Rigorous analysis of~50k Wuhan cases. Case fatality for COVID-19 =1.4% in symptomatic patients (below past estimates). OR for death 0.6 in those <30; and 5.1 in those >59 y. Risk of symptomatic infection increased ~4% per year between 30 & 60 years.

    link:https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-0822-7.epdf

    #112800

    In reply to: the testing fiasco

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    How the Coronavirus Became an American Catastrophe
    The death and economic damage sweeping the United States could have been avoided—if only we had started testing for the virus sooner.

    MARCH 21, 2020

    https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/how-many-americans-are-sick-lost-february/608521/

    How many people are sick with the coronavirus in the United States, and when did they get sick?
    These are crucial questions to answer, but they have never been answered well. Archived data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention—illustrated in the chart below—reveal that the government dramatically misunderstood what was happening in America as the outbreak began.
    On the last day of February, the CDC reported that 15 Americans had tested positive for COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.

    In the past week, as the country’s testing capacity has increased, officials have discovered more cases. Today, more than 17,000 people have tested positive.

    That may sound like a lot. But experts believe that the United States still isn’t testing enough people to detect the outbreak’s true spread. The virologist Trevor Bedford has found evidence that the coronavirus began spreading in the United States in January. It has already infected approximately 87,000 Americans, he says.

    The truth is: We don’t know how many Americans are infected with the coronavirus.
    The United States is a country soon to be overrun with sick people. As the positive tests for the new coronavirus have ticked upward, so, inevitably, will the deaths.

    When Wuhan began burning with infections in December, the U.S. government took only illogical, inadequate actions to stop the virus’s spread: It banned foreigners from entering from China, but inconsistently monitored Americans returning from the country. The president laughed off the virus and the Democrats’ response to it, calling it their “new hoax,” which immediately polarized the citizenry’s response to precautionary public-health information. When the sparks of this conflagration hit, Seattle was aflame before anyone at the CDC had started to reach for water.

    What’s happening here, in this country, was avoidable. Nearly every flaw in America’s response to the virus has one source: America did not test enough people for COVID-19.

    Testing should have told doctors how to triage patients and hospitals when to prepare their wards. It should have allowed governors to gauge the severity of a local outbreak and informed federal officials as they allocated scarce masks and ventilators. Testing should have answered the all-important question in any pandemic: How many people are sick right now? Had the nation known that, the systems that were put into place over years of pandemic planning could have powered on, protecting millions of Americans and containing the illness.

    Instead, the CDC botched its own test development. It sent testing kits to state public-health labs with a nonfunctioning ingredient. And by then, the virus was already spreading. It was already spreading as the Food and Drug Administration held up independent labs that had made their own tests. It was spreading as samples piled up, as the world’s top virology researchers pleaded to be permitted to test them and as the FDA denied their requests.

    The virus was spreading as a delay in test kits became a national shortage. When community transmission in the United States was discovered, and states and hospitals lacked the supplies to diagnose even a dangerously ill patient, it was spreading. When a week passed, and the market began to collapse, and the country had barely tested 1,000 people, it was still spreading. Even as kits started to trickle out, the CDC and many state officials clung to restrictive rules that allowed only patients who had traveled internationally or been exposed to a known case to be tested, even though the coronavirus was already clearly spreading in American offices, day cares, and movie theaters. Doctors and nurses with all the symptoms of COVID-19 were denied tests because they could not prove exposure. The virus was still spreading.

    Every six days that the country did not test, every six days that it did not act, the number of infected Americans doubled.

    “The way no one expected how this response would fail in the U.S. is the testing,” Nahid Bhadelia, the medical director of the Special Pathogen Unit at Boston University School of Medicine, told us. She is an expert in infectious diseases and pandemics, and oversees the medical-response program at one of the few labs in the country permitted to handle the pathogens that cause Ebola, anthrax, and the bubonic plague.

    “If you don’t know where the disease is early in the epidemic, you have no hope of containing it,” Bhadelia said. “Even now, [testing is] that Achilles’ heel; it’s the crack that is making its way throughout our entire response.”

    Without testing, there was only one way to know the severity of the outbreak: counting the dead. On February 29, Washington State confirmed that a man who had been at the Life Care Center outside Seattle had died, the first American death officially attributed to the virus. According to a now-archived version of the CDC’s website, the United States had, by then, tested 472 total people.

    The death came at the end of a month that was America’s last chance at containing COVID-19. But it was too late. February had been lost.

    On the last day of January, Trevor Bedford, a scientist at the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, in Seattle, hit Publish on a 484-word blog post that should have shaken the nation.

    Bedford is one of the country’s experts on the evolution and infectiousness of viruses. Virus genomes are like tree rings: They provide clues to where a virus came from and how many times it’s been passed from person to person. With the outbreak raging in Wuhan, Bedford had been studying the genetic sequences of the new coronavirus that Chinese researchers had posted. By January 11, six were in the record, which allowed him to reconstruct the relationships between the individual strains. Though the World Health Organization insisted that this new coronavirus had “limited human-to-human transmission,” the genomes told Bedford otherwise. Whatever this virus was, he suspected it could spread easily among strangers, like the common cold or the flu.

    Six days later, when a pair of travelers in Thailand came down with a similar illness, and researchers published the genome of the virus that had infected them, Bedford’s worst fears were confirmed. An epidemic had already begun. The new coronavirus had slipped the cordon in Wuhan, and was out in the world.

    “As this became clear to me, I spent the week of Jan 20 alerting every public health official I know,” Bedford wrote that month. On January 23, the Chinese government, which had spent weeks trying to cover up the virus, swung into action. It locked down the city of Wuhan and by mid-February had restricted the movement of 700 million people. On January 24, the CDC announced it had developed a test for the disease. The FDA wouldn’t approve it for another week and a half.

    This was the moment that epidemiologists had spent years dreading and anticipating. Almost every city and state in America had a pandemic-preparedness plan, reams of paper ready to put into action.

    King County, in which Seattle and Kirkland sit, had a plan, of course. The last revision, dated October 2013, forecast the consequences of a pandemic flu in now-eerie detail. The country, they predicted, would be faced with deaths that could range into the millions. The pandemic “has the potential to suddenly cause illness in a very large number of people, who could easily overwhelm the healthcare system throughout the nation.” No vaccines would be available at first. Community services could break down. Everything could become disrupted “for several weeks, if not months.” So many of the steps that then seemed unthinkable to regular people—closing schools for months, social distancing, curfews, and more—were not only contemplated but gamed out.

    Except for one thing. The plan took as a given that a functional testing apparatus would catch diseases on the way in, or at least before the fire started raging. Under its “Planning Assumptions” section, the second bullet point read, “There will be a need for heightened global, national and local surveillance.” Surveillance is public-health jargon for testing and the system that surrounds it. The planners knew there would be a need; they barely considered that it would not be met.

    “A heightened local surveillance system … serves as an early warning system for potential pandemics and a critical component of pandemic response plans,” they wrote in another section of the report. “Local surveillance during a pandemic outbreak provides important information regarding the severity of disease, characteristics of the affected population, and impacts on the healthcare system.”

    For every contingency that was considered, every difficulty and problem was assumed to be downstream of the high-quality information that would flow from the testing system. Without data about American cases in hand, how to handle the virus would become a matter of guesswork, not judgment.

    In late January, as Bedford began to warn public-health officials, there remained, according to the president, nothing to worry about. “We have it totally under control,” President Donald Trump said at Davos. “It’s one person coming in from China, and we have it under control. It’s going to be just fine.”

    On or about January 15, someone infected by the coronavirus arrived in the Seattle area, Bedford’s research would later show. The virus began to silently spread in the region. It would not be detected for another six weeks.

    If there is one thing about the novel coronavirus that you must understand, it’s that it is a firecracker with a long fuse. Here is what the explosion looks like: Every six days, the number of people infected by the disease doubles, according to estimates from Bedford and other epidemiologists. At the start of February, Bedford now believes, the United States had something like 430 infections; if American interventions have done nothing to slow the disease’s spread, then his simple calculations show that more than 120,000 people could be infected by this weekend. Because of the great uncertainty, it’s probably most appropriate to give Bedford’s range: About 60,000 to 245,000 people are now infected with COVID-19 in the United States.

    An invisible fuse sets off this burst of disease. If someone is infected with the coronavirus on Monday, she may start being contagious and infecting other people by Wednesday. But she may not start showing symptoms until Friday—meaning that she was spreading the virus before she even knew she had it. And in some cases, infected people take 14 days to start showing symptoms.

    The onset of symptoms starts another awful clock. Many people will recover in a few weeks. But if someone’s case is severe, he may not recover for a month. And even if someone’s case is fatal, she may still survive for three weeks. This means that, first, cases discovered now may not become deaths for weeks; second, some people who will die in early April may only start showing symptoms today.

    Mitigation efforts must burn through the same fuse. Even the decision to lock down the Bay Area, the country’s richest region, will not relieve pressure on the medical system for weeks.

    Both of these factors mean that time is of the essence. This virus hides effectively and doubles quickly, but it kills slowly and painfully, and it kills most effectively when medical care isn’t available. This makes the coronavirus a particular disaster for the American hospital system, which after decades of streamlining has little spare capacity.

    If the coronavirus was in the United States, it had to be found early, before too many explosions could go off.

    Helen Y. Chu, an infectious-disease specialist at the University of Washington, thought she had a way to detect COVID-19’s arrival. She directed a monitoring program called the Seattle Flu Study, which studied the spread of the seasonal flu and collected samples from sick people on an ongoing basis. What if some of those patients didn’t have the flu at all, but COVID-19? In January, she and her colleagues began asking federal and state officials for permission to repurpose specimens to test for this other, similar respiratory disease, according to The New York Times. They turned her down then—and they kept rejecting her requests as the weeks wore on. There were legitimate privacy concerns, and government officials were not ready to authorize Chu to look.

    On the last day of January, roughly 380 people were already infected with the coronavirus, most of them in the Seattle area, according to Bedford’s estimate. (Bedford is also part of the Seattle Flu Study.)

    But then the CDC hit a disastrous roadblock, as it began to send test kits to public-health labs across the country. Two of the test’s reagents were fine, in most cases, but a third chemical initially deemed necessary for the test simply did not work. For the time being, every test for COVID-19 would have to be conducted by the CDC.

    As the CDC struggled to find a solution, other laboratories tried to bring their own tests online. They found themselves hamstrung by the FDA, which, though it repeatedly loosened the rules, could not move as fast as the coronavirus.

    Alex Greninger, the assistant director of the clinical virology laboratory at the University of Washington, wanted to run a test of the lab’s own design. His lab would end up being one of the fastest to set up testing, and become the most important early source of information about the growth of the outbreak. But initially he, too, found himself caught up in the bureaucratic gears. On February 14, he sent a frustrated email to other clinical laboratories. The obstacles to setting up a test were unbelievable, he wrote: The FDA was asking him to show test results for more specimens than there were confirmed coronavirus cases in the United States—and the FDA wasn’t even making samples from those cases available to him. (The FDA did not immediately respond to The Atlantic’s request for comment.)

    No one at the federal level was moving fast enough to actually deal with the looming disaster. “The most pernicious effect of the current regulatory environment is that it kneecaps our ability for preparedness should a true emergency emerge,” Greninger wrote to other laboratory directors. “Why bother getting ready as a clinical lab if you think that you won’t ever be allowed to do anything until May or June?” Even after his lab got FDA approval, another two to three weeks would pass before it could actually test a large number of samples. In coronavirus time, three weeks is about how long it takes for 100 cases to become more than 1,000. “We’ve been exceptionally fortunate to have so few positive cases,” he wrote. “Should that change in the coming weeks, this month will have been the time when we could have expanded our capacity for testing by including clinical labs.”

    But the entire American testing effort, which would provide the crucial surveillance capability to understand any incipient outbreak, had stalled. The days ticked by; the virus spread. American public-health labs—which generally have far more capacity than the CDC—had completed only 16 tests, maybe a handful of people, by mid-February. All the way to February 26, only 102 specimens, or perhaps 50 people, had been tested by those labs. Overall, the CDC had tested fewer than 500 people. If the U.S. had a small number of cases, it was only because no one was looking for them. “We just twiddled our thumbs as the coronavirus waltzed in,” William Hanage, a Harvard epidemiologist, wrote in The Washington Post.

    Perhaps because of the wildly constrained supply of tests, the criteria to get one were strict. You basically had to go to Wuhan, lick someone, and then develop pneumonia. No one from the federal government even tried to look for community transmission in the United States. In late February, the president voiced his hopes that “the numbers are going to get progressively better as we go along.”

    They would not. In fact, as Trump spoke, the virus had reached a nursing home in the Seattle suburb of Kirkland, where it has so far killed 35 residents. The staff knew a mysterious virus was circulating, but life went on as normal. A concerned visitor who had gone to a Mardi Gras party at the center reached out to King County Public Health, the Los Angeles Times reported, and got the runaround.

    On February 26, the CDC confirmed what should have been clear much earlier: Community transmission in the United States had begun. The coronavirus was now spreading among Americans who had not traveled abroad or known a confirmed case. At least 60 people in the country now had the virus, according to the CDC’s totals at the time—and, as researchers and analysts soon realized, the true number was almost certainly much higher.

    The CDC’s website now says that there were already 268 cases in the United States by that date. When Japan had nearly as many confirmed cases, it closed every school in the country. But because of the testing backlog, the United States remained unaware of its infection rate. And the president encouraged happy thinking. As CDC officials warned that the number of cases could soon quickly rise, Trump disagreed. “Within a couple of days,” he said, the number of cases “is going to be down to close to zero. That’s a pretty good job we’ve done.”

    Bedford now estimates that roughly 7,640 people in the United States were already infected.

    Chu, the Seattle infectious-disease specialist, decided not to wait for government officials any longer. As the United States declared the first cases of community transmission, she tested through Greninger’s lab without official approval and got a positive. The meaning was obvious to her. “It’s just everywhere already,” she later told The New York Times.

    Under pressure to get tests out, the most important fix that our national agencies could make was to simply allow labs to start testing people. In a description that has now been removed from the CDC’s website, the agency gave labs simple instructions: They should use the two working reagents in the old kits. These instructions could have gone out weeks before they actually did, Greninger says, because they relied on the supplies that the CDC had already sent.

    Meanwhile, Bedford began examining the new coronavirus strains from patients in Washington State, just as he had, six weeks earlier, analyzed the Asian samples. The Seattle-area specimens led him to a devastating conclusion: The viral genomes were too similar to have arrived in the United States at different times, from different people, but they were also too varied to have arrived recently. By the end of February, the disease had not only established itself in the United States. It had been circulating for close to six weeks. Seattle, on March 1, found itself in the same position as Wuhan did on January 1, with a growing coronavirus outbreak that was on the verge of exploding.

    If Seattle went the route of Wuhan, the nation had three weeks before being set on a track in which hundreds or even thousands of people might die in Washington State alone. If a fire was raging in Seattle, it would throw off sparks across the country, hitting many more.

    The clock required urgent action. On March 2, Bedford pressed Seattle officials to implement social-distancing policies immediately. If the epidemic grew any further … well, the CDC knew what might happen.

    “Widespread transmission of COVID-19 in the United States would translate into large numbers of people needing medical care at the same time,” the agency warned in a passage titled “What May Happen” on the coronavirus page of its website. “Public health and healthcare systems may become overloaded, with elevated rates of hospitalizations and deaths.”

    One day after Bedford published his warning, the CDC announced that it would stop reporting how many people in the United States had been tested for the coronavirus. Donald Trump shared his views on Fox News the following night. “A lot of people will have this, and it’s very mild,” he said. “They’ll get better very rapidly. They don’t even see a doctor. They don’t even call a doctor.”

    The virus was now clearly spreading, but the CDC still seemed stuck in neutral. On March 10, CDC Director Robert Redfield described his agency’s strategy to The New York Times. “It’s going to take rigorous, aggressive public health—what I like to say, block and tackle, block and tackle, block and tackle, block and tackle,” he said. “That means if you find a new case, you isolate it.”

    Redfield’s advice would have sounded reasonable back on Planet A, where the U.S. surveillance apparatus had not failed so spectacularly, but it was almost nonsensical on Planet B, where we all now live. Almost no one was getting tested, so how could anyone find a new case? A few days earlier, a state-by-state investigation by The Atlantic found little evidence that more than 2,000 people had been tested nationwide. We also found that many states had effectively no ability to test for COVID-19, and the few that did—Washington and California—were already deep into their local outbreaks. After we published the story, reports flooded in from across the country from people who had been denied tests, or doctors who couldn’t get one for patients who they believed needed them. In some cases, even doctors who had treated COVID-19 patients were not able to get tested.

    As we heard from dozens of frightened and frustrated people across the country, President Trump told reporters, “Anyone who wants a test can get a test.” This was and is still not true.

    The scarcity of tests forced officials to ration them. States, counties, and hospitals implemented strict rules about who could qualify for a test. The rules, while based on CDC guidance, were often too limited, given how widely the virus had already spread: They asked about foreign travel and confirmed exposure to a COVID-19–positive patient, weeks after it was clear that the virus was in the United States and that many cases were going undetected. At least 19 states have used a version of the rules that made it effectively impossible to detect the first signs of community spread in a state or city.

    In the few places where officials have tested people without known exposure to COVID-19, they have found the virus. In Sonoma County, California, the public-health department asked four hospitals to test the first 20 patients who walked in the door each day with any coronavirus symptoms—even if the patient had not traveled abroad or been exposed to another known case. They started the project on a Friday. They had found a positive by Saturday. “All we needed was one case to say: Yes, we have community transmission,” Jennifer Larocque, a spokesperson for the county, told us.

    In other places, the criteria have prevented residents from understanding the true extent of community spread. Nebraska, which hewed closely to the rules, insisted it had only one case of community spread, even as suspicious cases filled ICUs, according to a 35-year-old doctor who asked not to be named, because she was not authorized to speak with the press. Nebraska announced its second case of community spread on Wednesday. The state has tested 800 people, total, for the coronavirus, the chief medical officer said.

    The federal government’s reliance on CDC data about the severity of the outbreak froze efforts to stop it. Even after Bedford’s warning, the government published no studies of viral mutation. The void forced leaders to act on the basis of risk, not solid information. How could a mayor shut down her city if it had only 10 for-sure cases? How could a CEO tell employees to call off their trips—and not to Western Europe or central China, but to Seattle?

    American cities, blinded by the lack of testing data, did little as crucial days went by. On March 7, as the severity of the local outbreak was becoming known, huge events were allowed to go on. More than 30,000 people attended a Seattle Sounders game that night. No one wanted to say what has now become clear: February was our chance to get this right. We lost that entire month. And we now live in a new era of work stoppages, overwhelmed hospitals, dead elders, and a wrecked economy.

    No one had the guts to say what needed to be said over the past month: To save our people, we will have to keep our cities in a chokehold and decimate our economy. It would have taken guts and the full-throated backing of every level of government and agency, as well as irrefutable data, for local officials to do something like that. No one told them to, and the data did not exist for them to come to that conclusion on their own.

    Without strong federal leadership, each state has been going after its own solutions and running its own show, as if its residents would stay neatly within their own state lines. Despite the rising number of cases and hospitalizations, President Trump tried to use partisan rhetorical tactics to fight the virus, and in so doing, encouraged Americans to ignore legitimate, dire warnings. Now, though Trump has begun to mobilize a response to the pandemic, his base has been slow to acknowledge that precautions are necessary. This dangerous remove from reality was possible for too long because of the absence of data showing how bad things already were.

    Ironically, given that the debacle started with testing, it may end there as well. South Korea, which on March 1 was the site of the largest confirmed coronavirus outbreak outside of China, has aggressively tested a huge percentage of its population, and continues to screen massive numbers of people. Now, just three weeks later, new COVID-19 cases are declining, and only 102 people have died as of Friday. Washington State, with one-seventh the population of South Korea, already has 83 fatalities. The U.S. caseload has ballooned to almost 20,000, more than twice South Korea’s total. Bedford and other experts believe that Korean-style massive-scale testing will be essential to restoring normal economic conditions. “This is the Apollo program of our times,” he said this week. “Let’s get to it.”

    #112757
    Avatar photowv
    Participant

    I’ve been interested in this question. Cause if you are immune once youve had it, the world is a lot different, than if you could still get it again. And again.

    Looks like the answer is: we dunno?

    ========================
    3. Can I catch COVID-19 a second time?

    Catching a coronavirus generally means that person is immune, at least for a time, to repeat infection. But doubts arose regarding COVID-19 in late February when a woman in her late 40s who had been discharged from hospital in Osaka, Japan tested positive a second time. There also a similar case with one of the Diamond Princess passengers, and another in South Korea. These were isolated cases, but more worrying was research from Guangdong province, China reporting that 14% of recovering patients had also retested positive.

    However, it is too early to jump to conclusions. These cases have not been fully confirmed, with many possible explanations, including faulty, over-sensitive or over-diligent testing; or that the virus had become dormant for a time and then re-emerged. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stress that our immune response to this particular disease is not yet clearly understood: “Patients with MERS-CoV infection are unlikely to be reinfected shortly after they recover, but it is not yet known whether similar immune protection will be observed for patients with COVID-19.”

    In terms of other after-effects, scientists are also currently speculating that coronavirus patients may suffer from reduced lung capacity following a bout of the disease. The Hong Kong Hospital Authority observed that two out of three recovering patients had lost 20-30% of lung function – something that can be treated with physiotherapy.
    ————–
    4. How long might immunity to COVID-19 last?

    “If you get an infection, your immune system is revved up against that virus,” Dr. Keiji Fukuda, director of Hong Kong University’s School of Public Health, told The LA Times. “To get reinfected again when you’re in that situation would be quite unusual unless your immune system was not functioning right.” With many past viruses, immunity can last years – but the reinfection question shows the bigger picture surrounding COVID-19 remains cloudy.

    One thing that might help clarify the immunity question is developing serological tests for antibodies to SARS-CoV2, the COVID-19 pathogen. This would not only provide more information about individual immune-system responses, but also able researchers to more accurately identify the total population affected – by detecting people who might have slipped through the net after recovery. No country currently has confirmed access to such a test, according to The Guardian. But numerous scientists around the world – including one in Singapore that has claimed a successful trial – are working on them.
    link:https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/coronavirus-recovery-what-happens-after-covid19/

    #112747

    In reply to: Coronavirus and Us

    Avatar photoInvaderRam
    Moderator

    Poverty is way scarier than the virus.

    yes. and my patients are at a high risk due to many many many underlying medical conditions. it’s unfortunate. we’re only doing emergency appointments at this point. it just really sucks.

    #112731

    In reply to: Coronavirus and Us

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    Some simple notes. Mon spouse is an RN who works in a facility that cares for the elderly, aging, and dying. They already have one patient with symptoms (though I don’t know if she was tested.) That patient is in full, complete quarantine in a different part of the building far from others. Because of Margo, I have to take more precautions than most. I can’t come home and spread something to her which would then invade the facility where she works. So I rarely if ever go out. When I do go–as I have a couple of times–it is to the store. When I do that I wear both a mask (a real KN95) and surgical gloves (nice blue ones). I just can’t afford to be uncautious in any way shape or form–it partly for my own sake, but mostly because my wife works with the most vulnerable population and so I have to act accordingly. The couple of times I have gone out, I am the only one in the store with a mask and gloves. A tiny part of me feels odd about that but mostly not–the stakes are too high and too real to care how I look in a store. Margo cleans all purchases with disinfectants and there is much hands washing (like after getting the mail or touching the mail in any way).

    There are some shortages here but we have not felt them. We tended to mass purchase before this anyway (Margo is a Sam’s fanatic and loves to bulk purchase and has for years) and so if we had to, we could go for weeks getting by on what we already have in the house. (Recent purchases are pretty much only perishables like eggs, cream, and fresh veggies.)

    My daughter and fiance live about 45 minutes south of us. They are in their 20s but fairly vulnerable because of pre-existing conditions. Nothing they can’t manage in normal times but there’s a hint of worry there in these times. My other daughter is married and lives in Florida and is pregnant. We worry about her too.

    There’s worries, but neither Margo nor I like to indulge panic. We both stand on a belief in informed, reasonable, clear thinking about the heavier things in life like this. (My daughter’s fiance on the other hand is a depression prone worrier. I have tried to say that emotional stress adds to the dangers. I hope that is heard.)

    We both worry about our mothers. (Both fathers passed long ago.) Both mothers are in facilities far away, in different states, and both have medical issues. They’re in their 80s. But they also both have family in town who are invested and caring, so the day to day stuff for them is good.

    #112729

    In reply to: Coronavirus and Us

    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    My wife and I both work in healthcare, so we are busy right now. My wife is a physician who does telemedicine from our home. She sees patients over the internet. Over the last week, she has 40+ patients in her virtual waiting room at any given time. Some of them wait 5 or 6 hours to see her ( um, what is that they always say about socialized medicine and wait times?). I’m a microbiologist in a hospital lab so I’m sorta in the thick of the specimen collecting and testing aspect of this thing.

    We don’t have children. Our only dependent is a sweet 4 year old German Shepherd with the disposition of a puppy and a few koi. My parents are in their late 70s. My dad is in pretty good shape from a pulmonary and cardiovascular standpoint but he can’t get around like he used to. My mother smoked most of her life. She finally quit but it took a nearly fatal episode due to COPD to scare her straight. There is no way she could survive COVID-19 given her condition.

    Fortunately they live on the side of a mountain in rural PA so they were practicing social distancing before it was cool. My brother is around and keeps an eye on them.

    Unfortunately we will all have COVID-19 stories by the time this is over.

    #112727
    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    My hospital and most of the hospitals in our region will be limiting tests to inpatients, nursing home residents, and healthcare workers.

    More and more labs are offering the test, but the supplies to collect and transport specimens for testing are in short supply. If you can’t collect the specimens, you can’t test them. For example, Copan is one of the major suppliers of the swabs needed to collect the specimens. If I place an order for swabs with Copan today, I won’t have them until August.

    The time when testing could have really been helpful in limiting the spread of Covid-19 has passed anyway. It’s ubiquitous now. It’s in every community. It has become a clinical diagnosis. If someone has symptoms consistent with the disease, then you treat them as if they have the disease and have them self-quarantine. It would be different if we currently had an approved treatment for the disease, but as it stands right now there is nothing that can be done except supportive care.

    #112718
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    L.A. County gives up on containing coronavirus, tells doctors to skip testing of some patients

    https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-03-20/coronavirus-county-doctors-containment-testing?fbclid=IwAR0WbZEFPXvi83iGptYup2FtDs-vI0LHzV32Vk7SEaIEfrNPpd3SzgvPSEc

    The nation’s second-largest municipal health system has told its staff that it is essentially abandoning hope of containing the coronavirus outbreak and instructed doctors not to bother testing symptomatic patients if a positive result won’t change how they would be treated.

    The guidance, sent by the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services to its doctors on Thursday, was prompted by a crush of patients and shortage of tests, and could make it difficult to ever know precisely how many people in L.A. County contracted the virus.

    The department “is shifting from a strategy of case containment to slowing disease transmission and averting excess morbidity and mortality,” according to the letter. Doctors should test symptomatic patients only when “a diagnostic result will change clinical management or inform public health response.”

    The guidance sets in writing what has been a reality all along. The shortage of tests nationwide has meant that many patients suspected of having COVID-19 have not had the diagnosis confirmed by a laboratory.

    In addition to the lack of tests, public health agencies across the country lack the staff to trace the source of new cases, drastically reducing the chances of isolating people who have been exposed and thereby containing the outbreak.

    For years, state and local health officials have been warning that steep cuts to federal grants meant to boost preparedness for a pandemic would mean there wouldn’t be enough equipment and staff on hand to respond in the crucial, early stage. Those fears have come to fruition now, officials said.

    A front-line healthcare provider who was not authorized to speak to the media and requested anonymity said county doctors are interpreting Thursday’s letter and other advice coming from senior L.A. County public health officials to mean they should only test patients who are going to be hospitalized or have something unique about the way they contracted the virus.

    They are not planning to test patients who have the symptoms but are otherwise healthy enough to be sent home to self-quarantine — meaning they may never show up in official tallies of people who tested positive.

    The letter also says that, with the increasing availability of tests at private labs, the health department will focus on testing aimed at detecting and preventing outbreaks in hospitals and “congregate living settings,” such as nursing homes.

    Department officials did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

    #112669
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    BANKS PRESSURE HEALTH CARE FIRMS TO RAISE PRICES ON CRITICAL DRUGS, MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR CORONAVIRUS

    https://theintercept.com/2020/03/19/coronavirus-vaccine-medical-supplies-price-gouging/?fbclid=IwAR2sXHwwqFEThedPxQPxCkhXuscEreaziqoNES5DwB9xPDdMw9hwHDS6vIA

    IN RECENT WEEKS, investment bankers have pressed health care companies on the front lines of fighting the novel coronavirus, including drug firms developing experimental treatments and medical supply firms, to consider ways that they can profit from the crisis.

    The media has mostly focused on individuals who have taken advantage of the market for now-scarce medical and hygiene supplies to hoard masks and hand sanitizer and resell them at higher prices. But the largest voices in the health care industry stand to gain from billions of dollars in emergency spending on the pandemic, as do the bankers and investors who invest in health care companies.

    Over the past few weeks, investment bankers have been candid on investor calls and during health care conferences about the opportunity to raise drug prices. In some cases, bankers received sharp rebukes from health care executives; in others, executives joked about using the attention on Covid-19 to dodge public pressure on the opioid crisis.

    Gilead Sciences, the company producing remdesivir, the most promising drug to treat Covid-19 symptoms, is one such firm facing investor pressure.

    Remdesivir is an antiviral that began development as a treatment for dengue, West Nile virus, and Zika, as well as MERS and SARS. The World Health Organization has said there is “only one drug right now that we think may have real efficacy in treating coronavirus symptoms” — namely, remdesivir.

    The drug, though developed in partnership with the University of Alabama through a grant from the federal government’s National Institutes of Health, is patented by Gilead Sciences, a major pharmaceutical company based in California. The firm has faced sharp criticism in the past for its pricing practices. It previously charged $84,000 for a yearlong supply of its hepatitis C treatment, which was also developed with government research support. Remdesivir is estimated to produce a one-time revenue of $2.5 billion.

    During an investor conference earlier this month, Phil Nadeau, managing director at investment bank Cowen & Co., quizzed Gilead Science executives over whether the firm had planned for a “commercial strategy for remdesivir” or could “create a business out of remdesivir.”

    Johanna Mercier, executive vice president of Gilead, noted that the company is currently donating products and “manufacturing at risk and increasing our capacity” to do its best to find a solution to the pandemic. The company at the moment is focused, she said, primarily on “patient access” and “government access” for remdesivir.

    “Commercial opportunity,” Mercier added, “might come if this becomes a seasonal disease or stockpiling comes into play, but that’s much later down the line.”

    Steven Valiquette, a managing director at Barclays Investment Bank, last week peppered executives from Cardinal Health, a major health care distributor of N95 masks, ventilators, and pharmaceuticals, on whether the company would raise prices on a range of supplies.

    Valiquette asked repeatedly about potential price increases on a variety of products. Could the company, he asked, “offset some of the risk of volume shortages” on the “pricing side”?

    Michael Kaufmann, a vice president at Cardinal Health, said that “so far, we’ve not seen any material price increases that I would say are related to the coronavirus yet.” Cardinal Health, Kaufman said, would weigh a variety of factors when making these decisions.

    “Are you able to raise the price on some of this to offset what could be some volume shortages such that it all kind of nets out to be fairly consistent as far as your overall profit matrix?” asked Valiquette.

    Kaufman responded that price decisions would depend on contracts with providers, though the firm has greater flexibility over some drug sales. “As you have changes on the cost side, you’re able to make some adjustments,” he noted.

    The discussion, over conference call, occurred during the Barclays Global Healthcare Conference on March 10. At one point, Valiquette joked that “one positive” about the coronavirus would be a “silver lining” that Cardinal Health may receive “less questions” about opioid-related lawsuits.

    Cardinal Health is one of several firms accused of ignoring warnings and flooding pharmacies known as so-called pill mills with shipments of millions of highly addictive painkillers. Kaufmann noted that negotiations for a settlement are ongoing, and noted that the company has told local officials that discharging the litigation would allow his company “to distribute free goods.”

    Owens & Minor, a health care logistics company that sources and manufactures surgical gowns, N95 masks, and other medical equipment, presented at the Barclays Global Healthcare Conference the following day.

    Valiquette, citing the Covid-19 crisis, asked the company whether it could “increase prices on some of the products where there’s greater demand.” Valiquette then chuckled, adding that doing so “is probably not politically all that great in the sort of dynamic,” but said he was “curious to get some thoughts” on whether the firm would consider hiking prices.

    The inquiry was sharply rebuked by Owens & Minor chief executive Edward Pesicka. “I think in a crisis like this, our mission is really around serving the customer. And from an integrity standpoint, we have pricing agreements,” Pesicka said. “So we are not going to go out and leverage this and try to ‘jam up’ customers and raise prices to have short-term benefit.”

    AmerisourceBergen, another health care distributor that supplies similar products to Cardinal Health, which is also a defendant in the multistate opioid litigation, faced similar questions from Valiquette at the Barclays event.

    Steve Collis, president and chief executive of AmerisourceBergen, noted that his company has been actively involved in efforts to push back against political demands to limit the price of pharmaceutical products.

    Collis said that he was recently at a dinner with other pharmaceutical firms involved with developing “vaccines for the coronavirus” and was reminded that the U.S. firms, operating under limited drug price intervention, were among the industry leaders — a claim that has been disputed by experts who note that lack of regulation in the drug industry has led to few investments in viral treatments, which are seen as less lucrative. Leading firms developing a vaccine for Covid-19 are based in Germany, China, and Japan, countries with high levels of government influence in the pharmaceutical industry.

    AmerisourceBergen, Collis continued, has been “very active with key stakeholders in D.C., and our priority is to educate policymakers about the impact of policy changes,” with a focus on “rational and responsible discussion about drug pricing.”

    Later in the conversation, Valiquette asked AmerisourceBergen about the opioid litigation. The lawsuits could cost as much as $150 billion among the various pharmaceutical and drug distributor defendants. Purdue Pharma, one of the firms targeted with the opioid litigation, has already pursued bankruptcy protection in response to the lawsuit threat.

    “We can’t say too much,” Collis responded. But the executive hinted that his company is using its crucial role in responding to the pandemic crisis as leverage in the settlement negotiations. “I would say that this crisis, the coronavirus crisis, actually highlights a lot of what we’ve been saying, how important it is for us to be very strong financial companies and to have strong cash flow ability to invest in our business and to continue to grow our business and our relationship with our customers,” Collis said.

    The hope that the coronavirus will benefit firms involved in the opioid crisis has already materialized in some ways. New York Attorney General Letitia James announced last week that her lawsuit against opioid firms and distributors, including Cardinal Health and AmerisourceBergen, set to begin on March 20, would be delayed over coronavirus concerns.

    MARKET PRESSURE has encouraged large health care firms to spend billions of dollars on stock buybacks and lobbying, rather than research and development. Barclays declined to comment, and Cowen & Co. did not respond to a request for comment.

    The fallout over the coronavirus could pose potential risks for for-profit health care operators. In Spain, the government seized control of private health care providers, including privately run hospitals, to manage the demand for treatment for patients with Covid-19.

    But pharmaceutical interests in the U.S. have a large degree of political power. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar previously served as president of the U.S. division of drug giant Eli Lilly and on the board of the Biotechnology Innovation Organization, a drug lobby group.

    During a congressional hearing last month, Azar rejected the notion that any vaccine or treatment for Covid-19 should be set at an affordable price. “We would want to ensure that we work to make it affordable, but we can’t control that price because we need the private sector to invest,” said Azar. “The priority is to get vaccines and therapeutics. Price controls won’t get us there.”

    The initial $8.3 billion coronavirus spending bill passed in early March to provide financial support for research into vaccines and other drug treatments contained a provision that prevents the government from delaying the introduction of any new pharmaceutical to address the crisis over affordability concerns. The legislative text was shaped, according to reports, by industry lobbyists.

    Joe Grogan, director of the Domestic Policy Council, listens during a coronavirus briefing with health insurers in the Roosevelt Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Tuesday, March 10, 2020. The window for fully containing the coronavirus has passed in some parts of the U.S. and the White House will roll out plans later Tuesday to mitigate its impact. Photographer: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty ImagesJoe Grogan, director of the Domestic Policy Council, listens during a coronavirus briefing with health insurers in the Roosevelt Room of the White House in Washington, D.C., U.S., on Tuesday, March 10, 2020. Photo: Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty Images

    As The Intercept previously reported, Joe Grogan, a key White House domestic policy adviser now serving on Donald Trump’s Coronavirus Task Force, previously served as a lobbyist for Gilead Sciences.
    s
    “Notwithstanding the pressure they may feel from the markets, corporate CEOs have large amounts of discretion and in this case, they should be very mindful of price gouging, they’re going to be facing a lot more than reputational hits,” said Robert Weissman, president of public interest watchdog Public Citizen, in an interview with The Intercept.

    “There will be a backlash that will both prevent their profiteering, but also may push to more structural limitations on their monopolies and authority moving forward,” Weissman said.

    Weissman’s group supports an effort led by Rep. Andy Levin, D-Mich., who has called on the government to invoke the Defense Production Act to scale up domestic manufacturing of health care supplies.

    There are other steps the government can take, Weissman added, to prevent price gouging.

    “The Gilead product is patent-protected and monopoly-protected, but the government has a big claim over that product because of the investment it’s made,” said Weissman.

    “The government has special authority to have generic competition for products it helped fund and prevent nonexclusive licensing for products it helped fund,” Weissman continued. “Even for products that have no connection to government funding, the government has the ability to force licensing for generic competition for its own acquisition and purchases.”

    Drug companies often eschew vaccine development because of the limited profit potential for a one-time treatment. Testing kit companies and other medical supply firms have few market incentives for domestic production, especially scaling up an entire factory for short-term use. Instead, Levin and Weissman have argued, the government should take direct control of producing the necessary medical supplies and generic drug production.

    Last Friday, Levin circulated a letter signed by other House Democrats that called for the government to take charge in producing ventilators, N95 respirators, and other critical supplies facing shortages.

    The once inconceivable policy was endorsed on Wednesday when Trump unveiled a plan to invoke the Defense Production Act to compel private firms to produce needed supplies during the crisis. The law, notably, allows the president to set a price ceiling for critical goods used in an emergency.

    • This topic was modified 5 years, 11 months ago by Avatar photozn.
    #112510
    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    I work in a hospital so I go to work as usual. I’m QA Supervisor and Microbiology Lead for the clinical lab. As you can imagine we’ve been especially busy with COVID-19 stuff (my hospital provides drive-up specimen collection for people suspected of having it).

    I thought there was a big shortage of tests. I was wondering how Idris Elba got tested when he claims he has no symptoms.

    There is. There is a shortage of tests and the viral media the specimens go in so they can be transported to the testing facilities. A good part of my day is trying to acquire supplies. People are only supposed to be tested if they have a referral from their doctor, which would imply the doctor has reason to suspect their patient might have the virus. It’s probably not a surprise to anyone on this board that there is a different set of rules for the rich.

    #112482
    Avatar photowv
    Participant

    Well, let me know if you meet any centrists or Rightwingers who change their views.

    voters or policy makers?

    ==================

    Voters.

    People dont change their minds for the most part. Leftist Friend of mine sent me this about her Rightwing Mom:
    “My mom posted a meme on facebook. It said something to the effect of ‘Italy is refusing to treat its elderly Coronavirus patients. That’s what happens with socialized healthcare!’
    After slamming my head into the keyboard several times, I had things to say.”

    I’ve seen that kind of thing over and over and over in my life.

    Granted some people change, and change does happen, etc.
    But by and large people dont change and change does not happen 🙂

    The Dem-Centrist-SuBSystem and the Rep-Rightwing-SubSystem are very effective at selling their stories.

    There has never been a corporate-propaganda system like this before, in the history of the world. This is something modern, something new.

    w
    v

    #112463

    In reply to: the testing fiasco

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    The 4 Key Reasons the U.S. Is So Behind on Coronavirus Testing
    Bureaucracy, equipment shortages, an unwillingness to share, and failed leadership doomed the American response to COVID-19.

    https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/why-coronavirus-testing-us-so-delayed/607954/

    The COVID-19 outbreak has been a confusing time for Americans, but one thing has been glaringly clear: The U.S. is way behind when it comes to testing people for the coronavirus.

    Despite the fact that last week, Vice President Mike Pence promised that “roughly 1.5 million tests” would soon be available, an ongoing Atlantic investigation can confirm only that 13,953 tests have been conducted nationally. New York, which has shut down Broadway and has at least 328 coronavirus cases, is still failing to test patients who have worrying symptoms. As late as March 6, a busy clinic in Brownsville, Texas, a border city of nearly 200,000 whose population crosses back and forth from Mexico frequently, told me they could test only three people. By comparison, South Korea, which has one of the largest outbreaks outside China, is testing nearly 20,000 people a day.

    Testing is essential for identifying people who have been infected and for understanding the true scope of the outbreak. But when the initial test from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was rolled out to state public-health laboratories in early February, one of its components was discovered to be faulty. Since then, academic, clinical, and other laboratories have struggled to get or make new tests and diagnose patients.

    Though some elements of the breakdown are by now understood, the full extent of the difficulties laboratory directors have faced has remained largely opaque. Interviews with laboratory directors and public-health experts reveal a Fyre Festival–like cascade of problems that have led to a dearth of tests at a time when America desperately needs them. The issues began with onerous requirements for the labs that make the tests, continued because of arcane hurdles that prevented researchers from getting the right supplies, and extended to a White House that seemed to lack cohesion in the pandemic’s early days. Getting out lots of tests for a new disease is a major logistical and scientific challenge, but it can be pulled off with the help of highly efficient, effective government leadership. In this case, such leadership didn’t appear to exist.

    Here are the four main reasons the testing issues have been so bad:

    RED TAPE

    The Food and Drug Administration has a protocol called emergency use authorization, or EUA, through which it clears tests from labs around the country for use in an outbreak. Getting more of these tests up and running would greatly increase the capacity of doctors and public-health officials to screen patients for the coronavirus.

    Former FDA officials I spoke with said that during past outbreaks, EUAs could be granted in just a couple of days. But this time, the requirements for getting an EUA were so complicated that it would have taken weeks to receive one, says Alex Greninger, the assistant director of the virology division at the University of Washington Medical Center, which is located right near the heart of the American outbreak. Greninger told me clinical labs were not allowed to begin testing at all before they had received the EUA, even if they had already internally made sure their tests worked. Though these regulations are in place to ensure that faulty lab tests don’t get used on patients, several microbiologists told me they felt the precautions were excessive for a fast-moving outbreak of this scale. “The speed of this virus versus the speed of the FDA and the EUA process is mismatched,” he said.

    On February 28, Greninger and dozens of other clinical microbiologists wrote a letter to Congress complaining that the EUA process was slowing down the ability of their labs to deploy coronavirus tests. “Many of our clinical laboratories have already validated [tests] that we could begin testing with tomorrow, but cannot due [to] the FDA EUA process,” they wrote. The following day, the FDA changed the EUA process so that labs like Greninger’s could begin testing—they would just have to submit data for the FDA’s authorization two weeks later. But weeks had already passed during which many labs and hospitals were unable to use their tests.

    “The EUA pathway … has served for Ebola and Zika, etc.,” says Mark Miller, the chief medical officer at bioMérieux, an infectious-disease diagnostic company based in France. “And then you have a situation like now with coronavirus, which I don’t think any of us have ever lived through.”

    Margaret Hamburg, who served as the FDA commissioner from 2009 to 2015, told me that while she doesn’t have knowledge of what went on inside the FDA over the past few months, the agency could have proactively reached out to different national and international labs to see whether their tests could be approved for use in the U.S. For example, the FDA might ask a lab, “Would you be interested to try to redirect what you were doing for a MERS diagnostic to a novel-coronavirus diagnostic?” she says. Instead, as The New York Times reported, federal officials told one Seattle infectious-disease expert, Helen Chu, to stop testing for the coronavirus entirely. (In an email, an FDA spokesperson denied that the agency acted slowly. Ensuring the validity of tests is important, she noted, to prevent false results.)

    It looks like Chu was not alone. Dozens of labs in the U.S. were eager to make tests and willing to test patients, but they were hamstrung by regulations for most of February, even as the virus crept silently across the nation.

    HARD-TO-GET VIRUS SAMPLES

    Labs and companies need samples of the virus itself in order to make their tests, but delays in getting access to samples further slowed down the test-development process. The coronavirus originated in China, and as several microbiologists told me, the Chinese government does not allow specimens to be shipped outside its borders.

    Many researchers have had difficulty getting their hands on samples even as the virus has spread. “I was working the phones to try to get access to the virus,” Greninger said.

    BioMérieux just released three versions of its coronavirus test this week, after beginning work on it on January 23. Miller says that with every viral outbreak, the company’s biggest problem by far is getting access to virus and patient specimens so that it can validate its tests. Even when working with nonauthoritarian countries, a combination of government processes, researcher reticence, complex shipping regulations, and patient-privacy concerns makes getting samples difficult for diagnostic companies like his.

    Miller said it would help if researchers, governments, and companies firmed up pathogen-sharing contracts in advance of an outbreak, but so far that hasn’t happened. “The problem is that in the past, industry has been viewed as this dirty participant in all of this, and we can’t be trusted, and why would I have contracts with you?” Miller says. “But that’s ignoring the plain fact that we’re the ones that create the product in the end.”

    LACKING EQUIPMENT

    The type of test Greninger is making is called a lab-developed test. To be used in other labs, his test requires special instruments that extract and then amplify the RNA that makes up the virus. However, labs across the country—like those at many county hospitals—don’t have the tools to do this. They can only run a simple type of test called a sample-to-answer test. As late as this week, several lab directors told me that no sample-to-answer versions of the coronavirus test had been approved in the U.S. “That means that the vast majority of clinical labs in this country will not be able to do in-house testing at this time,” says Susan Butler Wu, an associate professor of clinical pathology at the University of Southern California.

    The U.S. health-care system is broken up into state and county public-health laboratories, which have different equipment than academic research institutions, which have different equipment than hospitals that diagnose patients. So the same test won’t necessarily work in different places. “We don’t have a nationalized health-care system where you put the same equipment in all the hospitals,” Wu says. “We have all these independent hospital systems with their own equipment in their own labs.”

    Even though some hospitals actually have the new, functional CDC tests, the extraction machines and reagents that are used to perform them are in short supply. “We’ve been pleading to the research laboratories to please, if they have RNA-extraction machines, to give them to the hospital,” says Michael Mina, an associate medical director in the department of pathology at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston.

    LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS

    For months, President Trump has made light of the coronavirus, telling attendees at a Black History Month reception, for instance, that perhaps the virus could miraculously disappear. He claimed on Twitter that the U.S. has done a “great job” handling the outbreak. Such a cavalier attitude seems unlikely to have motivated health officials to take things seriously. It also contradicted advice from most public-health experts. Even Scott Gottlieb, who recently resigned as Trump’s FDA commissioner, wrote in The Wall Street Journal on February 4 that “it’s time to start testing more people.”

    Containing a new infectious disease requires a lot of close collaboration between the president, the CDC, the FDA, and other parts of the Department of Health and Human Services, several Obama-era health officials told me. “One reason we were able to move quickly [during the Ebola outbreak] was that there was a great deal of coordination and issue spotting and troubleshooting that went on,” Hamburg, the former FDA commissioner, told me.

    The different arms of the sprawling health department have to feel like they’re all pulling toward the same goal. “I think you have fabulous people at CDC and FDA all doing the best they can, but we always found it was incredibly important to have all the agencies together in the same room,” says Jesse Goodman, a former FDA chief scientist who helped manage the country’s response to the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. When issues came up that merited the attention of the White House, he says, they got it.

    Though Trump has proposed a payroll-tax break, as my colleague Peter Nicholas has pointed out, “Much of what he’s said publicly about the virus has been wrong, a consequence of downplaying any troubles on his watch.”

    On top of that, there’s reportedly been tension and infighting between the president and his HHS secretary, Alex Azar, as well as between the FDA and the CDC. Politico reported that Vice President Mike Pence, who has no background in public health, repeatedly sidelined Azar from the coronavirus-response task force, and the White House appears to be blaming Azar for any failures in its coronavirus response. Politico also reported that an FDA scientist was “initially rebuffed”—made to wait overnight—when he attempted to visit the CDC in order to help coordinate testing. (In an email, a CDC spokesperson said this was “in full compliance with standard security processes required for all individuals whether they are federal employees or other visitors.”)

    “I gather that there was a huge amount of infighting about who could or who should lead this, and there was a sense that a lot of people [inside HHS] weren’t considering it a major threat,” said a former Obama-administration official who has been in contact with current staffers and who related these private discussions under the condition of anonymity. “And why that was, I don’t know.”

    It’s possible that all of these other hurdles could have been cleared if officials at the highest levels of government had been working together smoothly. Instead, we’ve seen confusion, doubt, and even more delays.

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    Dr. Rob Davidson@DrRobDavidson
    As an ER doc trying to treat patients who may have COVID-19, I can’t underscore enough how much harder the lack of testing is making our job. Yes we’re used to making life-or-death decisions with limited information, daily. But this scenario is very different. Here’s why: (1/12)

    For us data is everything. Board Certified Emergency Physicians (ER docs) are trained in pattern recognition & rely on research to know when the preponderance of evidence directs us toward one or another path of treatment that could significantly help or harm our patients. (2/12)

    With COVID-19, we doctors have very little evidence-based data on the basic science of transmissibility, incubation period or even what measures would be taken to protect patients (& providers). Our best evidence? What has occurred in China, South Korea & Italy thus far… (3/12)

    But the difference with these other countries with COVID-19 is that at the earliest point possible, a huge testing regime was used to determine the extent of the virus in the hospitalized “very sick” population & the “walking well” less-sick population. We don’t have that. (4/12)

    Because this novel #coronavirus causes such minimal symptoms in so many young people (including children) — as well as in older people at the onset of disease — we’re not able to determine cases based on symptoms. This is how we managed the SARS outbreak of 2002-2003. (5/12)

    SARS had a case-fatality rate of 10%, but the ability to ID cases early & isolate them significantly, limited its spread and kept fatalities relatively low. By contrast, COVID-19 cases are difficult to ID early above the background level of other respiratory viruses. (6/12)

    During the H1N1 influenza pandemic of 2009, the case-fatality rate was 0.1%, slightly higher than seasonal flu. That’s also ~50% less contagious than COVID-19. The point? With a highly contagious virus that’s difficult to diagnose clinically, early testing is critical. (7/12)

    Here’s the kicker: WHO had a test that worked, but it was rejected by the U.S. in January. Then, initial attempts to make our own test failed. As a result, as an ER doc I can’t get most patients tested. And it’s now known that the virus has been here for several weeks. (8/12)

    To get a patient tested, they have to have traveled to certain countries, had direct contact with a COVID19+ patient, or be ill enough to be hospitalized & have no other diagnosis. There’s no way around it: Tests are being rationed due to the Administration’s mismanagement.(9/12)

    Right now we’re not truly defining the extent of the virus in communities. Short of a complete lockdown,we’re dependent on everyone exercising caution when they have even minor symptoms, to avoid infecting those most at risk of dying (elderly & those with chronic disease).(10/12)

    The only path forward is a massive testing regime ID’ing relatively healthy individuals who are infected.Only then can containment stop the spread in communities. And perhaps the more “walking well” positives we get, the more we can convince people that the threat is real.(11/12)

    To be blunt: Our ability to fight this virus has been seriously hurt by right-wing pundits & the President, who convinced people it’s “just a cold” and will go away “like that.” For us ER docs to do our job, those comments need to stop. And massive testing needs to start. /END.

    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    Do we have any logic-based-guesses on when the Virus is really gonna get going in the USA ? How soon before it gets rolling? Do we know?

    w
    v

    It’s hard to get good estimates because we aren’t doing enough testing. It could be rolling right now. We could be a couple weeks away from the peak. It’s hard to say. This disease has an estimated R0 of about 2.5 to 3.2, meaning one person with the disease infects between 2.5 and 3.2 others. Compare that with the seasonal flu which has an R0 of between 1 and 2. That means when COVID-19 begins rolling, it could really roll.

    Btw, we now have 3 positive patients in our small community hospital. That’s 3 positives in about 80 tests which doesn’t sound terrible, but 2 of those positives were in the last 10 tests. Shit might be about to get real.

    • This reply was modified 5 years, 12 months ago by Avatar photonittany ram.
    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    from This coronavirus is unlike anything in our lifetime, and we have to stop comparing it to the flu

    Business Insider

    https://www.yahoo.com/news/coronavirus-unlike-anything-lifetime-stop-201955346.html

    Our health care system doesn’t have the capacity to deal with this.

    Epidemiological experts keep talking about the need to “flatten the curve.” What they mean by that is that we need to slow the speed at which new cases are reported. We may not be able to stop the spread of the coronavirus, but we have to try to manage it. If 1,000 new cases happen over a month instead of a week, the health care system is more able to handle them.

    Here’s why this is a worry: Overall, our hospitals have fewer beds than other developed countries, according to recent data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The United States had 2.8 beds per 1,000 residents. By comparison, Germany had 8 beds and China 4.3 per 1,000.

    The United States looks better when it comes to intensive care beds, but there’s tremendous variation between regions and states. If we experience what parts of China and Italy saw, we won’t have anywhere for sick patients to go. We will quickly run out of capacity.

    Even if we have the capacity, we may not have enough supplies.

    In a crisis moment, supplies like ventilators and N95 face masks will be key. But as National Geographic and other media have reported, the United States has only a fraction of the medical supplies it needs.

    “Three hundred million respirators and face masks. That’s what the United States needs as soon as possible to protect health workers against the coronavirus threat. But the nation’s emergency stockpile has less than 15 percent of these supplies,” the magazine reported.

    Others have reported shortfalls as well, and ProPublica has been hearing from health care professionals across the country who say their own institutions are running short of supplies. (Share your story here.)

    U.S. Surgeon General Jerome Adams tweeted at the end of February, “Seriously people- STOP BUYING MASKS! They are NOT effective in preventing general public from catching #Coronavirus, but if healthcare providers can’t get them to care for sick patients, it puts them and our communities at risk!”

    Another challenge: Hospital staff have been exposed too.

    And if that weren’t enough, there’s another problem. Health care workers who have been exposed to the virus are now quarantining themselves, further reducing available staff at hospitals. Kaiser Health News reported on the effects of this:

    “In Vacaville, California, alone, one case — the first documented instance of community transmission in the U.S. — left more than 200 hospital workers under quarantine and unable to work for weeks.

    “Across California, dozens more health care workers have been ordered home because of possible contagion in response to more than 80 confirmed cases as of Sunday afternoon. In Kirkland, Washington, more than a quarter of the city’s fire department was quarantined after exposure to a handful of infected patients at the Life Care Center nursing home.”

    This week, Banner Health in Colorado informed employees that a co-worker is among those with the coronavirus, The Colorado Sun reported. “People who came into prolonged, close contact with the woman in a Banner Health emergency room are being notified and asked to home-quarantine for 14 days, according to a source close to the investigation who spoke to The Sun on the condition of anonymity.”

    And my ProPublica colleagues reported Friday how some EMS workers are also being quarantined because of exposure. (It didn’t help, of course, that the EMS system was slow to get up to speed on the threat.)

    More than that, many health care workers have children and as schools begin to close, they have to figure out how to care for their own families.

    People in rural areas will have little care nearby should they be affected by COVID-19.
    Rural areas in the U.S. are losing their hospitals entirely, and residents are having to travel hours for care. According to the Cecil G. Sheps Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 126 rural hospitals have closed since 2010, including six so far this year. That’s about 6%.

    An analysis by the Chartis Center for Rural Health and iVantage Health Analytics this year found that about a quarter of the nation’s 1,844 open rural hospitalsare vulnerable.

    As The Washington Post described it last year, “Hospitals like Fairfax Community [in Oklahoma] treat patients that are on average six years older and 40 percent poorer than those in urban hospitals, which means rural hospitals have suffered disproportionately from government cuts to Medicaid and Medicare reimbursement rates. They also treat a higher percentage of uninsured patients, resulting in unpaid bills and rising debts.

    “A record 46 percent of rural hospitals lost money last year. More than 400 are classified by health officials as being at ‘high risk of imminent failure.’ Hundreds more have cut services or turned over control to outside ownership groups in an attempt to stave off closure.”

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    They’ve Contained the Coronavirus. Here’s How.
    Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong have brought outbreaks under control — and without resorting to China’s draconian measures.

    March 13, 2020

    link https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/13/opinion/coronavirus-best-response.html

    HONG KONG — While the spread of Covid-19 is picking up speed in Europe and the United States, among other regions, the outbreaks in some countries in Asia seem to be under control.

    The epidemic in China appears to be slowing down after an explosion in cases followed by weeks of draconian control measures. And other locations have managed to avert any major outbreak by adopting far less drastic measures: for instance, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan.

    All have made some degree of progress, and yet each has adopted different sets of measures. So what, precisely, works to contain the spread of this coronavirus, and can that be implemented elsewhere now?

    In late January, after a sluggish — and problematic — initial response, the government of mainland China put in place unprecedented containment and social distancing measures. It locked down major cities, notably Wuhan, the epicenter of the outbreak, and imposed various travel restrictions throughout the country.

    The testing capacity of laboratories was rapidly expanded. To relieve pressure on hospitals, patients with milder symptoms were placed in temporary isolation facilities set up in gymnasiums and event halls. New hospitals were constructed.

    People who had come into contact with anyone infected were sent to designated facilities, typically converted hotels or hostels, for prophylactic quarantine. Home quarantine was advised only for those only at slight risk of infection.

    Initially, almost all residents of Wuhan and other affected cities were required to stay at home; schools and workplaces remained closed well after the end of the Lunar New Year festival, around Jan. 27.

    The scale of these measures has been extraordinary: Almost 60 million people were placed under lockdown in Hubei Province alone, and most factories in the province are expected to remain shut until March 20. The economic costs are enormous. Already in early February, about one-third of approximately 1,000 small and medium-size businesses interviewed for one survey said they had only enough cash to survive for a month.

    But the restrictions seemed to have worked to contain the spread of Covid-19 in China: The number of new cases reported every day is now consistently much lower than it was a few weeks ago.

    But lockdowns and forced quarantines on this scale or the nature of some methods — like the collection of mobile phone location data and facial recognition technology to track people’s movements — cannot readily be replicated in other countries, especially democratic ones with institutional protections for individual rights.

    And so Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong might be more instructive examples. All three places were especially vulnerable to the spread of the infection because of close links with mainland China — especially in early January, as they were prime destinations for Chinese travelers during the upcoming Lunar New Year holiday. And yet, after all three experienced outbreaks of their own, the situation seems to have stabilized.

    As of midday Friday, Singapore had 187 cases confirmed and no deaths (for a total population of about 5.7 million), Taiwan had 50 confirmed cases including 1 death (for a total population of about 23.6 million) and Hong Kong had 131 confirmed cases including 4 deaths (for a total population of about 7.5 million).

    Since identifying the first infections (all imported) on their territories — on Jan. 21 in Taiwan and on Jan. 23 in both Hong Kong and Singapore — all three governments have implemented some combination of measures to (1) reduce the arrival of new cases into the community (travel restrictions), (2) specifically prevent possible transmission between known cases and the local population (quarantines) and (3) generally suppress silent transmission in the community by reducing contact between individuals (self-isolation, social distancing, heightened hygiene). But each has had a different approach.

    Singapore, an island, could readily take aggressive measures to block the arrival of the infection from China — and it did. Three days after the Chinese authorities alerted the world about the outbreak in Wuhan, Singapore started referring inbound travelers from Wuhan with a fever and respiratory symptoms for further assessment and isolation. It was also one of the first countries to cancel all inbound flights from Wuhan after identifying its first imported case.

    Travelers coming from affected areas were placed under mandatory quarantine; three university hostels were promptly converted into facilities to host them. The government compensated individuals and employers for any workdays lost.

    The Singapore authorities undertook especially intensive efforts to trace the contacts of people known to be infected. Hospital staff went to great lengths to interview patients about their recent whereabouts; when information was unclear or unavailable, the Ministry of Health retrieved additional data from transport companies and hotels, including by consulting CCTV footage.

    Large gatherings have been suspended. But to minimize social and economic costs, schools and workplaces have remained open. The Singaporean Ministry of Education — on an extensive FAQs web page — calls the closing of schools “a major, major decision” that would “disrupt many lives.” Instead, students and staff are subjected to daily health checks, including temperature screenings.

    Public-health campaigns were also reinforced to further improve Singapore’s already exemplary standards of cleanliness and public hygiene. A special government task force recently recommended five personal hygiene habits:using a tissue when coughing or sneezing; using designated serving spoons during group meals; using trays when eating or drinking to limit contamination in case of spills; keeping public toilets clean and dry; and regular hand washing. From the outset, the government has recommended the use of masks only for people who already are unwell.

    Taiwan, also an island, took a slightly different tack. Instead of promptly banning travel from China, it undertook a comprehensive effort to screen newcomers from suspect areas. As soon as early January — just days after the news of the outbreak in Wuhan — Taiwanese medical authorities would board incoming flights from Wuhan and inspect and screen travelers on the planes.

    It was only after the first imported case was identified on Jan. 21 that four major airlines suspended flights between Taiwan and Wuhan. A ban on all but flights from Beijing, Shanghai, Xiamen and Chengdu was implemented three weeks later.

    Taiwan has also taken a rather mixed approach in its efforts to reduce transmission within the community.

    Some state-run facilities have been used for quarantines, but home quarantine has been the predominant method of isolation even when state facilities were available. To ensure compliance, the government has enforced strict penalties against anyone who breaks an isolation order, including fines up to about $33,200.

    Organizers of mass events were encouraged to defer or cancel events; some religious institutions suspended services. It was announced that elementary schools and high schools would remain closed after the end of the Lunar New Year holidays, but only for two weeks. In fact, classes resumed on Feb. 25.

    The Taiwanese authorities also oversaw the controlled distribution of surgical masks from existing stockpiles through community stores, having also fixed their price. Taiwan’s main health messages — “Wear a surgical mask when coughing or sneezing,” “Wash hands thoroughly with soap” and “Avoid crowded places, including hospitals” — were displayed prominently on the Centers for Disease Control’s website.

    As of Friday, about 58 percent of all confirmed cases in Taiwan were believed to have resulted from local transmission. This is an important marker of success for Taiwan’s containment strategy: In many other places, local cases outnumbered imported infections by a far greater margin.

    Hong Kong adopted yet another approach, presumably in part because, unlike Taiwan and Singapore, the city shares a border with mainland China and is formally part of China, as a Special Administrative Region. (An average of 300,000 people crossed the border every day last year.) The authorities here focused less on completely blocking the entry of possibly infected people into the territory than on preventing transmission within the community.

    On Jan. 3 — again, very soon after the first declared case in Wuhan — existing temperature-screening stations at ports of entry were expanded, and local clinicians were asked to report to the city’s health authorities any patient with a fever or acute respiratory symptoms and a history of recent travel to Wuhan.

    But it took five days after the first imported case for travel restrictions to be placed on visitors from Wuhan and other affected areas and for six of the territory’s 14 border crossings with the mainland to be closed. (Another five crossings were closed later.) The number of visitors to Hong Kong from mainland China fell to a daily average of 750 in February.

    Starting on Feb. 5, anyone coming across the border — or arriving from elsewhere who had been in mainland China in the preceding 14 days — was required to undergo a mandatory 14-day period of self-quarantine.

    Extensive efforts have also been made to track down and quarantine the close contacts of confirmed cases. And in the event transmission might occur before an infected person displayed any symptoms, tracing included all contacts starting two days before the onset of the patient’s illness.

    Of Hong Kong’s 40,000 hospital beds, some 1,000 are negative-pressure beds, allowing confirmed cases to be properly isolated. Holiday camps and newly constructed public-housing units that were still vacant were rapidly repurposed into quarantine facilities.

    As of March 12, 62 of the city’s 131 confirmed cases were thought to have resulted from close contact with other confirmed cases. More than 24,700 people were still under quarantine this week.

    Hong Kong has also deployed very extensive measures to encourage social distancing. As early as Jan. 28, many civil servants were asked to work from home for the following month. Most large-scale events have been canceled or postponed. On Jan. 27, all kindergartens and schools were closed until Feb. 16; the decision was extended several times, most recently to at least April 20. Many classes have been conducted online.

    Although it’s still not clear whether or how much children contract and spread Covid-19, they are known major contributors to the transmission of influenza, and Hong Kong has been effective in stemming outbreaks of the flu by suspending classes four times over the past 12 years (in 2008, 2009, 2018 and 2019). Closing schools is a very invasive measure, but Hong Kong has a social structure that helps cushion some of the burden: Many families with two working parents already rely on domestic helpers or grandparents for child care.

    The government has mounted a public-education campaign to promote hand hygiene and environmental hygiene. Nearly everyone in Hong Kong wears a face mask in public.

    And now, the caveats. Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as China, all had to contend with the SARS outbreak of 2002-3 and they internalized the lessons of that experience. Institutionally, this has meant, among other things, that they developed testing capacity for new viruses as well as hospitals’ ability to handle patients with novel respiratory pathogens. At the individual level, the experience of SARS has prepared people to voluntarily display a tremendous amount of self-discipline in, say, avoiding crowds and heightening their personal hygiene. These places were better equipped to face an outbreak of the new coronavirus than many others.

    At the same time, if the inroads Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong — China, too — have made against Covid-19 are promising, these gains also are fragile. These governments will need to keep at their containment measures for many more months or else risk a surge in infections. Taiwan seems especially vulnerable because it appears not to be testing people enough.

    The Chinese government has taken something of a victory lap recently, prematurely. But even it seems to know that, despite its bluster: Judging from bans China is now imposing on travelers from certain European countries, it is well aware that cases of infection could be reintroduced from abroad.

    Containment, however valiant an aim, also comes with very high costs, social and economic, and it might be an impossible goal for some countries, especially by now. In some places, Covid-19 could already be too widespread to be stopped. The vast majority of infections still appear to be mild, though; many might not even require medical attention. In such cases, it would be better to forgo trying to contain the disease and instead focus on mitigating its worst effects, for example, by concentrating resources on preventing an overwhelming surge in demand for hospital care, particularly intensive care.

    Still, the central point is this: Each in its own way, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong — three places with markedly different socioeconomic and political features — have been able to interrupt the chain of the disease’s transmission. And they have done so without embracing the highly disruptive, drastic measures adopted by China. Their success suggests that other governments can make headway, too.

    Avatar photozn
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    Italy’s Health Care System Groans Under Coronavirus — a Warning to the World
    In less than three weeks, the virus has overloaded hospitals in northern Italy, offering a glimpse of what countries face if they cannot slow the contagion.

    link https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/europe/12italy-coronavirus-health-care.html

    ROME — The mayor of one town complained that doctors were forced to decide not to treat the very old, leaving them to die. In another town, patients with coronavirus-caused pneumonia were being sent home. Elsewhere, a nurse collapsed with her mask on, her photograph becoming a symbol of overwhelmed medical staff.

    In less than three weeks, the coronavirus has overloaded the health care system all over northern Italy. It has turned the hard hit Lombardy region into a grim glimpse of what awaits countries if they cannot slow the spread of the virus and ‘‘flatten the curve’’ of new cases — allowing the sick to be treated without swamping the capacity of hospitals.

    If not, even hospitals in developed countries with the world’s best health care risk becoming triage wards, forcing ordinary doctors and nurses to make extraordinary decisions about who may live and who may die. Wealthy northern Italy is facing a version of that nightmare already.

    “This is a war,” said Massimo Puoti, the head of infectious medicine at Milan’s Niguarda hospital, one of the largest in Lombardy, the northern Italian region at the heart of the country’s coronavirus epidemic.

    He said the goal was to limit infections, stave off the epidemic and learn more about the nature of the enemy. “We need time.”

    This week Italy put in place draconian measures — restricting movement and closing all stores except for pharmacies, groceries and other essential services. But they did not come in time to prevent the surge of cases that has deeply taxed the capacity even of a well-regarded health care system.

    Italy’s experience has now underscored the need to act decisively — quickly and early — well before case numbers even appear to reach crisis levels. By that point, it may already be too late to prevent a spike in cases that stretches systems beyond their limits.

    With Italy having appeared to pass that threshold, its doctors are finding themselves in an extraordinary position largely unseen by developed European nations with public health care systems since the Second World War.

    Regular doctors are suddenly shifting to wartime footing. They face questions of triage as surgeries are canceled, respirators become rare resources, and officials propose converting abandoned exposition spaces into vast intensive care wards.

    Hospitals are erecting inflatable, sealed-off infectious disease tents on their grounds. In Brescia, patients are crowded into hallways.

    Get an informed guide to the global outbreak with our daily coronavirus newsletter.

    “We live in a system in which we guarantee health and the right of everyone to be cured,” Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte said on Monday as he announced the measures to keep Italians in their homes.

    “It’s a foundation, a pillar, and I’d say a characteristic of our system of civilization,” he said. “And thus we can’t allow ourselves to let our guard down.”

    For now, Italian public health experts argue that the system, while deeply challenged, is holding, and that all the thousands of people receiving tests, emergency room visits and intensive care, are getting it for free, keeping a central principle of Italian democracy intact.

    But before the region of Lombardy centralized its communication on Thursday and seemed to muzzle doctors and nurses who spoke out about the conditions, there emerged troubling pictures of life inside the trenches against the infection.

    A photo of one nurse, Elena Pagliarini, who collapsed face down with her mask on in a hospital in the northern town of Cremona after 10 straight hours of work, became a symbol of an overwhelmed system.

    “We are on our last legs, physically and physiologically,” Francesca Mangiatordi, a colleague who took the picture said on Italian television on Wednesday, urging people to protect themselves to avoid spreading the virus. “Otherwise the situation will collapse, provided it hasn’t already.”

    A doctor in a hospital in Bergamo this week posted on social media a graphic account of the stress on the health system by the overwhelming number of patients.

    “The war has literally exploded and battles are uninterrupted day and night,” the doctor, Daniele Macchini wrote, calling the situation an “epidemiological disaster” that has “overwhelmed” the doctors.

    Fabiano Di Marco, head of pulmonology at the Papa Giovanni XXIII hospital in Bergamo, where he has taken to sleeping in his office, said Thursday that doctors literally “draw a line on the ground to divide the clean part of the hospital from the dirty one,” where anything they touch is considered contagious.

    Giorgo Gori, the mayor of Bergamo, said that in some cases in Lombardy the gap between resources and the enormous influx of patients “forced the doctors to decide not to intubate some very old patients,” essentially leaving them to die.

    “Were there more intensive care units,” he added, “it would have been possible to save more lives.”

    Dr. Di Marco disputed the claim of his mayor, saying that everyone received care, though he added, “it is evident that in this moment, in some cases, it could happen that we have a comparative evaluation between patients.”

    On Thursday, Flavia Petrini, the president of the Italian College of Anesthesia, Analgesia, Resuscitation and Intensive Care, said her group had issued guidelines on what to do in a period that bordered on wartime “catastrophe medicine.”

    “In a context of grave shortage of health resources,” the guidelines say, intensive care should be given to “patients with the best chance of success” and those with the “best hope of life” should be prioritized.

    The guidelines also say that in “in the interests of maximizing benefits for the largest number,” limits could be put on intensive care units to reserve scarce resources to those who have, first, “greater likelihood of survival and secondly who have more potential years of life.”

    “No one is getting kicked out, but we’re offering criteria of priority,” Dr. Petrini said. “These choices are made in normal times, but what’s not normal is when you have to assist 600 people all at once.”

    Giulio Gallera, the Lombardy official leading the emergency response, said on Thursday that he hoped the guidelines never needed to be applied.

    He also said the region was working with Italy’s civil protection agency to study the possibility of using an exhibition space abandoned by canceled conventions as a 500-bed intensive care ward.

    But, he said, the region needed doctors, and respirators.

    “The outbreak has put hospitals under a stress that has no precedents since the Second World War,” said Massimo Galli, the director of infectious diseases at Milan’s Sacco University hospital, which is treating many of the coronavirus patients. “If the tide continues to rise, attempts to build dams to retain it will become increasingly difficult.”

    Dr. Galli pointed out that while the government’s emergency decrees had sought to boost the hiring of thousands of doctors and health workers — including medical residents in their last years of medical school — it took time to train new doctors, even those transferred from other departments, who had little experience with infectious diseases. Doctors are also highly exposed to contagion.

    Matteo Stocco, the director of the San Paolo and San Carlo hospitals in Milan, said 13 members of his staff were home after testing positive for the virus. One of his primary emergency room doctors was also infected, he said, “after three weeks of continuous work, day and night on the field.”

    Dr. Puoti, of Niguarda hospital, said the doctors kept distance from one another in the cafeteria, wore masks during staff meetings and avoided gathering in small rooms. Still, he said, some had been infected, which created the risk of greater personnel shortages.

    “We’re trying to keep a humanly sustainable level of work,” he said. “Because this thing is going to last.”

    He said the hospital was trying to buy more respirators and preparing for the possibility that patients would come not only from the surrounding towns, but because of a wave of infections in Milan.

    Dr. Stocco said that moment had already arrived.

    Fifty people showed up in the emergency room on Thursday afternoon with respiratory problems, he said. The hospital had already canceled surgeries and diverted beds and respirators to coronavirus patients, and doubled its intensive care capacity.

    “The infection is here,” he said.

    Carlo Palermo, president of the association representing Italy’s public hospital doctors, said the system had so far held up, despite years of budget cuts. It also helped, he said, that it was a public system. Had it been an insurance-based system, there would have been a “fragmented” response, he said.

    He said that since about 50 percent of the people who tested positive for the virus required some form of hospitalization, there was an obvious stress on the system. But the 10 percent needing intensive care, which requires between two and three weeks in the hospital, “can saturate the capacity of response.”

    Many experts have noted that if the wealthy and sophisticated northern Italian health care system cannot bear the brunt of the outbreak, it is highly unlikely that the poorer south would be able to cope.

    If the virus spread south at the same rate, Dr. Palermo said, “the system won’t hold up, and we won’t be able to assure care.”

    Many experts have warned that Italy is about 10 days ahead of other European countries in the development of its outbreak. Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany has raised the alarm that about 70 percent of Germans could get the virus.

    And reports of the overwhelmed Italian system have resonated in the United States, where President Trump closed flights to foreigners coming from Europe on Wednesday night.

    “The Italian disease is becoming a European disease and Trump, with his decision, is trying to avoid that this becomes an American disease,” said Romano Prodi, a former Italian prime minister and president of the European Union commission.

    “In any case I think that coronavirus is already also an American problem,” he said, adding that, because of the difference in the health care system, “it may be more serious than the European one.”

    #112269
    Cal
    Participant

    Italy 2.6%
    China 3.5%
    Iran 10.6%

    USA is currently at 2.7% We’ve only conducted 7000 tests TOTAL in the entire US thus far.

    We have ZERO handle on this, Drs are SCREAMING about symptomatic patients not being able to get tested and NO ONE knowing what to do if they clearly have COVID.

    It is entirely possible using the 70% threshold and just Iran’s numbers (ours could be substantially worse considering the federal and state responses), we’re looking at potentially 24.4M DEAD.

    As bad as Trump’s gov’t is handling the covid crisis, I think it’s unwise to think even 1 million people die in the US from Covid.

    The country is taking the virus seriously now with schools, sports, and events being cancelled. Even though our system is incredibly screwed up because of Trump, there’s still lots of professionals who will do a good job. The US probably won’t come close to doing as good as Germany and South Korea. But Germany has 4,000 cases and 8 deaths. Yes EIGHT!

    So this virus is hardly the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic where millions died.

    And you can bet that Trump will be crowing about how well he managed the crisis.

    Avatar photowv
    Participant

    This site is purty good on the basics, Invader. At least thats what I’ve been told. See the actual link. I just cut and pasted a bit of it.
    Its ‘mutating’ btw. Two distinct strains as of now, from what i read from a Doc on a message board.

    link:https://emcrit.org/ibcc/covid19/

    basics

    COVID-19 is a non-segmented, positive sense RNA virus.
    COVID-19 is part of the family of coronaviruses. This contains:
    (i) Four coronaviruses which are widely distributed and usually cause the common cold (but can cause viral pneumonia in patients with comorbidities).
    (ii) SARS and MERS – these caused epidemics with high mortality which are somewhat similar to COVID-19. COVID-19 is most closely related to SARS.
    It binds via the angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) receptor located on type II alveolar cells and intestinal epithelia (Hamming 2004).
    This is the same receptor as used by SARS (hence the technical name for the COVID-19, “SARS-CoV-2”).
    When considering possible therapies, SARS (a.k.a. “SARS-CoV-1”) is the most closely related virus to COVID-19.
    COVID-19 is mutating, which may complicate matters even further (figure below). Virulence and transmission will shift over times, in ways which we cannot predict. New evidence suggests that there are roughly two different groups of COVID-19. This explains why initial reports from Wuhan described a higher mortality than some more recent case series (Tang et al. 2020; Xu et al 2020).
    (Ongoing phylogenetic mapping of new strains can be found here.)
    ———–

    stages of illness ??

    There seem to be different stages of illness that patients may move through.
    (#1) Replicative stage – Viral replication occurs over a period of several days. An innate immune response occurs, but this response fails to contain the virus. Relatively mild symptoms may occur due to direct viral cytopathic effect and innate immune responses.
    (#2) Adaptive immunity stage – An adaptive immune response eventually kicks into gear. This leads to falling titers of virus. However, it may also increase levels of inflammatory cytokines and lead to tissue damage – causing clinical deterioration. There is a suggestion that this could lead to virus-induced hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis (HLH)(Mehta et al.). More discussion about this entity and possible therapy here.
    This progression may explain the clinical phenomenon wherein patients are relatively OK for several days, but then suddenly deteriorate when they enter the adaptive immunity stage (e.g. Young et al. 3/3/2020).
    This has potentially important clinical implications:
    Initial clinical symptoms aren’t necessarily predictive of future deterioration. Sophisticated strategies may be required to guide risk-stratification and disposition (see below section on prognosis).
    Anti-viral therapies might need to be deployed early to work optimally (during the replicative stage).
    Immunosuppressive therapy (e.g. low-dose steroid) might be best initiated during the adaptive immune stage (with a goal of blunting this immunopathologic response slightly, in the sickest patients). But this is purely speculative.

    transmission

    (back to contents)
    large droplet transmission

    COVID-19 transmission can occur via large droplet transmission (with a risk limited to ~6 feet from the patient)(Carlos del Rio 2/28).
    This is typical for respiratory viruses such as influenza.
    Transmission via large droplet transmission can be prevented by using a standard surgical-style mask.

    airborne transmission ??

    It’s controversial whether COVID19 can be transmitted via an airborne route (small particles which remain aloft in the air for longer periods of time). Airborne transmission would imply the need for N95 masks (“FFP2” in Europe), rather than surgical masks. This controversy is explored further in Shiu et al 2019.
    Airborne precautions started being used with MERS and SARS out of an abundance of caution (rather than any clear evidence that coronaviruses are transmitted via an airborne route). This practice has often been carried down to COVID19.
    Guidelines disagree about whether to use airborne precautions:
    The Canadian Guidelines and World Health Organization guidelines both recommend using only droplet precautions for routine care of COVID19 patients. However, both of these guidelines recommend airborne precautions for procedures which generate aerosols (e.g. intubation, noninvasive ventilation, CPR, bag-mask ventilation, and bronchoscopy).
    The United States CDC recommends using airborne precautions all the time when managing COVID19 patients.
    Using airborne precautions for all patients who are definitely or potentially infected with COVID19 will likely result in rapid depletion of N95 masks. This will leave healthcare providers unprotected when they actually need these masks for aerosol-generating procedures.
    In the context of a pandemic, the Canadian and WHO guidelines may be more sensible in countries with finite resources (i.e. most locales). However, infection control is ultimately local, so be sure to follow your hospital’s guidance regarding this.

    contact transmission (“fomite-to-face”)

    This mode of transmission has a tendency to get overlooked, but it may be incredibly important. This is how it works:
    (i) Someone with coronavirus coughs, emitting large droplets containing the virus. Droplets settle on surfaces in the room, creating a thin film of coronavirus. The virus may be shed in nasal secretions as well, which could be transmitted to the environment.
    (ii) The virus persists on fomites in the environment. Human coronaviruses can survive on surfaces for up to about a week (Kampf et al 2020). It’s unknown how long COVID-19 can survive in the environment, but it might be even longer (some animal coronaviruses can survive for weeks!).
    (iii) Someone else touches the contaminated the surface hours or days later, transferring the virus to their hands.
    (iv) If the hands touch a mucous membrane (eyes, nose, or mouth), this may transmit the infection.
    Any effort to limit spread of the virus must block contact transmission. The above chain of events can be disrupted in a variety of ways:
    (a) Regular cleaning of environmental surfaces (e.g. using 70% ethanol or 0.5% sodium hypochlorite solutions; for details see Kampf et al 2020 and CDC guidelines).
    (b) Hand hygiene (high concentration ethanol neutralizes the virus and is easy to perform, so this might be preferable if hands aren’t visibly soiled)(Kampf 2017).
    (c) Avoidance of touching your face. This is nearly impossible, as we unconsciously touch our faces constantly. The main benefit of wearing a surgical mask could be that the mask acts as a physical barrier to prevent touching the mouth or nose.
    Any medical equipment could become contaminated with COVID-19 and potentially transfer virus to providers (e.g. stethoscope earpieces and shoes). A recent study found widespread deposition of COVID-19 in one patient’s room, but fortunately this seems to be removable by cleaning with sodium dichloroisocyanurate (Ong et al 2020).

    when can transmission occur?

    (#1) Asymptomatic transmission (in people with no or minimal symptoms) appears to be possible (Carlos del Rio 2/28).
    (#2) Transmission appears to occur over roughly ~8 days following the initiation of illness.
    Patients may continue to have positive pharyngeal PCR for weeks after convalescence (Lan 2/27). However, virus culture methods are unable to recover viable virus after ~8 days of clinical illness (Wolfel 2020). This implies that prolonged PCR positivity probably doesn’t correlate with clinical virus transmission. However, all subjects in Wolfel et al. had mild illness, so it remains possible that prolonged transmission could occur in more severe cases.
    CDC guidance is vague on how long patients with known COVID-19 should be isolated. It may be advisable to obtain two paired RT-PCR tests (one of the nasopharynx and one of the pharynx), with each pair collected >24 hours apart, prior to discontinuing precautions.

    R⌀

    R⌀ is the average number of people that an infected person transmits the virus to.
    If R⌀ is <1, the epidemic will burn out.
    If R⌀ = 1, then epidemic will continue at a steady pace.
    If R⌀ >1, the epidemic will increase exponentially.
    Current estimates put R⌀ at ~2.5-2.9 (Peng PWH et al, 2/28). This is a bit higher than seasonal influenza.
    R⌀ is a reflection of both the virus and also human behavior. Interventions such as social distancing and improved hygiene will decrease R⌀.
    Control of spread of COVID-19 in China proves that R⌀ is a modifiable number that can be reduced by effective public health interventions.
    The R⌀ on board the Diamond Princess cruise ship was 15 – illustrating that cramped quarters with inadequate hygiene will increase R⌀ (Rocklov 2/28).

    Avatar photonittany ram
    Moderator

    I read that even as more test kits come in, our facilities can run only about 1,000 tests/day anyway.

    But since there is nothing much that can be done for patients apart from IVs and comfort care, I’m not sure testing really makes that much difference. I don’t know what can be done except for everyone to stay away from crowds, wash hands all the time, and stop breathing.

    I hope RBG is in a bubble tent.

    Not testing from the beginning is where we really dropped the ball. Testing early and often is how you stop an outbreak in its tracks. It allows you to find and contain infected people before the disease gets into the community. Once its in the community, the opportunity to contain it is lost, as zn’s article says.

    Gearing up for this outbreak has been a nightmare for my small community hospital. We are not staffed well enough to deal with the logistics of coordinating the billion moving parts involved in this. We send the covid-19 specimens we collect to the VT Dept of Health Lab. I’ve been there for meetings and seminars many times. It is a brand new and modern lab but they are also not staffed to deal with this. Tensions are high. I got in a shouting match with the state’s Public Health Compliance chief over the phone when they decided we could no longer send specimens in the manner they initially requested. There I was with 20 specimens from suspected covid-19 patients that the state lab was telling me they wouldn’t accept. As it turns out, one of those specimens was positive for the covid virus (SARS-COV-2). It was the first positive specimen in VT.

    Of course, testing isn’t perfect and a negative result does not ensure the patient isn’t infected. In the beginning when they were trying to determine the best way to test for the virus, the CDC recommended that we collect lower respiratory cultures (sputum or bronchial lavage), upper respiratory specimens (nasopharyngeal swab, oropharyngeal swab, and nasal wash), and a stool and urine specimen in case additional testing was necessary. That’s a lot of specimens to be collecting and testing. As it turns out, the best results come from sputum and the lavage. The problem is, a productive cough isn’t a typical symptom so sputum is often hard to come by, and you can’t collect a lavage (flood the lungs with saline and suck up the contents) easily especially when you are talking about dozens of people a day. So they settled on the nasopharyngeal (NP) and oropharyngeal (OP) swabs and winnowed that down further to just the NP swab. Remember that patient who tested positive? He was tested early on when we were still collecting multiple specimens from all those different sources. We were able to get a sputum from him, so we sent it along with an NP swab, OP swab, and nasal wash to the state lab for testing. The sputum and nasal wash came back positive. The NP and OP swabs were negative. The NP swab is now the specimen of choice, but if that was all that we had sent, we might not know we had a patient with covid-19. Don’t get me wrong, testing is still effective and necessary in dealing with this outbreak, but as I said before, it’s not perfect.

    #112233
    Mackeyser
    Moderator

    Worst possible president at potentially the worst possible time.

    Merkel recently told Germans that 70% of their country could catch the virus. Its lethality rate hasn’t been determined yet, but the usual estimates are somewhere between 1-4% of those who contract it. If just a quarter of Americans catch it, we could be looking at well over a million fatalities here.

    Trump has lied about all of this from Day One, seeing it as a crisis for himself, his reelection, Wall Street and Corporate America, not as a public health crisis. He isn’t even trying to hide this, except in his scripted speeches, and even in those, he keeps lying about the science.

    At this point, I almost don’t care who the Dem nominee is. They could run a ham sandwich and the nation would be better off, if the ham sandwich beats Trump. We won’t be proactively better off, of course. It’s a matter of “less damage.” But I prefer that to more damage.

    Regardless, this is really one of those proverbial “chickens coming home to roost” moments. The deadly combo of capitalism and right-wing ideology, weaponized by both major parties, has left us largely without the tools we need to cope with this. Centuries of gaslighting about its supposed wonders, while it’s worked to destroy our capacity to act collectively to solve the crises it (capitalism and wingnuttery) creates.

    We’re hollowed out. We’re gutted. Our Commons is in tatters. But our ethos remains “I got mine, go fuck yourself!!”

    At a moment when we need to do a 180° on that ethos, etc. etc.

    Italy 2.6%
    China 3.5%
    Iran 10.6%

    USA is currently at 2.7% We’ve only conducted 7000 tests TOTAL in the entire US thus far.

    We have ZERO handle on this, Drs are SCREAMING about symptomatic patients not being able to get tested and NO ONE knowing what to do if they clearly have COVID.

    It is entirely possible using the 70% threshold and just Iran’s numbers (ours could be substantially worse considering the federal and state responses), we’re looking at potentially 24.4M DEAD.

    In order for us to remain at 2.7%, we’d need to RADICALLY shift the entire healthcare system to addressing this as they did in Italy and China.

    But we won’t. Which is why so many are gonna die.

    If you look at what this looks like for countries that are ahead of us in this by a few weeks, it’s literally the stuff of nightmares.

    That’s it. Nightmares.

    Sports is the crucible of human virtue. The distillate remains are human vice.

    Avatar photoZooey
    Moderator

    I read that even as more test kits come in, our facilities can run only about 1,000 tests/day anyway.

    But since there is nothing much that can be done for patients apart from IVs and comfort care, I’m not sure testing really makes that much difference. I don’t know what can be done except for everyone to stay away from crowds, wash hands all the time, and stop breathing.

    I hope RBG is in a bubble tent.

    Avatar photozn
    Moderator

    Notes from UCSF Expert panel – March 10

    University of California, San Francisco BioHub Panel on COVID-19

    https://www.linkedin.com/content-guest/article/notes-from-ucsf-expert-panel-march-10-dr-jordan-shlain-m-d-/

    March 10, 2020

    Panelists
    Joe DeRisi: UCSF’s top infectious disease researcher. Co-president of ChanZuckerberg BioHub (a JV involving UCSF / Berkeley / Stanford). Co-inventor of the chip used in SARS epidemic.
    Emily Crawford: COVID task force director. Focused on diagnostics
    Cristina Tato: Rapid Response Director. Immunologist.
    Patrick Ayescue: Leading outbreak response and surveillance. Epidemiologist.
    Chaz Langelier: UCSF Infectious Disease doc

    What’s below are essentially direct quotes from the panelists. I bracketed the few things that are not quotes.

    Top takeaways
    At this point, we are past containment. Containment is basically futile. Our containment efforts won’t reduce the number who get infected in the US.
    Now we’re just trying to slow the spread, to help healthcare providers deal with the demand peak. In other words, the goal of containment is to “flatten the curve”, to lower the peak of the surge of demand that will hit healthcare providers. And to buy time, in hopes a drug can be developed.
    How many in the community already have the virus? No one knows.
    We are moving from containment to care.
    We in the US are currently where at where Italy was a week ago. We see nothing to say we will be substantially different.
    40-70% of the US population will be infected over the next 12-18 months. After that level you can start to get herd immunity. Unlike flu this is entirely novel to humans, so there is no latent immunity in the global population.
    [We used their numbers to work out a guesstimate of deaths— indicating about 1.5 million Americans may die. The panelists did not disagree with our estimate. This compares to seasonal flu’s average of 50K Americans per year. Assume 50% of US population, that’s 160M people infected. With 1% mortality rate that’s 1.6M Americans die over the next 12-18 months.]
    The fatality rate is in the range of 10X flu.
    This assumes no drug is found effective and made available.
    The death rate varies hugely by age. Over age 80 the mortality rate could be 10-15%. [See chart by age Signe found online, attached at bottom.]
    Don’t know whether COVID-19 is seasonal but if is and subsides over the summer, it is likely to roar back in fall as the 1918 flu did
    I can only tell you two things definitively. Definitively it’s going to get worse before it gets better. And we’ll be dealing with this for the next year at least. Our lives are going to look different for the next year.
    What should we do now? What are you doing for your family?
    Appears one can be infectious before being symptomatic. We don’t know how infectious before symptomatic, but know that highest level of virus prevalence coincides with symptoms. We currently think folks are infectious 2 days before through 14 days after onset of symptoms (T-2 to T+14 onset).
    How long does the virus last?
    On surfaces, best guess is 4-20 hours depending on surface type (maybe a few days) but still no consensus on this
    The virus is very susceptible to common anti-bacterial cleaning agents: bleach, hydrogen peroxide, alcohol-based.
    Avoid concerts, movies, crowded places.
    We have cancelled business travel.
    Do the basic hygiene, eg hand washing and avoiding touching face.
    Stockpile your critical prescription medications. Many pharma supply chains run through China. Pharma companies usually hold 2-3 months of raw materials, so may run out given the disruption in China’s manufacturing.
    Pneumonia shot might be helpful. Not preventative of COVID-19, but reduces your chance of being weakened, which makes COVID-19 more dangerous.
    Get a flu shot next fall. Not preventative of COVID-19, but reduces your chance of being weakened, which makes COVID-19 more dangerous.
    We would say “Anyone over 60 stay at home unless it’s critical”. CDC toyed with idea of saying anyone over 60 not travel on commercial airlines.
    We at UCSF are moving our “at-risk” parents back from nursing homes, etc. to their own homes. Then are not letting them out of the house. The other members of the family are washing hands the moment they come in.
    Three routes of infection
    Hand to mouth / face
    Aerosol transmission
    Fecal oral route
    What if someone is sick?
    If someone gets sick, have them stay home and socially isolate. There is very little you can do at a hospital that you couldn’t do at home. Most cases are mild. But if they are old or have lung or cardio-vascular problems, read on.
    If someone gets quite sick who is old (70+) or with lung or cardio-vascular problems, take them to the ER.
    There is no accepted treatment for COVID-19. The hospital will give supportive care (eg IV fluids, oxygen) to help you stay alive while your body fights the disease. ie to prevent sepsis.
    If someone gets sick who is high risk (eg is both old and has lung/cardio-vascular problems), you can try to get them enrolled for “compassionate use” of Remdesivir, a drug that is in clinical trial at San Francisco General and UCSF, and in China. Need to find a doc there in order to ask to enroll. Remdesivir is an anti-viral from Gilead that showed effectiveness against MERS in primates and is being tried against COVID-19. If the trials succeed it might be available for next winter as production scales up far faster for drugs than for vaccines. [More I found online.]
    Why is the fatality rate much higher for older adults?
    Your immune system declines past age 50
    Fatality rate tracks closely with “co-morbidity”, ie the presence of other conditions that compromise the patient’s hearth, especially respiratory or cardio-vascular illness. These conditions are higher in older adults.
    Risk of pneumonia is higher in older adults.
    What about testing to know if someone has COVID-19?
    Bottom line, there is not enough testing capacity to be broadly useful. Here’s why.
    Currently, there is no way to determine what a person has other than a PCR test. No other test can yet distinguish “COVID-19 from flu or from the other dozen respiratory bugs that are circulating”.
    A Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test can detect COVID-19’s RNA. However they still don’t have confidence in the test’s specificity, ie they don’t know the rate of false negatives.
    The PCR test requires kits with reagents and requires clinical labs to process the kits.
    While the kits are becoming available, the lab capacity is not growing.
    The leading clinical lab firms, Quest and Labcore have capacity to process 1000 kits per day. For the nation.
    Expanding processing capacity takes “time, space, and equipment.” And certification. ie it won’t happen soon.
    UCSF and UCBerkeley have donated their research labs to process kits. But each has capacity to process only 20-40 kits per day. And are not clinically certified.
    Novel test methods are on the horizon, but not here now and won’t be at any scale to be useful for the present danger.
    How well is society preparing for the impact?
    Local hospitals are adding capacity as we speak. UCSF’s Parnassus campus has erected “triage tents” in a parking lot. They have converted a ward to “negative pressure” which is needed to contain the virus. They are considering re-opening the shuttered Mt Zion facility.
    If COVID-19 affected children then we would be seeing mass departures of families from cities. But thankfully now we know that kids are not affected.
    School closures are one the biggest societal impacts. We need to be thoughtful before we close schools, especially elementary schools because of the knock-on effects. If elementary kids are not in school then some hospital staff can’t come to work, which decreases hospital capacity at a time of surging demand for hospital services.
    Public Health systems are prepared to deal with short-term outbreaks that last for weeks, like an outbreak of meningitis. They do not have the capacity to sustain for outbreaks that last for months. Other solutions will have to be found.
    What will we do to handle behavior changes that can last for months?
    Many employees will need to make accommodations for elderly parents and those with underlying conditions and immune-suppressed.
    Kids home due to school closures
    [Dr. DeRisi had to leave the meeting for a call with the governor’s office. When he returned we asked what the call covered.] The epidemiological models the state is using to track and trigger action. The state is planning at what point they will take certain actions. ie what will trigger an order to cease any gatherings of over 1000 people.
    Where do you find reliable news?
    The John Hopkins Center for Health Security site. Which posts daily updates. The site says you can sign up to receive a daily newsletter on COVID-19 by email.
    The New York Times is good on scientific accuracy.

    Observations on China
    Unlike during SARS, China’s scientists are publishing openly and accurately on COVID-19.
    While China’s early reports on incidence were clearly low, that seems to trace to their data management systems being overwhelmed, not to any bad intent.
    Wuhan has 4.3 beds per thousand while US has 2.8 beds per thousand. Wuhan built 2 additional hospitals in 2 weeks. Even so, most patients were sent to gymnasiums to sleep on cots.
    Early on no one had info on COVID-19. So China reacted in a way unique modern history, except in wartime.
    Every few years there seems another: SARS, Ebola, MERS, H1N1, COVID-19. Growing strains of antibiotic resistant bacteria. Are we in the twilight of a century of medicine’s great triumph over infectious disease?
    “We’ve been in a back and forth battle against viruses for a million years.”
    But it would sure help if every country would shut down their wet markets.
    As with many things, the worst impact of COVID-19 will likely be in the countries with the least resources, eg Africa. See article on Wired magazine on sequencing of virus from Cambodia.

    #112190
    waterfield
    Participant

    Column: Why sleepy Joe Biden is exactly what voters want
    Joe Biden
    Joe Biden campaigns in Philadelphia.(Mandel Ngan / AFP-Getty Images )
    By VIRGINIA HEFFERNAN
    MARCH 12, 20209 AM
    One candidate inspired a stampede of voters on Tuesday. He also managed, for the time being, to take big money out of politics.

    But it wasn’t Sen. Bernie Sanders. The Bellwether of Burlington promised to do these things, but in the end, he wasn’t the one who got the big turnout without the big bucks. It was former Vice President Joe Biden, a hoary has-been who reps what Sanders likes to call the “corporate wing of the Democratic Party.”

    Once upon a time, Biden may have embraced that role. Decades ago, the first time he ran for president, he was an ace fundraiser — a sweetheart of the DNC, till that campaign fizzled and he was proclaimed the “once hot” Democrat in a news headline. This time he started with an exceedingly modest war chest and low expectations, only to build something more than momentum out of thin air.

    It should be said that the Biden of 2020 didn’t try to run without big money. He probably wouldn’t have been averse to a lot of sweet corporate windfalls. And don’t expect him to turn them down now. They just didn’t come his way early on. Before his victories on Tuesday, he’d raised about $76 million to Sanders’s $134 million in grassroots donations.

    ADVERTISING

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    No wonder Biden’s touching but rattletrap campaign has had all the hallmarks of involuntary thrift. He didn’t just fail to appear in several primary states; in many, his campaign barely set up card tables. And the Biden comms efforts are still so threadbare that even his fundraising emails look like they come from cardboard boxes stamped “1987.” (We must have those bumper stickers blasting Reaganomics around here somewhere.)

    Biden hasn’t even paid an agency to develop a snappy hashtag. #IAmTiredAndDontHaveAnyMoney, in fact, might have been the campaign’s default theme till about a week ago. At least it’s relatable.

    But, money or no, and razzle-dazzle or no, Biden voters have showed up. Biden added four of the six Tuesday night states to his win column, including the big prize, Michigan, and as of Wednesday, he had pulled ahead in Washington, which is still counting votes. All those victories followed his Super Tuesday blowout: Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Arkansas, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Texas and Maine.

    There is a theoretical “path forward” for Sanders, but Biden seems to be the presumptive nominee now. It says something that President Trump, when he’s not producing COVID-19 covfefe on Twitter and from the Oval Office, is back to attacking him. Even Sanders, who announcedhe would stay in at least through Sunday’s debate, admits that Biden may be winning the “electability” contest.

    Which brings us to turnout. The Sanders campaign regularly prophesied that new voters — voters who grew up with student debt, bank failures, rapacious capitalism and endless wars — would be impelled to the polls by the promises of a revolution that would lift up the working class.

    That prediction missed the mark, but Tuesday’s polling places were hardly empty. Indeed, there was record-breaking turnout, especially in Michigan. It’s just that the votes were cast for Biden, from a formidable group now considered Biden’s coalition: African Americans, suburban women and non-college-educated whites.

    It’s admittedly hard to imagine Biden spiking anyone’s adrenaline. He’s low-key in the extreme on the stump. He’s regularly praised for “humility” now — an odd quality for a presidential candidate, from whom voters usually want dreams, ambitions, plans, pep rallies.

    But for a country suffering from tinnitus after four years of a headbanger president, Biden’s quietude is welcome.

    Election forecaster and political scientist Rachel Bitecofer calls the powerful force that keeps prospective voters away from the polls “comfort.” When choosing a candidate, you ask yourself for whom (and for what) you’re going to forfeit your comfort — get a babysitter, change clothes, jump on a bus and stand in line at a polling place, or even make sure a mail-in ballot gets to the registrar on time. For decades, Democrats have given one answer: a dreamy candidate who makes their hearts race.

    Not this time. If Democrats have long been accused of wanting “savior” presidents — and staking everything on presidential elections while ignoring the rest — this election may mark a turning point.

    If the Biden wave is any indication, Democrats are no longer looking for that kind of perfection. They’ll settle for a break from the jackhammer noise — from Trump, from Michael Bloomberg, from Sanders, from cable news, from their bloviating relatives, from Twitter.

    The lesson going into next week’s primaries seems to be that voters will give up “comfort” because their situation now is not all that comfortable. Discomfort is ever-present even when we’re at home on the sofa self-quarantined with our hand sanitizer. A virus is stalking the planet. Kids are shut out of schools. Our savings are plummeting. The president is disturbed, senseless and tyrannical.

    What’s driving turnout now, and what will drive it in November, isn’t infatuation with a savior. We aren’t head over heels. We aren’t buying Big Ideas. We’ll move heaven and earth to get to the polls, to turn in our ballots, because we want to stop tossing and turning and get some sleep again.

    And sleepy Joe is just the guy for bedtime stories and lullabies.

    @page88

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